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A.

I. INTRODUCTION

Under California law, property that is by statutory definition 1
community or separate property of husband (H) or wife (W) may
be changed into another form of ownership by a contract between
the spouses or by a gift made by one to the other. The term
"transmutation" 2 is generally used to refer to changes in ownership rights in marital property3 that depart from the ordinary
1. The primary definitional statutes are CAi. Crv. CODE §§ 5107, 5108, 5110
(West Supp. 1980).
2. See, e.g., W. REPPY, CoMMuNITY PROPERTY IN CALuiORNIA 29 (1980); W.
REPPY & W. DE FUNiAK, CormNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 421 (Ist ed.

1975).
3. This article uses the term "marital property" to mean all community property and the separate property of both spouses. See Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554
S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977); Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961). In California, quasi-community property is usually a type of separate property (although
it apparently can be community where the pre-California domicile was a commu-

rules of classification.
The freedom of contract enjoyed by California spouses 4 also
empowers them to alter the principles of management and control
of marital property contained in the statutes without altering the
ownership of marital property.5 Since the right of creditors to
reach marital property generally follows management and control
in California, 6 this latter type of agreement can be as significant
in a creditors' rights case as an agreement altering ownership.
Nevertheless, to distinguish the two types of agreements, the
term transmutation is used in this article to refer solely to agreements altering ownership. The term "management agreement" is
used to refer to the other type of contract between spouses.
This article observes that usually no formalities, such as a
signed writing or recordation, are required for a transmutation or
management agreement to be binding between H and W. The little authority that is on point also suggests that the informal transmutation is binding on third parties, including creditors and
transferees for value, unless actual or constructive fraud is established. In assessing the creditors' rights issue, the article notes
some uncertainty in pre-existing California law as to liability for
debts of various types of marital property even in the absence of
transmutation. Clarifying legislation is proposed including statutes addressed to liability of parties to a void or voidable mar7
riage and parties living in a Marvin relationship.
The article suggests that if the transmutation is to bind creditors, it may be desirable to change the statutes to require both a
writing and recordation. It is noted that until 1980 there was such
a statutory procedure to ensure a public record in cases where
nity property state) and hence is part of the "marital property." See

CAL. Crv.
CODE § 4803 (West Supp. 1980). In the case of parties to an invalid marriage, "marital property" includes quasi-marital property (as defined in CAl. Civ. CODE § 4452
(West Supp. 1980)) and "pure" separate property (i.e., that which is not quasimarital). See Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976).
4. See, e.g., CAL. CrV. CODE § 5103 (West Supp. 1980).
5. See HuIsman v. Ireland, 205 Cal. 345, 270 P. 948 (1928) (W acquired power
by arrangement with statutory manager H to run a community business); see also
Althof v. Conheim, 38 Cal. 230, 99 Am.Dec. 363 (1869); Meyer v. Thomas, 37 Cal.
App. 2d 720, 100 P.2d 360 (1940). Currently the primary statutes concerning management power are CA.CrV. CODE §§ 5107-5108 (West 1970) (separate property),
and §§ 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1980) (community property).
6. See, e.g., Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 111 P.2d 641 (1941); Estate
of Hirsh, 122 Cal. App. 2d 822, 265 P.2d 920 (1954); W. REPPY, supra note 2, at 209.
7. This term is used to describe a man and a woman cohabiting together
without any attempt to marry but under such circumstances that one or more of
the remedies given one cohabitor against the other in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d
660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), are available. This type of relationship
was formerly called "meretricious." E.g., Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359,
362-63, 270 P.2d 69, 70 (1954).
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what would ordinarily be W's community earnings were converted into her separate property because she functioned as a
"sole trader." The article recommends enactment of a somewhat
similar procedure for public recordation of transmutation agreements if they are to be binding on creditors. The new law should
be applicable to husbands as well as wives and to transmutations
affecting the income of salaried persons, income from partnerships and corporate stock, etc., as well as income of individual entrepreneurs.
With one type of transmutation--community to joint tenancyeven when there is a writing there frequently is litigation over
whether the spouses actually intended to change the community
character of the property. Often the spouses appear to intend
merely to engraft a right of survivorship onto community ownership, creating a type of concurrent ownership not now recognized
in California. To reduce litigation in this area and further the policies of freedom of contract, this article proposes enactment of
legislation recognizing a hybrid community-property joint-tenancy form of ownership for married persons.
U.
A.

"EASY" TRANSmUTATION UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW

Ownership Controlled by Source of Acquisition, not "Title"
1.

Civil Law Roots

California community property has its roots in the civil law of
Spain and Mexico, specifically in the marital property regime
8
called sociedad de gananciales.
Three aspects of this civilian
marital property system are important to the development of California transmutation law. First, the central concept of co-ownership by H and W of the earnings of each during marriage and of
the rents and profits of the separate property of each accruing
during marriage 9 made it highly impracticable to determine own8. See Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1803: Sociedad de
Gananciales,30 LA. L. REV. 1 (1969).
9. See W. DE FUNIAX & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLEs OF COMMUurrY PROPERTY § 71
(2d ed. 1971); 1 FEBRERO MECANO tit. B, capitulo X, §§ 1, 9 (E. Tapia ed. 1834);
Pugh, supra note 8, at 8-10.
In California the initial statutory scheme made the rents and profits accruing
during marriage from one spouse's separate wealth community property. As ap-

plied to W's separate capital, this was held violative of the provision of the 1849
California constitution that assures a married woman the right to own property
separately from her husband in George v. Ransom, 15 Cal. 322 (1860) (an errone-

ership rights based on paper "title." For example, if H, in exchange for his labor, were granted some asset by way of a
document of title, the grantor might well put the "title" in H's
name, rather than in the names of H and W. Yet because of the
source of the acquisition-in exchange for labor by a spouse during marriage'O -the acquisition was unquestionably community
property. Likewise if H owned as his separate property the
equivalent of a block of corporate stock under contemporary securities law, any documents evidencing payment of dividends
would logically refer to H as the owner. A dividend check would
be made payable to him, the payor being unconcerned about his
marital status and knowing only that H was the owner of the
stock. Again, at civil law the dividend was community owned.
The second aspect of civil law bearing on development of California transmutation law was that H was practically the exclusive
manager of the community property." Since he was the one with
power to alienate an asset owned in community, there was little
reason to put W's name as co-owner on a document of title. Indeed, adding W's name on a document of title might have caused
confusion and inconvenience by suggesting to a third party dealing with H that W's interest was her separate property (e.g., the
what we would now call tenancy in common)
ownership was in"
which she alone might convey. Also in situations where W performed services during marriage and thereby earned ownership
of an asset granted to her with documents of title, she might reasonably have directed the grantor to place H's name on the document of title to facilitate his management of the asset without any
ous decision because the context of the constitutional provision made clear that
the Spanish-Mexican rather than the English common law concept of separate

property was being adopted). Since George California has maintained an "Americanized" regime of community property in which rents and profits of separate
property are also separate (unless and until transmuted into community property). See CAL. CrV. CODE §§ 5107, 5108 (West 1970).
10. Unlike present California law, see CAl. Crv. CODE § 5118 (West Supp.
1980), onerous acquisitions by spouses living separate and apart were nevertheless

community property. See 1 FEBRERO

MEJicANo,

supra note 9, at § 3. However, if

one of the spouses was at fault in bringing about the separation and the other
spouse was innocent, all post-separation gains of the innocent spouse were his or
her separate property although the gains by the "guilty" party were community.
Pugh, supra note 8, at 3; W. DE FuNLA & M. VAuGHN, supra note 9,at § 1P9 (observing that the sexist standards of Spanish law made it easy for- W tc be at
"fault" but not H).
11. See 1 FEBRERO MEJICANo, supra note 9, at §§ 19-20 (observing that W did
have control over small sums of community property so that she could make small
gifts to the poor and purchase feminine clothing and adornments); Pugh, supra
note 8, at 12-14; W. DE FuNiAx & M. VAu GE, supra note 9, at § 113; Vaughn, The
Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions,19 BAYLOR I. REV.
20, 46-47 (1967).
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intention of making a gift to him by changing the ownership to his

separate property.
Third, at civil law a married woman was not afeme covert but
was recognized as an individual who could enter into her own
contracts including contracts with her husband.12 W could renounce her interest in all or portions of the community, as could
H.13 By marriage contract, the spouses could agree to live wholly

separate in property or to limit the scope of the community. Also
at Spanish law when the sociedad de gananciales developed,
marriage contracts could be changed during marriage.' 4 Thus, at
least formal transactions that would today be viewed as transmutations were sanctioned because the law recognized W as having

capacity to contract despite her married status.
2. Peculiar Pre-1927 California Marital Property System
The significance of the civil law roots in development of the
transmutation doctrine in California is clouded by the fact that

before 1927 California was not really a community property jurisdiction. The state constitution of 1849 contained a provision call-

ing for legislation relating to property "held in common" by H and
W.15 It is very clear from the debates that this provision intended

to continue Spanish-Mexican marital property law then in

effect.16

The earliest legislation and court decisions, nevertheless, employed English common law principles with the exception that W
12. Vaughn, supra note 11, at 67-68; W. DE FurIAK & MLVAUGHN, supra note 9,
at § 333. But see id. § 140 (Spanish law greatly restricted the power of one spouse
to give his property to the other, probably to protect rights for forced heirship unknown in the United States outside of Louisiana). See Pugh, supra note 8, at 27.
It should be noted that this freedom of contract under 18th century Spanish law
was much broader than existed in Louisiana from 1808 to 1980. Compare present
LA. Cirv. CODE AN. arts. 2328-2332 (West 1971) with former arts. 2327, 2329, and especially 2446 (all repealed by 1978 La. Acts No. 627).
13. See W. DE FUNiAX & M. VAUGHN, supra note 9, § 140, at 343 (observing that
such renunciation was not one of the prohibited gifts, see note 12 supra).
14. See Pugh, supra note 8, at 27. By the time California became part of the
United States the trend was against such freedom of contract LA. Civ. CODE of
1808, art. 6, at 324 (derived from CODE NAPOLEON art 1395 (1804)) prohibited postmarriage changes to an antenuptial contract. The initial California legislation regulating marital property relationships adopted the no-change rule. 1849-50 Cal.
Stats. ch. 103, § 21, at 255.
15. CAL CONST. of 1849 art. XL, § 14.

16. J. BROWNE,

REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONvENION OF CALIFoRNIA

257-

69 (1850). See the excellent analysis respecting the intent of the convention delegates in Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in California's
Community PropertySystem, 1849-1975, 24 U.C.LA L. REv. 1, 8-24 (1976).

was recognized as capable of owning separate property despite
her married status.' 7 The first statute concerning management
provided: "The husband shall have the entire management and
control of the common property, with the like absolute power of
disposition as of his own separate estate.'"8 This appeared to
give H much more control than Spanish law did, since it seemed
to allow unrestricted gifts by him of community assets.19 Then in
1860 the California Supreme Court held that W had no ownership
interest in community property: "The interest of the wife is a
mere expectancy, like the interest which an heir may possess in
the property of his ancestor." 20 Obviously, with the courts taking
this extraordinary approach to defining "community" property it
would be considered appropriate for deeds and documents of title
to name H alone as grantee even if W by her labor or acquisitions
furnished part or all of the consideration.
Since W both owned no interest in and had no management
power over so-called community property, such assets were not liable for her ordinary debts. This meant she could not feasibly engage in business by herself because the very profits she earned
would not be liable for the obligations incurred to earn them.
This made credit purchases impossible because no one would
deal with her except as H's agent or under some separation of
property arrangement.
Not surprisingly, the courts were quick to find W operating a
business as H's agent on the flimsiest of proof. For example, in
Hulsman v. Ireland,21 W and a friend began operating a restaurant as joint venturers. They hired H as an employee of the restaurant. W purchased food on credit, and when she did not pay,
the creditor sued both her (to reach any separate property she
might have) and H. The court held W had made the purchase as
agent for H because H "had knowledge" that she was using community assets at the restaurant and also took the benefit of her
17. See Prager, supra note 16, at 25-47; Reppy, Retroactivity of the 1975 California Community Property Reforms, 48 S. CAL. L. RE:v. 977, 1055-59 (1975).
18. 1849-50 CaL Stats. ch. 103, § 9, at 254 (emphasis added).
19. Although this implication was ignored in one case, Lord v. Hough, 43 Cal.
581 (1872), subsequent decisions established that H's "absolute" power of alienation under this statute before its amendment by 1891 Cal. Stats. ch. 220, § 1, at 425
(requiring W's written consent to a gift of community property), did give him such
power. See Scott v. Austin, 57 Cal. App. 553, 207 P. 710 (1922).
20. Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 311 (1860),followed in Packard v. Arellanes, 17 Cal. 525, 539-40 (1861). Even if the earnings were W's they were this same
type of so-called community property owned by H (unless she had become a sole
trader, see notes 369-82 infra and accompanying text). See Washburn v. Washburn, 9 CaL 475 (1858). See also Street v. Bertolone, 193 Cal. 751, 754, 226 P. 913, 914
(1924); Martin v. Southern Pacific Co., 130 Cal. 285, 286, 62 P. 515, 516 (1900).
21. 205 CaL 345, 270 P. 948 (1928).
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endeavor by allowing community profits to be generated.2 2 The
latter made this a "clear case of ratification of the acts of the

wife." 23 This resulted in not only the community property but H's

separate property being liable, since the implied agency made the

obligation H's.24
Other remedies for the wife who wanted to work used transmutation to enable her to do so. Legislation enacted in 185225 empowered the self-employed married woman to become a "sole
trader." If she did so the earnings from her trade or profession
were her separate property under her own management, and
2
hence liable to her creditors. As discussed more fully below, 6
this legislation provided for formal documentation and recordation2 7 of the transmutation arrangement that made the sole trader
W's earnings her own separate property.
For the majority of working women who did not or could not
utilize the sole trader procedure, the courts on the weakest of evi22. W had started the business when H was out of town, and he returned to
find afait accompli. Exactly what he was supposed to do to stop W from operating the business is unclear. As manager of the community he could have removed
the particular community-owned items W was using at the restaurant, but if W
could have found replacements, the law would hardly permit H to forbid her from
applying her labor to the non-community assets. Cf.Garver v. Thoman, 15 Ariz. 38,
135 P. 724 (1913) (even under exclusive male management regime W may contract
out her services).
23. Hulsman v. Ireland, 205 Cal. 345, 352, 270 P. 948, 951 (1928). On this theory
H would be a principal any time he knew W was generating community income,
since ordinarily he will have no power to prevent her from doing so. Under present law, see CAL. CIM. CODE § 5125(d) (West Supp. 1980), H could not even remove
the community assets from W's business.
24. At the time of Hulsman, prevailing management and control and creditors'
rights principles provided the court with no method for making the community liable without also making H's separate estate liable. The court obviously stretched
the law of agency to the breaking point to provide some remedy for the creditor.
Under existing law, CAL Crv. CODE § 5116 (West Supp. 1980), the community property alone would be liable. Since the assets of the business will be liable to the
credit vendor, fairness does not demand torturing H's acquiescence in W's endeavor into an agency (which would make his separate property liable as well).
The California Supreme Court should overrule Hulsman and kindred cases at the
earliest opportunity.
25. 1852 Cal. Stats. ch. 178, at 881-82 (codified as CAL Civ. PRoc. CODE §§ 18111821 (1872), repealed by 1980 Cal. Stats. ch. 123, § 1.)
In Washington tort cases, the equitable lien in favor of the non-tortfeasor spouse
attaching to the remaining half of the property for all practical purposes makes it
her separate property. See note 107 infra.
26. See notes 377-83 and accompanying text infra.
27. Indeed, by an 1862 amendment, the procedure for becoming a sole trader
was changed from registration to the completion of a judicial proceeding. 1862 Cal.
Stats. ch. 121, at 108.

dence would leap to the conclusion that the spouses had made a
transmutation agreement concerning W's business that converted
it into her separate property. Some of the decisions were based
on testimony of an actual oral discussion in which H told W that
her earnings would be her separate property.2 8 In others H told
W she could manage and control her own earnings; 29 the court
then jumped to the conclusion that this necessarily meant H was
giving up his ownership in the community property as well. Prior
to 1927, when W had no ownership interest in community property, any management power she had over it was not as co-owner
but as H's agent. But H's "gift" to W of management power could
well have been construed as creating a naked agency or creating
an agency coupled with an interest by recognizing W as a coequal owner, as she was in the various pre-1927 jurisdictions that
actually practiced the community system. 3 0 It was almost as if

the court considered a gift of mere management power to be unmasculine. 31
The most disturbing cases where property that was or would
have been community was converted into W's separate property
based the transmutation on H's acquiescence in or failure to ob-

ject to W's taking control of community assets.32 In a case where

H watched contentedly as W took some community funds or com-

munity tangible property for use in a business that generated
profits, it would seem logical to infer that H did not object because he was pleased to see the community assets being used to

produce community profits. The inference that his silence was an
expression of donative intent (giving up his ownership of the
community property and not just allowing W to exercise manage-

ment power) seems strained. These pre-1927 cases of "easy"
28. See, e.g., Perkins v. Sunset Telephone & Telegraph Co., 155 Cal. 712, 103 P.
190 (1909) (H agreed that not only W's earnings but all acquisitions that would
have been community would be her separate property); Wren v. Wren, 100 Cal.
276, 34 P. 775 (1893); Von Glahn v. Brennai 81 Cal. 261, 22 P. 596 (1889). Note that
transmutation of future earning, cannot be characterized as a contract (because
there is no consideration for H's relinquishment) and cannot be characterized as a
gift (because there is no property in existence and no delivery, actual or constructive). This type of transmutation exists solely as a unique aspect of community

property law. The cases refer to it as an "agreement" (apparently to distinguish
the situation from a "contract" for which there must be consideration).
29. E.g., Kaltschmidt v. Weber, 145 Cal. 596, 79 P. 272 (1904).

30. E.g., Estate of Williams, 40 Nev. 241, 161 P. 741 (1916); Kohny v. Dunbar, 21
Idaho 258, 121 P. 544 (1912); Wright v. Hays' Administrator, 10 Tex. 130, 133 (1853).
31. It is curious that in the one oft-cited case where the court concluded that
W was managing solely as agent and not as owner (or co-owner) H was functioning as W's employee at the business. Hulsman v. Ireland, 205 Cal. 345, 270 P. 948
(1928). See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
32. E.g., Diefendorff v. Hopkins, 95 Cal. 343, 28 P. 265, 30 P. 549 (1892); Larson v.
Larson, 15 Cal. App. 531, 115 P. 340 (1911).
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transmutation in W's favor are perhaps best explained as the judiciary's attempt to ameliorate some of the unfairness to W inherent in the statutory scheme denying her management and control
of community property and the judicial decisions denying her any
33
ownership of community property.
3.

Retention of "Easy" Transmutation After Reform of
California Community Property Law

Reform of the California marital property law to ameliorate or
eliminate various aspects of it that were unfair to wives was a
slow, piecemeal process that began with the 1852 enactment of
the Sole Trader Act.34 Another significant step for purposes of

transmutation law was legislation passed in 188935 providing that
33. The overwhelming majority of pre-1927 transmutations conferred a benefit
on W. In most she acquired separate property. See Perkins v. Sunset Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 155 Cal. 712, 103 P. 190 (1909); Kaltschmidt v. Weber, 145 Cal. 596, 79
P. 272 (1904); Wren v. Wren, 100 Cal. 276, 34 P. 775 (1893); Diefendorif v. Hopkins, 95
Cal. 343, 28 P. 265 (1892); Von Glahn v. Brennan, 81 Cal. 261, 22 P. 596 (1889); Larson v. Larson, 15 Cal. App. 531, 115 P. 340 (1911); Carlson v. Carlson, 10 Cal. App.
300, 101 P. 923 (1909). In a few cases the transmutation was from H's separate
property to so-called community property. E.g., Yoakam v. Kingery, 126 Cal. 30, 58
P. 324 (1899). This type of arrangement gave W no immediate proprietary benefits,
but at divorce or H's death her rights would be substantially greater because of
the transmutation.
One unusual case where W came out the loser is Estate of Wahlefeld, 105 Cal.
App. 770, 288 P. 870 (1930) (involving a 1925 transmutation). W had invested
$17,000 of her separate funds in a business; the opinion suggests H's contribution
was some amount less than $10,000. After H's death W overcame the problem of a
pre-marriage "title" in H's name to some of the assets by establishing an oral
agreement converting all of the business to community property.
W was technically the loser in Martin v. Pritchard, 52 Cal. App. 724, 199 P. 846
(1921). W's parents intended to make a gift that would be co-owned by H and W
as tenants in common. W, however, treated the acquisition as community property, thus giving away her proprietary interest to H (retaining only the expectancy
of obtaining at least half ownership at divorce or H's death).
34. The various steps in the movement to reform the law to make it fairer to
W are analyzed in Prager, supra note 16, at 39-56. Legislation in 1870 removed liability of W's "community" earnings for H's debts and classified her earnings while
living apart from H as her separate property. Id. at 45. In 1872 H's almost exclusive management power over W's separate property--an extraordinary feature of
the initial 1849-50 convention given the purpose of the 1849 constitutional provision
to protect W's separate property-was given to W. Id. at 39-40.
35. 1889 Cal. Stats. ch. 219, at 328. The presumption now applies only to instruments taking effect prior to January 1, 1975. CAi. Civ. CODE § 5110 (West Supp.
1980). Retention of this presumption in situations where it was not relied upon by
either spouse or by a third party is of doubtful constitutionality because of unnecessary discrimination based on gender. See Reppy, Retroactivity of the 1975 California Community Property Reforms, 48 S. Cm. L. REV. 977, 990-95 (1975).

where a written instrument named W as transferee or owner of

property it was presumptively her separate property. 36 This

greatly facilitated transmutations from community to W's separate property and from H's separate property to W's separate

property.
Although a series of pre-1927 acts 37 gave W, in specific situations, veto power over H's attempt to alienate so-called community property, she was still held to lack the co-ownership of
spouses in a true community regime. It was not until the 1927 legislation that W was declared an equal owner of community prop-

erty.3 8 Following the enactment of the 1927 legislation California
treated the property rights of married women in many respects
according to principles of the civil law and as married women
were treated in the seven other community property states. Indeed, because of the pre-1927 reform legislation, California wives
had more rights than married women in most other community

jurisdictions. 39
The 1927 Act could have occasioned a tightening up of the transmutation doctrine, such as requiring greater formalities for the
36. Under the pre-enactment law the mere fact that W was the named grantee
in an instrument would not affect the general presumption that properties possessed during marriage are community, and that was true even when H himself
was the grantor (unless the deed recited a gift rather than using bargain-sell terminology). Woods v. Whitney, 42 Cal. 358 (1871). Where the grantor was a third
party the presumption in favor of the community was not dispelled even by a recital in the deed that W had used separate property to pay for the grant and was
taking the property as part of her separate estate. Tolman v. Smith, 85 Cal. 280, 24
P. 743 (1890) (a dubious decision in rejecting the inference that H had directed the
deed to be so worded).
37. Veto power over gifts was granted by 1891 Cal. Stats. ch. 220, § 1, at 425
(see CAL. CrV. CODE § 5125(b) (West Supp. 1980) for the present anti-gift statute);
over all conveyances and encumbrances of household furnishings by 1901 Cal.
Stats. ch. 190, § 1, at 598 (see contemporary provision in CAL. Crv. CODE § 5125(c))
(West Supp. 1980); and over encumbrances and conveyances of community realty
by 1917 Cal. Stats. ch. 583, § 2, at 829 (today part of CAT. CIV. CODE § 5127 (West
Supp. 1980)). Each of these enactments was held to be nonretroactive in the
sense that it did not apply to assets acquired before the effective date. Spreckels
v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897) (gifts); Duncan v. Duncan, 6 Cal. App.
404, 92 P. 30 (1907) (sale of household items); Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 191 Cal. 601,
218 P. 22 (1923) (conveyance of realty).
38. 1927 Cal. Stats. ch. 265, § 1 (now, as amended, CAL. Crv. CODE § 5105). This
statute, too, was held inapplicable to pre-enactment acquisitions. Stewart v. Stewart, 204 CaL 546, 269 P. 439 (1928); W. REPPY, supra note 2, at 17.
39. The presumption in favor of W arising from a written instrument naming
her grantee, see note 35 supra, existed only in New Mexico (where it now applies
only to pre-July 1, 1973, instruments, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-(2) (1978)). The majority of community property states had not given wives the veto powers listed in
note 37 supra. Legislation in 1923 had given W a testamentary power over half the
community property when she died before H. 1923 Cal. Stats. ch. 18, at 29. See
CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956). This right was not enjoyed by New Mexico
wives until very recently. See W. DE FuNiAK & M. VAUGHr, supra note 9, at § 198.
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transfering of ownership between spouses. But that did not happen; if anything the law became even looser. In Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Cleverdon,40 W, a school teacher, placed her
earnings during 1930-36 in a bank account in her own name. H deposited other funds in this account and sometimes he "borrowed"
from the account, intending to pay back the withdrawal. From
these facts the court could "see no escape from the conclusion"
that H had "relinquished to the wife the right" to her earnings.41
That is, he had transmuted the earnings to W's separate property.
The eagerness of the Cleverdon court to find a transmutation
perhaps stemmed from judicial distaste for the law's failure to
grant W management power over her earnings even though male
management was the traditional community principle. Legislation in 1951 did give W such management power, provided she
kept her earnings segregated from H-managed property. 42 But
still transmutations favoring W were found on the flimsiest of evidence. The case of O'Connor v. Travelers Insurance Co.,43 involved post-1951 earnings of W which she kept in her own bank
account. H was aware that W was sending some money from the
account to her young son living in another state. H's failure to object caused not only a transmutation of all of the funds in the
bank account but also of all the fringe benefits of W's employment including her life insurance coverage. The statute giving W
management power over her own earnings required H's written
consent to W's gifts of such community property, but the court's
opinion does not state that the sums W sent were gifts as opposed
to amounts she owed because of a support obligation. Moreover,
there are numerous other explanations for H's failure to make a
written consent than that he was transmuting the funds at issue
to W's separate property. The extension of the transmutation to
the fringe benefits of her employment was preposterous.
In re Marriage of Ashodian,44 also involved post-1951 earnings
of W and arose before the 1975 equal management reform. W was
a real estate broker who also made gains by purchasing and resel40. 16 Cal. 2d 788, 108 P.2d 405 (1940).
41. Id. at 791, 108 P.2d at 406.
42. 1951 Cal. Stats. ch. 1102, § 1, at 2860 (the closest equivalent of which is the
current CAL Cry. CODE § 5125(d) (West Supp. 1980)).
43. 169 Cal. App. 2d 763, 337 P.2d 893 (1959), criticized in H.VERRAILT, CALrroRNIA Comm-Nirry PROPERTY 139 (2d ed. 1977).
44. 96 Cal. App. 3d 43, 157 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1979).

ling real property in her own name. H, a bus driver, did not participate in the business and did not know that W was taking title
in her own name after using community funds to make the
purchases. The trial court found from H's disinterest in W's business that he had "sort of abandoned his wife to practice in the
field of real estate and didn't want to be bothered by it."45 This
was held sufficient evidence of a gift transmutation by H!46
California became an equal-management state with the enactment of Civil Code Section 512547 in 1975 but still the courts find
transmutations in W's favor without any supporting evidence. In
In re Marriageof Lucas 4 8 W purchased a 1976 "mini-motorhome"
with $2,567 of community funds, obtained by trading in a community owned vehicle, and $8,195 of her separate funds. Since the
motorhome was a 1976 model, the purchase must have been made
after January 1, 1975 when equal management was in effect.
Moreover, even if the purchase had been made pre-1975 the statute specifically makes the equal management system retroactive
to pre-1975 acquisitions. 49 According to the court, "[t] he purchase
contract was made out in the name of Gerald [H] alone, but title
and registration were taken in Brenda's [W's] name only. Brenda
wished to have title in her name alone, and Gerald did not object." 50 Nevertheless, both spouses referred to the motorhome as
a "family vehicle." Incredibly, H's failure to object to the form of
title 5 ' "constitute [d] substantial support for the trial court's con45. 96 Cal. App. 3d at 46, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
46. Another factor relied on in Ashodian is that at W's request H signed two
grant deeds of real property involved in her business. It is not stated that W was
the grantee in the deeds; surely that would have been stressed if she were. If a
vendee of W's were the grantee, H's signature on the deed would establish that
the realty was being treated as community property because CA. CIv. CODE § 5127
(West Supp. 1980) would require H's joinder even though "title" was in W's name.
47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1980).

48. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
49. CAL. Crv. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1980). The constitutionality of such retroactive application would seem to be settled by Robertson v. Willis, 77 Cal. App.
3d 358, 143 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1978) (subjecting W's pre-1975 earnings to H's debts
under specific retroactivity provisions of 1975 reform package).
50. 27 Cal. 3d at 817, 614 P.2d at 290, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
51. In Lucas, H's assisting W in obtaining a document of title in her name for
the vehicle would have satisfied the manual delivery requirement for a completed
gift generally imposed by property law. But despite such delivery the courts will
find no gift if the alleged donor shows an absence of donative intent. 6A R. PowELL, REAL PROPERTY § 891 (P. Rohan rev. 1980); 4 F. TnFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1034
(rev. 1975). Estate of Hall, 154 CaL 527, 98 P. 269 (1908) involved a deed signed by
H manually delivered to W purporting to give her his property. The court declared that "in every case, although the writing may by its terms purport to presently pass title, the validity of the attempted gift will depend on the intention of
the donor." Id. at 532, 98 P. at 271. See also Fulkerson v. Stiles, 156 Cal. 703, 105 P.
966 (1909) (H used community funds to buy land taking title in W's name but
overcame presumption of gift by convincing trier of fact he had no donative in-
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clusion that Gerald was making a gift to Brenda of his community
52
property interest in the motorhome."
Under equal management H had no reason to or right to make
such an objection. W was entitled to manage the $2,567 of community funds. She could purchase something with them in her
own name if she wished to do so. The Lucas decision will result
in thousands, perhaps millions, of transmutations because there
is simply no reason why one spouse, living happily with the other
and not contemplating a divorce, would "object" when the other
spouse exercises the statutory equal management powers. Indeed, Lucas seems contrary to public policy, as it penalizes the
husband for acceding to his wife's exercise of equal management
powers. Rather the opinion interjects disharmony into marriages
by encouraging husbands to demand that their wives carry on
management powers only in the husband's or both partner's
3
names.5
4.

Nonapplicability of the Statute of Frauds Respecting Real
Property Transfers

The post-1927 case law not only continued "easy" transmutation
of personal property such as a spouse's earnings but removed all
doubts as to the validity of an oral (or implied) transmutation of
real property despite non-compliance with the statute of frauds54
normally applicable to real property conveyances. It is only necessary to find that the transmutation was fully "executed" by the
oral statement or by the conduct implying a transmutation.5 5 The
tent); Hotaling v. Hotaling, 187 Cal. 695, 203 P. 745 (1922) (alleged donor convinced
trier of fact she signed transfer documents at alleged donee's request without
reading them, thus there was no donative intent).
52. 27 Cal. 3d at 818, 614 P.2d at 290, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858.

53. Since the motor home in Lucas was 75% W's separate property without a
transmutation, it would not have been appropriate for H to ask W to have the title
list them as co-equal owners. Apparently the Lucas court thinks H ought to have
asked for a written side agreement wherein W stipulated that notwithstanding the
form of title to the vehicle the community interest was not lost.
What can explain the dreadful Ashodian and Lucas decisions? Both arose at divorce, and the findings of transmutation allowed the wives in both cases to end up
with more than half of what should have been classified as community property,
contrary to the equal division mandate of CAI. Crv. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1980).
Perhaps the courts in these cases thought equal division was unfair because of
some "fault" of H that led to the divorce. But the legislative policy is to keep
'fault" out of divorce. See CA_ CiV. CODE § 4509 (West Supp. 1980).
54. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1091 (West 1954).
55. E.g., Woods v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal. 2d 697, 701, 299 P.2d 657, 659

transaction is "executed" if neither party has any undertaking left
to perform. Thus, unless the spouse declaring the transmutation
has at the same time declared that the transmutation will be
achieved by changing documents of title to reflect the new ownership or unless the spouse benefiting from the declared transmutation is required to furnish some consideration, the informal
transmutation will always be "executed" and no writing will be
required.
Community property scholars express doubts whether a separate to separate oral transmutation of real property is possible.
These doubts seem illogical for two reasons. First, the many
cases involving community-to-separate and separate-to-community transmutations have established that the real property statute of frauds simply is not applicable to "executed" agreements
and gifts between married persons. Second, if somehow a separate-to-separate transmutation is distinguishable, an oral attempt
to effectuate such a transmutation can readily be recast by the
law so as to achieve validity under existing case law. For example, H may say, "I am making my ranch Blackacre, my separate
property, community property"; and one minute later, "I give you,
W, my community half interest in Blackacre." This plainly
achieves H's purposes under existing transmutation case law. If
instead he says, "I am giving you as your separate property my
separate ranch Blackacre," the law can impute to him the intent
that the transmutation he desires will occur in two steps so that
Blackacre is momentarily community.
5.

Avoiding the Antenuptial Contract Statute of Frauds

California Civil Code section 5134 provides: "All contracts for
marriage settlements must be in writing .... " 5 6 Several devices
have been recognized for avoiding this provision, and no contemporary reported case has invalidated a prenuptial agreement simply because it was oral. Not unexpectedly, antenuptial
agreements that have been "fully executed" are not within section 5134. Where no documentary transfers are contemplated by
(1956) (separate to community); Estate of Welling, 37 Cal. 2d 106, 230 P.2d 808
(1951) (community to separate); Kenney v. Kenney, 220 Cal. 134. 30 P.2d 398 (1934)
(separate to community); Estate of Raphael, 91 Cal. App. 2d 931, 206 P.2d 391
(1949) (separate to community). See generally Comment, Oral Transmutation of
Separate Property: California'sLaw by Dicta, 9 STAN.L REv. 183 (1956).
56. CAL. CrV. CODE § 5134 (1970). It goes on to require that the instrument be
"executed and acknowledged or proved" like a grant deed of realty. According to
In re Marriage of Cleveland, 76 Cal. App. 3d 357, 142 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1977), because
of the use of "or" in § 5134, acknowledgment is not mandatory; the execution may

be "proved" by any admissible evidence. Section 5135 requires recordation of the
contract in each situs county in order to have effect on real property.
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the spouses, apparently marriage itself completes the "execution"
of the contract.5 7 If changing of documents of title is contemplated, that act together with the marriage executes the contract.5 P A different approach is to focus on the post-marriage
conduct of the spouses. If the parties act in accordance with a
pre-marriage oral transmutation arrangement, a new post-marriage transmutation can be implied from the conduct of the parties and section 5134 does not apply. 59 However, if land is
involved, some "execution" must be found. Obviously a post-marriage fresh oral declaration restating the transmutation would
provide a means of circumventing section 5134.60
The final device for evading section 5134 is estoppel. Two types

of estoppel are recognized, one based on the unconscionability of
allowing the promissor in the oral contract to repudiate the promise, the other based on the promisee's action in reliance on the
6
oral agreement. 1
B.

The Significance of "Title': Transmutationsto Joint Tenancy
1.

Statute of Frauds Is Applicable

Civil Code section 683, requiring a "written transfer" for the creation of a joint tenancy,62 has been construed to have far more
teeth in it than the real property and marriage settlement statutes
of frauds. Attempts to circumvent this statute have repeatedly
failed due to a flat ruling that an oral agreement for joint tenancy
is void.63 A leading case is California Trust Co. v. Bennett.6 W
57. See Martin v. Pritchard, 52 Cal. App. 720, 199 P. 846 (1921).
58. Freitas v. Freitas, 31 Cal. App. 16, 159 P. 611 (1916) (H executed writing
making W life insurance beneficiary and because of prenuptial oral marriage contract could not later change this designation). See also Estate of Dokoozean, 219
Cal. App. 2d 531, 33 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1963).
59. See Estate of Wahlefeld, 105 Cal. App. 770, 288 P. 870 (1930) (post-marriage
meeting of minds revealed by conduct of spouses).
60. Apparently this is what the Wahlefeld court had in mind when it spoke of
a possible post-marriage oral "ratification" of an oral antenuptial transmutation
agreement. Id. at 776, 288 P. at 873.
61. See Estate of Sheldon, 75 Cal. App. 3d 364, 142 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1977), applying to an oral agreement covered by § 5134 the estoppel principles laid out in
Monarco v. LoGreco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950).
62. CAL Cr. CODE § 683 (West Supp. 1980). As presently worded, § 683 is construed to require a writing for creation of joint tenancies in personal as well as
real property. Donovan v. Donovan, 223 Cal. App. 2d 691, 697, 36 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229

(1963).
63. See cases discussed at notes 64, 69 infra; Wheeland v. Rodgers, 20 Cal. 2d
218, 124 P.2d 816 (1942); Estate of Harris, 9 Cal. 2d 649, 72 P.2d 873 (1937). Note,

orally told H she was depositing some $8,000 of her separate funds
in a bank account so that it would pass to H at her death.65 H relied on statements in Tomaier v. Tomaier,6 6 that as between married persons formal declarations of title in deeds and other
documents did not govern ownership but the source of the acquisition and the intention of the spouses did. The Bennett court replied:
This decision [Tomaier] carried out the well-established policy that the
use of common law forms of conveyances should not be permitted to alter
the community character of real property contrary to the intention of the

parties. There is no claim that the property involved here was ever community property, or that it was the intention of the parties to convert it
in the Tomaier deinto community property, and, therefore, the reasoning
67
cision has no application to the facts of this case.

This is merely to say that intention of the parties is given effect in
one situation but is defeated by the statute of frauds in another.
It, of course, does not consider whether a "fully executed" oral
transmutation to joint tenancy is outside section 683. This case
would arise where one spouse declared all of his or her separate
property to be held in joint tenancy or where both spouses declared all community property68 (or separate property as well) to
however, that an oral transmutationfrom joint tenancy to some other forms is permitted. Estate of Watkins, 16 Cal. 2d 793, 109 P.2d 1 (1940); Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23
Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944).
64. 33 Cal. 2d 694, 204 P.2d 324 (1949).
65. Obviously, this declaration is not unambiguously a statement of a present
separate-to-joint-tenancy transmutation. W could have had in mind a contingent
remainder for H, an executory interest for H, or a mere expectancy that he would
inherent her interest by some form of will substitute. Additionally, the Bennett
facts do not smack of a "fully executed" transmutation, for it seems that W undertook in her discussion with H to reduce the agreement to writing via a deposit
agreement with her bank, but an enforceable writing was not executed by her.
66. 23 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944), holding that although a deed to H and W
recited a joint tenancy, they were free to prove that community funds were used
for the acquisition and that they had not in fact transmuted such funds to joint
tenancy. Obviously, Tomaier was not the best authority for H to cite because it
did not involve a "fully executed" transmutation that defeated the real property or
marriage settlement statutes of frauds.
67. 33 Cal. 2d at 698, 204 P.2d at 327.
68. Although the point has sometimes escaped the notice of the courts, since
1923, after which year both spouses have had testamentary power over half the
community property, a unilateral attempt by the manager spouse to transmute
community property to joint tenancy property should be ineffective. The other
spouse would be deprived of the statutorily granted testamentary power without
his or her consent and have a survivorship right in favor of the other spouse imposed by the unilateral action of that spouse. Moreover, since 1975 the unilateral
community-to-joint-tenancy transmutation would deprive the non-acting spouse of
management power as well, reducing it from a power to alienate all the community property, see CAL. CIrv. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1980), to power to alienate
only half. (With respect to realty, the power reduced by half is not the power to
alienate directly--the joinder requirement of CAL. Civ. CODE § 5127 (West Supp.
1980) already prevents such action-but the power to obligate the property to the
spouse's creditors.)
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be held in joint tenancy, and there was no undertaking to prepare
documents of title witnessing the transmutation (i.e., no act left
to "execute" under the agreement). In two decisions 69 involving
such apparently "fully executed" transmutations the courts simply held the statute of frauds for joint tenancies applicable without distinguishing the cases involving "fully executed"
transmutations and the real property and marriage settlements
statutes of frauds.
The fact that joint tenancy involves a right of survivorship does
make it a form of will substitute, yet it would seem that this type
of transmutation is no more likely to be asserted for the first time
after the death of the alleged donor than a transfer of ownership
not involving a right of survivorship.7 0 Moreover, the writing that
satisfies section 683 does not begin to satisfy the Statute of
Wills: 71 the spouse making the transfer of an ownership interest

or giving up testamentary power need not even sign the deed
(and seldom does, as most deeds are executed solely by the grantor(s) and not by the grantee(s)). Mere acceptance of the deedtaking possession under it, for example-is all that usually connects the grantee joint tenant spouses to the writing.7 2
69. Estate of Baglione, 65 Cal. 2d 192, 417 P.2d 683, 53 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1966); Estate of Horn, 102 Cal. App. 2d 635, 228 P.2d 99 (1951). Both involved alleged oral
separate-to-joint-tenancy transmutations by the decedent spouse. In Horn the argument was made that if the statute of frauds precluded creation of a joint tenancy, tenancy in common should be found (i.e., if the survivor cannot have the
whole loaf, try for half). The court held that a declaration of joint tenancy did not
contain within it an alternative second choice of tenancy in common if the joint
tenancy failed. Cf. Allen v. Samuels, 204 Cal. App. 2d 710, 22 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1962)
(because the attempted oral separate to joint tenancy transmutation failed because of the statute of frauds, it should be construed as a separate to community
property transmutation-another recipe for half a loaf). The court held that the
trial judge could not be reversed for declining to infer such alternative intent. One
should question whether it ever would be proper to impute to the donor an alternative intent as to a form of conveyance not actually considered.
70. Whether the transmutation is to separate property of one spouse, to community property, or to joint tenancy, if it involves a gift-a change of ownership
rights-its validity will certainly be litigated at divorce, at death of a spouse, and
(unless both pre- and post-transmutation classes of property are either both liable
or not liable to a creditor) during marriage in a debt collection case. A community
to joint tenancy transmutation does not alter ownership rights, but creditors can
certainly be affected. Moreover, at divorce joint tenancy property cannot be
awarded wholly to one spouse like community property. That is, an "aggregate"
division cannot be made of joint tenancy property. See W. REPY, supra note 2, at
237. Thus it is quite probable that the validity of such an attempted transmutation
will be litigated at divorce as well as at the death of one alleged joint tenant.
71. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 50 (witnessed wills), 53 (holographs) (West 1956).
72. Moreover, acceptance by one spouse of a deed tendered for delivery is

Thus, the refusal to date to recognize a "fully executed" oral
transmutation to joint tenancy cannot be explained by the "smell
of death" surrounding such an arrangement. Since the "fully executed" precedents arising under the real property and marriage
settlement statutes of frauds have not been urged on the California Supreme Court in a case involving a fully executed transmutation to joint tenancy, it may be that some time in the future
such an "exception" to section 683 will be recognized. This article
assumes for the time being, however, that every transmutation to
joint tenancy will involve a writing.
2. Transmutation Agreemefit Presumed from Recital in
Deed
As has been noted,73 a recital in a deed not signed by either
spouse (or not signed by the spouse whose property or managerial rights are reduced if the recital is given effect) that, for example, the property is one spouse's separate property ordinarily
does not displace the general presumption that property possessed by either or both spouses during marriage is community. 74
In other situations, the form of title of a document obviously
should, and does under California law, indicate that a change of
ownership may have been found to have occurred. Where one
spouse-in the cases it has almost always been H-executes a
deed or other document of title naming the other spouse as
grantee or owner of an item of property there is reason to find he
or she has done so in order to make a gift. That is, if the property
was community, a gift of his half interest, or if the grantor's separate property, a gift of his entire interest.7 5 Rather than a mere
treated as acceptance by both. See Sanders v. Crabtree, 44 Cal. App. 2d 602, 112
P.2d 923 (1941).
73. See Ramsdell v. Fuller, 28 Cal. 37, 42 (1865) and note 36 supra.
74. This is the legally correct formulation of the general pro-community presumption. See Lynam v. Vorwerk, 13 Cal. App. 507, 110 P. 355 (1910). The general
presumption is the creation of caselaw and is not described in any statute. See
Marriage of Lusk, 86 Cal. App. 3d 228, 150 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1978); Reppy, Retroactivity

of the 1975 CaliforniaCommunity Property Reforms, 48 S. CAL I. REV. 977, 1104-05
n.433. Lynam quite properly applied the civil law rule (which did not require
proof of the time of acquisition of an asset but attached the presumption if H or W
or both possessed the asset during marriage). Dictum in In re Marriage of Lucas
(See text accompanying notes 48-53 supra.) that there is a "general presumption
set forth in Civil Code section 5110 that property acquired during marriage is community property," however, is erroneous. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 814, 614 P.2d 285, 288, 166
Cal. Rptr. 853, 856 (1980). "Acquired during marriage" is part of § 5110's definition

of community propety. As Lusk aptly observes, § 5110 does not provide for any
general presumption. The only statute that might be said to do so is CAI. CIV.
CODE § 5111 (West 1970). See W. REPPY, supra note 2, at 63.
75. Extrinsic evidence might show that the transaction was intended to transmute the grantor's separate property to community property with the grantee-
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inference of gift, a presumption of gift is held to arise in such a
situation.76 The modern cases raise the same presumption when
the alleged donor spouse does not execute the deed but furnishes
consideration to the grantor (either community or alleged donor's
separate property) and directs the grantor to name as grantee in

77
the deed or document of title the payor's spouse.
The presumption of transmutation by gift where the alleged donor spouse has signed the deed at issue or directed the grantor to

spouse as sole manager thereof, but under present California law such a deed
does dispel the presumption of community ownership.
76. Dunn v. Mullan, 211 Cal. 583, 296 P. 604 (1931); Estate of Klumpke, 167 Cal.
415, 139 P. 1062 (1914); Ayoob v. Ayoob, 74 Cal. App. 2d 236, 168 P.2d 462, 473 (1946).
Estate of McCauley, 138 Cal. 546, 71 P. 458 (1903), applied this rule where the deed
by H to W recited a consideration of love and affection (e.g., it was a gift deed). If
the deed were in bargain-and-sale form and cited a consideration paid by the
grantee spouse, it is believed the presumption of gift would still apply insofar as it
would be presumed the funds possessed by the grantee spouse and used for the
payment to the grantor were community property.
The early cases always spoke of the presumption of gift arising in husband to
wife conveyances, and there was authority that in a wife-to-husband deed a resulting trust rather than gift would be presumed. Under contemporary gender-neutral
principles of law, see Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329 (1971), the presumption of gift will be extended to grants by W. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853, 857 (1980),
applying against W the rule that a gift is presumed when a spouse uses his separate property f~r community purposes (as to pay mortgage payments on a community owned house).
Recognition of a presumption arising from the form of the deed has important
benefits that an inference lacks. Often in these title dispute cases the person
whose state of mind (donative intent) is at issue is dead or otherwise unavailable.
If, as is likely, there is just no direct evidence on the issue of donative intent, the
presumption enables the parties to predict the result of litigation. A mere inference might or might not be accepted by the trier of fact, and the parties will be in
doubt until a verdict returned by a jury or a decision announced by the judge.
Compare the unfortunate situation presently existing with respect to alleged gifts
not accompanied by formal documents of title. One spouse's statement to the
other that an item bought with community funds is a "gift" to the other at birthday, anniversary, etc., raises, the trier of fact is told, merely an inference that the
trier of fact may accept if it wishes. See Estate of Walsh, 66 Cal. App. 2d 704, 152
P.2d 750 (1944) (H presented jewelry to W at Christmas and their anniversary;
trial judge declined to infer donative intent).
77. Hamilton v. Hubbard, 134 Cal. 603, 65 P. 321 (1901); Jackson v. Torrence, 83
Cal. 521, 23 P. 695 (1890) (where deed to W erroneously recited she had paid the
full consideration). A number of such cases involving deeds to W during 1899-1975
also recite such a presumption without relying on the statute then in effect that
compelled it. E.g., Nordquist v. Malmberg, 213 Cal. 394, 2 P.2d 334 (1931); Miller v.
Brode, 186 Cal. 409, 199 P. 531 (1921). The early case not raising a presumption of
gift in such a situation is Peck v. Brummagim, 31 Cal. 441 (1866) (deed recited consideration was W's separate property but evidence established H paid grantor
community funds; presumption of community ownership overcome by proof of
donative intent).

name the donee as grantee is reasonable. A much more dubious
presumption is recognized in California where grant by deed poll
(i.e., not signed by the grantee spouses) for a consideration recites that the spouses take as joint tenants. Since the consideration is paid during marriage to the grantor, the general
presumption would apply and the property acquired would be
community unless the spouses transmuted the community funds
to joint tenancy property. 78
Case law has firmly established, however, that the mere recital
of joint tenancy raises a presumption that H and W by agreement
transmuted the community consideration to joint tenancy property.79 The presumption of transmutation is overcome either by
78. Prior to 1927 such a transmutation involved H giving W a present half ownership interest in the property including management power over the interest. Between 1927 and 1951 such a transmutation merely altered management power. H
lost power to obligate a half interest to pay the debts of his non-necessaries creditors; W gained both the ability to obligate and to convey a half interest. If the acquisition in joint tenancy was obtained by H and W trading community realty, H
also enjoyed in one respect an increase in management power. he could voluntarily convey his half ownership interest without W's joinder. Between 1951 and
1975, if W's earnings subject to her exclusive management were used for the acquisition, the alteration of management power caused by the transmutation could
be reversed, gender-wise. After 1975, if community personalty or money is used
for the acquisition, each spouse gives up equal management power over the
other's half interest while, at the same time each is benefited by having his or her
half interest freed of the other's management power (except in the case of involuntary seizure by the other spouse's necessaries creditors, see text accompanying
notes 154-63 infra).
The above analysis indicates the transmutation does not affect a spouse's testamentary power. That is true because, although joint tenancy carries with it the
right of survivorship, a spouse desiring a different disposition at his or her death
can readily achieve it by causing a severance of the joint tenancy by way of an
instrument signed by him alone or a strawman conveyance. See Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal. App. 3d 524, 527, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532 (1980); Burke v. Stevens, 264
Cal. App. 2d 30, 34-35, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (1968).
However, if the transmutation were effective to joint tenancy even though one
spouse did not know about it (which some cases indicate can in fact happen, see
note 84 infra), that spouse's testamentary power is interfered with in a very practical sense. Such spouse believes his or her will will operate on the property and
has no reason to initiate strawman conveyances to protect the desired testamentary scheme.
79. See, e.g., Machado v. Machado, 58 Cal. 2d 501, 375 P.2d 501, 25 Cal. Rptr. 87
(1962); Siberell v. Siberel, 214 Cal. 767, 7 P.2d 1003 (1932); Mears v. Mears, 180 Cal.
App. 2d 484, 4 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1960). This presumption does not apply at divorce
when property is a single family residence and the issue is division of marital
property. CAL. Crv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1980); In re Marriage of Lur as, 27
Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980). Although the anti-joint tf nancy
provision in § 5110 is restricted to division "upon dissolution of marriage or legal
separation only," In re Marriage of Tfrantafello, 94 Cal. App. 3d 533, 156 Cal. Rptr.
556 (1979), extended it to annulment proceedings so that the acquisition was presumed to be quasi-marital property under CAr. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp.
1980) rather than joint tenancy property. Section 5110 purports to raise a pro-community presumption when the residence "is acquired by them [H and W] during
marriage as joint tenants." Of course, if the spouses did in fact acquire the prop-
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proof that the spouses actually agreed to own the property in
some form other than joint tenancy, such as community property,80 or that both spouses did not understand the difference between community property and joint tenancy (a state of mind
obviously precluding an agreement to transmute) A'
By all logic, if one spouse was wholly unaware that the other
was using community funds to purchase property under a joint
tenancy form of title, no transmutation should occur that disturbs

management powers or encumbers testamentary powers of the ignorant spouse, as a community to joint tenancy transmutation
does. 82 At least one case is construed as so holding,83 but there is

contrary authority.84

erty in joint tenancy there would be no room for any contrary presumption. Obviously the quoted phrase means acquired by deed reciting a joint tenancy.
The anti-joint tenancy proviso in § 5110 seeks to facilitate a division of property
whereby the wife can be awarded the family house and the husband offsetting
property (such as the community business), in the face of the rule that title to
separate property cannot be disturbed at divorce. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal.
3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
80. See, e.g., Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 259 P.2d 656 (1953); Socol v. King,
36 Cal. 2d 342, 223 P.2d 627 (1950).
81. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Blankenship, 212 Cal. App. 2d 736, 28 Cal. Rptr. 176
(1963). H and W's shared intent to take a form of title that would avoid probate
administration is insufficient understanding of the effect of a community to joint
tenancy transmutation, and proof of such a state of mind rebuts the presumption
of transmutation. Bowman v. Bowman, 149 Cal. App. 2d 773, 308 P.2d 906 (1957);
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 147 Cal. App. 2d 527, 305 P.2d 289 (1957).
82. See note 78 supra.
83. Palazuelos v. Palazuelos, 103 Cal. App. 2d 826, 230 P.2d 431 (1951), explained by, Schindler v. Schindler, 126 Cal. App. 2d 597, 272 P.2d 566 (1954). In
Schindler, where W participated in the transaction and consented in writing to the
transfer of community funds to joint tenancy property, although she maintained
that her hidden intention was that the property remain community, the holding
that the property was owned in joint tenancy can be explained by two principles
of contract theory. First, under the objective theory of contract formation, even
without a meeting of the minds, a party will be bound-manifestation or expression of intent is controlling. Brant v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Cal. 2d 128, 133, 48
P.2d 13, 16 (1935); Blumfeld v. RLH. Macy & Co., Inc., 92 Cal. App. 3d 38, 46, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 652, 656 (1979). Also, in some situations (e.g., a special relationship between
the parties) silence may be a valid acceptance. See Southern Cal. Acoustics Co.,
Inc. v. C.V. Holder, Inc., 71 Cal. 2d 719, 722, 456 P.2d 975, 978, 79 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322
(1969); McAvlay v. Jones, 110 Cal. App. 2d 302, 309, 242 P.2d 650, 654 (1952). Cf.
Lovetro v. Steers, 234 Cal. App. 2d 461, 44 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1965).
84. See Estate of Kruse, 7 Cal. App. 3d 471, 86 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1970), where H
used community funds to acquire land with title taken in joint tenancy and W was
unaware of the acquisition. A transmutation was found to have occurred. (The result is conceivably correct on a weak form of estoppel theory, for W had treated
the property as joint tenancy after H's death to avoid probate administration expenses.) Kiuse is surely wrong in declaring that only proof of an agreement by H

In any event, where the spouse harmed by the presumption
arising from the recital is dead or otherwise unable to testify, the
presumption of transmutation will control the characterization of
the property. This state of the law must result in the sanctioning
of numerous abuses of management power by one spouse in derogation of the rights of the other.85 It is possible that the presumption would still be acceptable if empirical evidence indicated that
in most instances of a deed poll reciting a joint tenancy, the
grantee spouses had in fact agreed to a community to joint tenancy transmutation. However, what evidence there is shows that
the great majority of deeds of land to married persons recite a

joint tenancy. 86 It is difficult to believe that most married couples

acquiring land either discuss the transmutation that occurs when
a joint tenancy form of deed is used or for that matter understand
87
the difference between joint tenancy and community property.
Perhaps the presumption of transmutation arising from joint
tenancy recitals in a deed poll was fashioned by the courts to facilitate passing of title without the expenses of probate court administration. Prior to the enactment in 1974-75 of the community
property set-aside law, 88 a transmutation to joint tenancy form

could eliminate some expense and inconvenience. However, recent reform has made formal administration optional in many situations where the decedent's interest in community property
passes to the surviving spouse. On the other hand, unsettled federal law poses a risk of adverse estate tax consequences if joint
and W not to transmute will overcome the presumption that they did transmute.
The same error was made in In re Marriage of Frapwell, 49 Cal. App. 3d 597, 122
Cal. Rptr. 718 (1975), where H used separate funds to acquire property and took a
deed reciting a H-W joint tenancy. The trial court found H had no donative intent
but was reversed on a theory that only an express H-W agreement that there was
no gift could overcome the presumption arising from the title. Accord, In re Marriage of Wall, 30 Cal. App. 3d 1042, 106 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1973) (W put separate funds
in H-W joint tenancy bank account but had no donative intent); Cash v. Cash, 110
Cal. App. 2d 534, 243 P.2d 115 (1952) (H put separate funds in joint tenancy account
without donative intent). The error of the last two decisions is aptly analyzed in
Sims, Consequences of Depositing Separate Property in Joint Bank Accounts, 54
CAL. ST. B.J. 452 (1979). It is not required by CAL. F. CODE § 852 (West 1968),
which merely raises a rebuttable presumption of gift because of the form of bank
account "title."
85. Consider the case where W has a will leaving all to the son of a former
marriage. Without telling W, H invests all of the community property in acquisitions with deeds or title documents reciting a joint tenancy between him and W.
W dies. The chances that the son can muster evidence that W in fact did not
agree to the presumed transmutation are surely slim.
86. See Griffith, Community Property in Joint Tenancy Form, 14 STAr. L. REv.
87 (1961).
87. Recall that if their only agreement is to select a form of ownership that
avoids probate this is not enough understanding to support a conclusion of transmutation. See note 81 supra.
88. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 202, 205 (West Supp. 1980).
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tenancy form of ownership is used,89 and certain income tax benefits are certain to be lost in many situations where joint tenancy
form is employed.9 0 The presumption of transmutation arising
89. When a joint tenant dies, LR.C. § 2040 includes all of the property in his
estate for estate tax purposes until it is shown that the surviving joint tenant
made a contribution in money or money's worth for the acquisition and that such
contribution did not come to the survivor by way of gift from the decedent. Although I can find no authority directly on point, it would seem that the survivor
cannot simply rely on California's general presumption in favor of the community
to prove his or her contribution. If the deed recited a consideration and the date
showed the joint tenancy property was acquired during marriage, the presumption
might well establish that community funds were used for the purchase. However,
the cases say that the burden of proof is on the estate to show that all components
of the exception to inclusion are present. Tuck v. United States, 282 F.2d 405 (9th
Cir. 1960); English v. United States, 270 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1959). The California presumption would not bear on the question whether the survivor's community interest in the funds arose as a result of a separate-to-community transmutation by the
decedent at some time prior to the joint tenancy acquisition.
If for some reason the survivor is unable to testify as to the source of community funds for the acquisition (e.g., because she is incompetent, dies before the
matter is litigated, or doesn't remember), all of the joint tenancy property will be
included in the decedent's gross estate. The amount of the contribution by the
survivor is included, not just the appreciation traceable thereto. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2040-1(b); Wenig, Marital Status and Taxes, in UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE
LAw 246 (G. Douthwaite ed. 1979).
Observe that if a bank account is used, any form of survivorship, and not just
standard common law joint tenancy, triggers § 2040. The same is true with United
States Savings bonds. Rev. Rul. 68-269, 1968-1 C.B. 399. The regulations do not say
that tenancy in common is within § 2040, but do not specifically consider the case
of a contingent remainder following a tenancy in common life estate. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2040-1(b) (1958). See Bill Froelich Motor Co. v. Estate of Kohler, 240 Cal. App.
2d 897, 50 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1966) (bill of sale in which vendor conveyed property to
herself and a vendee "with sole right of survivorship" held to convey to the vendee
a life estate held in common with the vendor, with a remainder in fee, contingent
on survival).
If the creation of the joint tenancy involves a gift and an appropriate gift tax return is filed, § 2040 has since 1976 removed the tainted source of the survivor's contribution. Where community funds are used that became community in a previous
separate-to-community transmutation, the creation of the joint tenancy does not
involve a gift at that time. Literally applied, the 1976 amendments to § 2040 afford
no relief even if a gift tax had been filed at the time of the earlier transmutation.
Since the relief is available if "the creation of such (joint tenancy) interest constituted in whole or in part a gift," § 2040(b) (2) (B) (i) (dealing with personalty), it
would be wise for the decedent spouse to contribute a dollar of separate funds.
(The spouses, however, will not know who the decedent spouse will be, and if both
contributed $1 of his separate funds, there would be no gift.)
90. If onerously acquired community funds are shown to have been used to
acquire property taken in joint tenancy (i.e., there was a transmutation), the surviving spouse's half interest is not in the gross estate of the decedent for estate tax
purposes but does not obtain a stepped up basis under LR.C. § 1014(b) (6). Bordenave v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal. 1957); Murphy v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 608 (1964); Petersen v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 962 (1961). If,

from a joint tenancy recital in a deed poll is illogical and will
cause far more harm to married persons than any benefits conferred. 9 '
C.

Summary of Transmutation Problem

California law gives married persons great freedom to alter the
nature of the proprietary interests in assets owned or even yet to
be acquired. Usually, no formalities are required, even where real
property is at issue. In the case of transmutations of property to
joint tenancy a writing is required. However, the law presumes a
transmutation without any evidence at all that either spouse
knew the contents of the writing. Obviously, this state of the law
invites litigation and tends to encourage perjury. These problems
are compounded if the same looseness of the law applies when
third parties are in a dispute with either or both spouses.
III. THE "MANAGERIAL" SYSTEM OF DEBT LIABILITY
IN CALIFORMA
The problems in the debt collection area caused by transmutations are quite different depending on the method used by the
community property jurisdiction for initially assessing liability.
Before the effect of transmutation agreements on creditors' rights
can be analysed, one must understand the California system for
determining the'debt liability of marital property.92
A.

Basic Rule: What H or W Could Voluntarily Use to Pay a
Debt the Creditor Can Seize

From the outset, California has utilized what is called the "managerial system" for determining the rights of creditors to reach
marital property.93 The basic rule is that all property subject to
the debtor spouse's management and control can be reached by
his or her creditors.9 4 A leading case has explained the theory
partly on the notion that if a debtor spouse could use his managehowever, there was no transmutation, a stepped up basis would be obtained for

the community half interest of the survivor.
91. At pp. 240-41 infra a statute is proposed which would require H and W to
sign the deed reciting joint tenancy before it could be the basis of finding a trans-

mutation.

92. Regarding the definition of "marital property," see note 3 supra
93. W. REPPY & W. DE FuNIAi, ComuNIrrY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 370

(1975); W. REPPY, CommuNrry PROPERTY IN CALIFoRmA 209 (1980). See also Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975) (citing TEX. FAm. CoDE ANN. tit. 1,
§ 5.61 (Vernon 1975)).
94. E.g., Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 111 P.2d 641 (1941); Spreckels
v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897); Estate of Hirsh, 122 Cal. App. 2d 822, 265
P.2d 920 (1954); Estate of Haselbud, 26 Cal. App. 2d 375, 79 P.2d 443 (1938).
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ment power to voluntarily pay over community assets to his creditor, the creditor should be able to compel him to do so. 9 5 That
the creditor can seize what the debtor can convey, is consistent
with California law when the debtor's separate property and community personalty is at issue. Subject to exceptions to be discussed below each spouse has power to convey all community
personalty, 96 and his or her creditor can reach all of it.97 Also if H
and W co-own real property separately as tenants in common or
joint tenants, each has power to convey only a half interest and
that is the interest a creditor can reach.9 8 This is true even
though in some respects management power is broader. 99
The same is not true with community realty. With community
realty the creditor reaches what the spouse can manage, not what
he or she can convey. One spouse alone has managerial power
over community realty, in that one alone can license third parties
to enter, plant and harvest crops, etc. 00 Since 1917,101 however,
one spouse alone has been unable to voluntarily convey any inter-

est in community realty. Joinder of the other spouse in the instrument of conveyances is required. 0 2
California nonetheless allows the creditor of one spouse to levy
execution on community realty. In effect, one spouse alone can
indirectly alienate community realty by incurring an enforceable
obligation and refusing to pay it.103 California, like the majority of
95. Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 683-84, 111 P.2d 641, 643 (1941).
Q6. CAL CIV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1980).
97. Id. §§ 5116, 5122.
98. Milton E. Giles & Co. v. Bank of America, 47 Cal. App. 2d 315, 117 P.2d 943
(1941); Pepin v. Stricklin, 114 Cal. App. 32, 299 P. 557 (1931).
99. For example, one cotenant by lease or license can confer upon another
person the right to use and occupy all of the property as fully as he could have
under the cotenancy, Verdier v. Verdier, 152 Cal. App. 2d 348, 313 P.2d 123 (1957);
Carbine v. Meyer, 126 Cal. App. 2d 386, 393, 272 P.2d 849, 854 (1954); Waterford Irr.
Dist. v. Turlock Irr. Dist., 50 Cal. App. 213, 194 P. 757 (1920); or one cotenant may
farm all of the land and is not required to account for crops grown or harvested by
him as long as he has not reduced the value of the property. See, e.g., 2 AmIEicAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.14 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
100. CAL. Crv. CODE § 5127 (West Supp. 1980).

101. 1917 Cal. Stats. ch. 583, § 2, at 829, now codified as part of CAL Crv. CODE
§ 5127 (West Supp. 1980); see Reppy, Retroactivity of the 1975 California Community PropertyReforms, 48 S. CAL. I REV. 977 (1975); Prager, supra note 16.
102. Section 5127 excepts leases of a year or less. CAT_ Crv. CODE § 5127 (West
Supp. 1980).
103. The statute is most strangely worded. It first requires both spouses join in
"executing any instrument by which such community real property or any interest
therein is leased for a longer period than one year, or is sold, conveyed, or encum-

other community property jurisdictions which use the "managerial system" for determining rights of creditors to reach marital
property, however, recognizes several exceptions to a strict equation between property over which a debtor spouse has management power and property his or her creditor can seize. 0 4
B. Alternatives to the ManagerialSystem
The states of Arizona, Washington and New Mexico determine
the marital property that a creditor can reach in part by classify0
ing the obligation as a community or separate debt.1 5
bered." Then it provides "that the sole lease, contract, mortgage, or deed" of one
spouse alone is presumptively valid in favor of "a lessee, purchaser, or encumbrancer in good faith, without knowledge of the marriage relation." CAL. Civ.
CODE § 5127 (West Supp. 1980) (emphasis added). At least prior to the time equitable conversion occurs (ie., when each side is so ready to perform that the contract is specifically enforceable, Mamula v. McCulloch, 275 Cal. App. 2d 184, 194, 79
Cal. Rptr. 571, 576-77 (1969)), a contract does not convey realty. Moreover, even
when equitable conversion applies, the contract itself is not an "instrument" that
causes a conveyance of an equitable interest in many cases where post-contracting events (such as clearing up an impediment to title) are necessary before
the contract is specifically enforceable. See In re Dwyer's Estate, 159 Cal. 664, 675,
115 P. 235, 240 (1911). On the other hand, if the "instrument" in the first clause of
the statute does not include a contract, why does the provision about presumptive
validity refer to contracts as well as deeds, leases, and mortages?
Apparently without realizing the problem existed, Mark v. Title Guarantee &
Trust Co., 122 Cal. App. 301, 9 P.2d 839 (1932), held that an executory installment
contract to sell land executed by H alone was a conveyance voidable by W who
could overcome the presumption of validity by showing that in fact the land was
community property.
In two other states where the management statute requires joinder of both
spouses in an "instrument" by which community realty is sold or conveyed, there
is a strong suggestion that a contract to sell also must be executed by both
spouses. It arises from holdings that one spouse alone may not enter a binding
contract to pay a real estate broker to locate a buyer for community realty. See
Whiting v. Johnson, 64 Wash. 2d 135, 390 P.2d 985 (1964); Lockwood v. Mattingly, 97
Ariz. 85, 397 P.2d 64 (1964). In other states the management statutes specifically
require joinder in the contract of sale by both spouses. N.M. STAT. AN,. § 40-3-13
(1978).
104. The California exceptions are discussed at text accompanying notes 144231 infra. The other community jurisdictions using the managerial system are
Louisiana, Nevada, Idaho, and Texas. See W. REPPY &W. DE FuIAK, supra note 2,
at 370-73. Under a proposal pending in Wisconsin to make it the ninth community
property state, the managerial system will be the basic approach in the case of all
liabilities except torts and criminal fines. Wis. Assembly Bill No. 1090 (1980), proposing enactment of § 766.71(3) of the Wisconsin Statutes.
105. The Wisconsin proposal, supra note 104, would follow the Arizona approach with respect to tort liability and liability for criminal fines. See proposed
766.71(2)(g)-(h), the latter conclusively establishing the separate nature of all
such fines. Assembly Amendment No. 4 to Bill 1090 would classify obligations
arising because of a "forfeiture" as separate or community depending on whether
"the actions which gave rise to the forfeiture were undertaken for a marital partnership (community) purpose."
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1. The Approach of Arizona
In Arizona and Washington if an obligation receives the "community" label, all non-exempt community property as well as the
obligor-spouse's separate property is liable.106 This result is the
same as under California law. However, if the debt is a "separate
debt" in Arizona and previously Washington, 107 no portion of the
community property is liable, and the creditor can reach only the
debtor's separate property.108 Generally, whether an obligation is
separate or community turns on whether it arose out of activities
that did or which, if successful, could have conferred a commu106. See, e.g., W. DE FUmAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 9, at 374, 377. At least
where the obligation is contractual, its "community" character is presumed. See,
e.g., Oil Heat Co. of Port Los Angeles, Inc. v. Sweeney, 26 Wash. App. 351, 613 P.2d
169 (1980).
107. Washington law in this respect has recently been changed. DeElche v. Jacobsen, - Wash. 2d -, 622 P.2d 835, (1980) (6-3 decision). H and W had by written
transmutation agreement converted all of the separate property of each of them
into community property. Subsequently, H raped the plaintiff after a social event
they had both attended. Under prior law, there was no community benefit and
plaintiff would have recovered no damages. Under DeElche, the separate tort victim may, after exhausting the tortfeasor's separate property, seize his half of community property. The remaining half is still community property but is subject to
an implied-by-law lien to secure the reimbursement to the nontortfeasor spouse
that is owed because community funds went to pay off a separate debt. (This prevents another creditor of the tortfeasor spouse from seizing the remaining half interest.)
The court specifically declined to state whether the new approach to liability
would be extended to non-tortious obligations (e.g., breach of contract liabilities).
It also cautioned that in the tort area, adoption of the New Mexico system might
lead to reclassifying some tort liabilities previously labeled "community" as separate torts, since the community label need not be unreasonably stretched to avoid
no recovery at all under the new approach.
DeElche obviously overrules many of the Washington cases cited herein, but
they will remain precedents under Arizona jurisprudence.
108. See, e.g., Babcock v. Tam, 156 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1946) (Arizona law); Cross,
The Community Property Law in Washington, 49 WASH. L, REV. 729, 819-20 (1974).
Cross says it is "likely" that one spouse found liable for a "separate" obligation
will have no separate property, in which case the creditor can recover nothing. Id.
at 819. See, e.g., Aichlmayr v. Lynch, 6 Wash. App. 434, 493 P.2d 1026 (1972) (H
committed separate torts of alienation of affection and criminal conversation and
it is obvious from opinion he had no separate property). Obtaining judgment for
the creditor in this situation is not a senseless act. The debtor spouse may inherit
separate property. Also his marriage could end by death of either spouse before
the judgment expires, and the creditor could then reach the obligor's half of the
community property which dissolution converts into equal shares of separate
property. See Edmonds v. Ashe, 13 Wash. App. 690, 537 P.2d 812 (1975). If divorce
ends the marriage, as much of the community property as the Washington or Arizona court awards the debtor spouse can now be reached by the judgment creditor.

nity benefit.109
The Arizona system imposes a substantial burden on third parties asked to enter into a contractual arrangement with one
spouse alone. To avoid the risk that facts unknown to the third
party might support a characterization of the obligation incurred
by H or W as separate debt and thus possibly uncollectable, the
obligee will require the obligor's spouse to join in the contract or
at least consent to community liability.11o It is of no benefit to the
third party to have the spouse he is dealing with convenant that a
community obligation is being created."'
While third parties expecting to become contract creditors of a
married person are able to protect themselves from the harshness
of the community-versus-separate-debt system of marital property liability, few if any tort creditors will be able to obtain in advance of suffering injury an agreement to assure that community
wealth of a tortfeasor spouse is not immune from liability. If the
tort victim is entitled to recovery, he probably will not know until
long after the injury whether he was fortunate enough to have
been harmed by an unmarried person or a married person on a
community rission.112
Sympathy for creditors has caused courts in Arizona and previ109. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 108, at 822-26, 835-39; Marsh, CaliforniaFamily
Law-A Review, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 368, 379-80 (1954); Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17
Cal. 2d 679, 111 P.2d 641 (1941); Farman v. Farman, 25 Wash. App. 896, 611 P.2d 1314
(1980) (W's harassment of H's ex-wife could not benefit community).
110. If H is contracting with X who asks W to sign on as party, her unrestricted
signature will make her an obligor and her separate property will be bound. I
would assume that few Washington and Arizona wives understand the importance
that W in such a situation add something like: "agreeing only that community
property shall be liable hereunder and not obligating her separate estate."
111. Bank of Washington v. Hilltop Shakemill, Inc., 26 Wash. App. 943, 614 P.2d
1319 (1980). The spouse's signature is especially likely to be demanded by the
third party who realizes the debt sought to be created is a separate debt. If W
wants X to grade and pave a road on her heavily-mortgaged separate land, and W
has extensive community earnings from her law practice, X will demand H's signature on his contract with W if he has good business sense. Will H have enough
sense to limit the effect of his signature to binding W's community earnings?
There is no authority to the effect he can legally do so.
112. It is assumed the tortfeasor has no liability insurance or his insurance is
inadequate. Suppose, however, there is adequate insurance purchased entirely
with community funds but the tort is a "separate" tort of H or W. Under Arizona
property law, the insurance, having no source in the separate estate of the
tortfeasor, could not be reached. Contract law will come to the rescue of the victim, for it is inconceivable that H or W would risk purchasing a policy that indemnified only for "community" torts. Even if the spouse at the time had no separate
estate, he might acquire separate property by inheritance or death of his spouse.
Thus the policy will surely confer on the "separate" tort victim a third party beneficiary right to proceeds notwithstanding only community funds were used for premiums. Whether the community estate has a claim on the tortfeasor's estate to
reimburse the community for a fair share of premiums paid to insure both estates
is a question Arizona has not considered.
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ously Washington to greatly expand the concept of community
benefit to avoid separate tort characterizations." 3 The very need
to "cheat" on the definitions employed suggests there is something .wrong with the system." 4 The clinching proof is that, in
those instances where stretching of the concept of community
debt is impossible, a seriously injured creditor may receive nothing while H and W live in splendor on a multi-million dollar community estate." 5 The family unit should be protected instead by
generous exemptions laws that do not protect excess wealth at
the expense of a deserving creditor.
Not surprisingly, the Arizona approach has come under heavy
criticism in California." 6 It seems highly unlikely that reform of
113. See, e.g., Moffitt v. Krueger, 11 Wash. 2d 658, 120 P.2d 512 (1941), where W
was on a beer-drinking binge with a man who obviously was her boyfriend. She
let him drive the community-owned car, and he struck plaintiff. In Washington
and Arizona, recreational activity (even of one spouse alone) is viewed as a community endeavor for creditors' rights purposes. E.g., Reckart v. Avra Valley Air,
Inc., 19 Ariz. App. 538, 509 P.2d 231 (1973) (H crashed airplane while taking flying
lessons for pleasure). In Moffit, W's '"recreation" with her boyfriend was held to
be a community activity!
Because the courts in Washington and Arizona have been stretching the concept
of community debt in order to get some recovery for a tort victim who would
otherwise take nothing, the precedents developed in those states as to what constitutes "community benefit" are of dubious relevance in applying that concept
under CAL.'Crv. CODE § 5122 (West Supp. 1980). Under it the issue is not recoveryor-not for the victim but whether separate property of the tortfeasor is primarily
liable. See text accompanying notes 144-50 infra. If there are little or no such separate funds, the victim of the "separate tort" will still recover from the community.
There is no reason to skewer the classification process in sympathy for the plaintiff.
114. See H. MARSH, MARIrAL PROPERTY IN CONEC OF LAWS 147-48 (1952).
115. The lack of logic in the concept underlying the Arizona system is further
evident from the fact that both Washington and Arizona in the last decade had to
engage in some legislative tinkering to avoid near absurdity. By the logic of the
system, an obligation incurred by H or W alone before they marry could not have
been incurred to benefit the community (as none existed). Thus it was a separate
debt. Yet as soon as the debtor spouse married, his earnings-sole source of
wealth for many obligors-were community and not liable for the "separate" obligation. Marriage by a debtor in this situation was called "marital" bankruptcy.
Note, Community Property--Antenuptial Debts-Eliminating Immunity of Earnings and Accumulations of Debtor Spouse, 45 WASm L. REV. 191, 192 (1970). The
remedial legislation in Arizona, Aniz. REV. STAT. Ar. § 25-215(b) (1976), analyzed
in Comment, Community Assets and Separate Debts: Increased Community Vulnerability in Arizona, 1975 ARIz. ST. LJ. 797, gives creditors considerable relief
from "marital bankruptcy." To a much lesser extent, the Washington remedial act,
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.200 (1979), allows antenuptial "separate" creditors to
reach some community assets. See Watters v. Doud, 92 Wash. 2d 317, 596 P.2d 280
(1979).
116. See Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 689-90, 111 P.2d 641, 646 (1941)

California debt collection law would embrace the Arizona approach; it should not.117

2. The System in New Mexico: The Partitionable
Community
Like Arizona, New Mexico characterizes obligations as separate
or community under a similar "benefit" test. However, the obligee of a "separate" debt, after exhausting the debtor spouse's separate property, can levy on community property.l18 But only the
debtor's half interest can be taken. Apparently if the community
asset is partitionable in kind, like a bank account or a supply of
fungible goods or products, the levying officer just takes half of it.
If the asset is land partitionable in kind either some sort of judicial action is necessary to divide it or the debtor spouse's undivided half interest will have to be sold. Where the asset is not
partitionable in kind, the debtor's community half interest must
be sold.
The New Mexico statute does not say what happens to the
nondebtor spouse's half interest after such involuntary partition.119 It may be that the nondebtor spouse is left as a tenant in
common with the purchaser at the judicial sale. One would think
this interest should be converted into the nondebtor spouse's separate property. In a case decided before the partitionable community system was codified, however, the New Mexico Supreme
Court implied that the remaining half retains its character of community property and the community gets a reimbursement claim
(system "unfair," "unjust," and has "diastrous effect"); Marsh, California Family
Law-A Review, 42 CALiF. L REv. 368, 379-81 (1954).
117. Not only is the Arizona approach unfair to creditors and a breeder of litigation (over whether a contract or tort is to be characterized as community or separate), but its adoption in California where transmutations occur so easily will raise
a host of new problems. For example, what effect would there be on the debt characterization process if the spouses had agreed that all of W's acquisitions would
be her separate property, all of H's community? (Suppose W injured someone
while at recreation, for example.) Presumably every obligation in Arizona is separate if the spouses have contracted to live separate in property.
118. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3-9 to 40-3-11 (1978).
119. This problem can also arise in California, which has never addressed it in
a reported case. See text accompanying notes 226-30 infra. Under the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution, the federal government has compelled
Washington and Arizona to use the partitionable community system when the
"separate" creditor of a spouse is the Internal Revenue Service collecting a separate (i.e., prenuptial) tax debt from community property (such as the nondebtor
spouse's earnings) that state law would immunize from liability. United States v.
Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970) (Washington property); In re Ackerman, 424
F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1970) (Arizona property). Neither decision even suggests what
happens to the half of the community property remaining after the I.R.S. takes the
debtor's interest.
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against the debtor's separate estate.1
The New Mexico system, in not immunizing all of the community property from the reach of deserving "separate" creditors of
a spouse is superior to the Arizona approach. If the present California law is to be radically changed, New Mexico's approach
would be the preferable alternative to adopt.

C. Reimbursement in Californiato Prevent a "Taking"
Prior to adoption of a true community of property in California
in 1927,121 the managerial system of debt liability was arguably

logical. So-called community property really was not family property W had no proprietary interest in it that was lost when H's
obligation arose out of a transaction not related to community affairs. Also the wife, lacking management power, could not incur a
"community" debt, except for "necessaries"122 and for such a debt

of W's all of H's property, including the community, was liable.
It was urged that California's legislative adoption in 1927 of the

community concept of equal ownership required shifting to the
Arizona approach (New Mexico's partitionable community notion

not yet having been invented) so that W's ownership rights in
post-1927 community property would not be sacrificed to pay H's

separate debts. The California Supreme Court rejected the contention in an unfortunate opinion that implied W's proprietary in-

terest in post-1927 community property was less "vested" than
H's despite the statutory mandate that the interests were

"equal." 2 3 The same decision contained equally unfortunate lan120. McDonald v. Senn, 53 N.M. 198, 213, 204 P.2d 990, 999 (1949): "Proper
charges and credits may be made, as in cases where community funds are used to
improve the separate property of one of the spouses." One should question, however, if the remaining half is to be treated as community property in all situations.
What if another "separate" creditor of the debtor spouse whose half interest has
been taken already levies on the remaining interest? Surely there is no half interest of the debtor in the property sought to be seized, as there would be if it were
really community. Perhaps the McDonald court intended the remaining half to be
community simply for management and control purposes. That is, if it were realty,
the nondebtor spouse could not without joinder of the other spouse convey it (as
he could if it were his separate property). I think it would be much simpler for
any partitionable community system for marital property liability to convert the
remaining half interest into separate property.
121. See note 38 supra.
122. See text accompanying notes 154 et seq. infra.
123. Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 111 P.2d 641 (1941), stating the 1927
act did "not change the nature of the wife's interest to a vested one so as to give
her creditors the right" to reach community property. Id. at 686. The appropriate

guage to the effect that H could use community funds to pay "separate" debts because he has the power "to divest the parties of
their community property by his own act in the same manner that
he might divest himself of his separate property, so long as he did
not make a gift. .... -124 Such language implied that W's interest
was simply lost when H paid his separate debt with community
funds. This caused other community property states to conclude
that the 1927 legislation had not adopted a true community of
125
equal owners in California.
Later, it became settled that there was no "divesting" of the
community interest in such a situation, and W's ownership rights
did not just dissolve. Rather, what the community owned
changed from money, or whatever property H used to pay the
"separate" debt, to a reimbursement claim against H's separate
estate that could be asserted at dissolution of the community.
Thus, at divorce, debts already paid are classified as separate or
community under a benefit test somewhat similar to that used in
Arizona and New Mexico. This is done to determine if the community, actually the nondebtor spouse asserting half the community's claim, is entitled to reimbursement because a separate debt
was paid with community funds.126
Similar classification of outstanding debts must be made at divorce. "Separate" debts can be assigned for payment to the appropriate spouse and the amount of community indebtedness
subtracted from the value of total community assets. Then the direasoning to reach the result of Grolemund was that the purpose of the 1927 legislation was to make California a true community property jurisdiction in the civil
law sense and the civil law's debt liability system was the managerial system already utilized in the state (except as altered by statute). See, e.g., analysis of civilian principles in Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973). The
majority of American community property states had long recognized the shared
ownership principle adopted legislatively by California in 1927 while allowing a
managing spouse's "separate" creditors to reach community property. Idaho and
Texas are illustrative. See Holt v. Empey, 32 Idaho 106, 178 P. 703 (1919) (community property liable for all of manager H's debts); Kohny v. Dunbar, 21 Idaho 258,
121 P. 544 (1912) (W is equal owner); Moody v. Smoot, 78 Tex. 119, 14 S.W. 285
(1890); Taylor v. Murphy, 50 Tex. 291 (1878); Wright v. Hays' Administrator, 10 Tex.
130 (1853) (H and W are equal owners); Tax. Fsv. CODE § 5.61(c) (Vernon 1975); 1
OAKES, SPEWR's MARITAL RiGTS IN TExAs § 375 (1962) (employing the managerial
system of debt liability).
124. Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 684, 111 P.2d 641, 644 (1941).
125. McDonald v. Senn, 53 N.L 198, 204 P.2d 990 (1949).
126. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Walter, 57 Cal. App. 3d 802, 129 Cal. Rptr. 351
(1976); Somps v. Somps, 250 Cal. App. 2d 328, 58 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1967); see generally
Gutierrez, Apportionment of Debts, HANDLING DIsPuTEs IN PROBATE 11 (1976). In

the converse situation where separate funds were used to pay a community debt,
reimbursement is not available except on proof that the spouses had an agreement for reimbursement. E.g., In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285,
166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
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vorce court can determine what constitutes the required equal division of the next community wealth under Civil Code section

4800.127
Section 4800(b) (2) gives the divorce court itself jurisdiction to
order reimbursement to the nondebtor spouse out of the other's
half of community property and quasi-community property if the
use of community funds to pay separate debts can be classified as
"misappropriation."12 8 It is unclear whether the divorce court has

jurisdiction to issue an order enabling the nondebtor spouse to
reach separate property of the spouse who used community funds
to pay his separate debt. Such separate property is, of course, liable on the obligation. Also unsettled is whether the divorce court
has jurisdiction to apply not only the misappropriation test of sec29
tion 4800(b) (2) but the "benefit" test developed in case law.1 If
the answer to either question is no, a separate action in addition
to the divorce suit may have to be brought to obtain reimbursement.130
127. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1980). See In re Marriage of Epstein, 24
Cal. 3d 76, 592 P.2d 1165, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1979); In re Marriage of Barnert, 85 Cal.
App. 3d 413, 149 Cal. Rptr. 616 (1978); In re Marriage of Eastis, 47 Cal. App. 3d 459,
120 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1975). The latter decision holds that if community debt exceeds
community liability, § 4800 does not require the excess debt be assigned equally.
It is true that the statute calls for division of "property" and that the mention of
debt is in a 1976 (and hence post-Eastis) amendment calling on the court to "value
the assets and liabilities as near as practicable to the time of trial." 1976 Cal. Stats.
ch. 762, § 1, at 1801. Eastis is inconsistent with the notion of a community as an
equal partnership and should be judicially disapproved or legislatively abrogated.
If the wife is unable-because for example she must stay home with the children-to earn money to pay her half of the net excess debt, the appropriate remedy is a support award for her which will terminate upon change of circumstances
(e.g., she inherits $1 million). An unequal assignment of excess debt between the
supposed equal partners (CAL. CiV. CODE § 5105 (West Supp. 1980)) would be in
the form of a nonmodiflable final property award.
128. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b) (2) (West Supp. 1980). Use of community funds
would under most circumstances not be classified as "Misappropriation." Legislative history indicates that §4800(b)(2) envisions a serious, almost fraudulent
squandering of the community property. See Grant, How Much of a Partnershipis
Marriage?23 HASTINGS L.J. 249, 254-55 (1971).
129. Divorce courts have granted reimbursement under the "benefit" test but
jurisdiction to do so was not contested. See cases cited note 126 supra.
130. A separate action would waste the time of bar, bench, and the spouses.
Statutory amendments are in order to provide specifically that the divorce court
has jurisdiction to adjudicate reimbursement claims arising between spouses out
of expenditures of community and separate property and to render a judgment
that can be enforced against the obligor's separate property as well as his share of
the community property. A similar amendment to the Probate Code to give probate courts such jurisdiction is needed to prevent senseless multiplicity of actions.

Although one spouse's use of community funds to pay off a

"separate" debt smacks of a loan, apparently no California case
has awarded reimbursement with interest.' 3 ' It seems under
present law interest could be obtained only upon proof that the
spouses agreed to an actual loan. Arguably, one spouse's seizing
without consent of the other community funds to pay separate
debts without agreeing to pay interest is bad faith management
prohibited by Civil Code section 5125(e).1 32 I should think the
33
better rule would be a presumption that interest1 is owing un-

less the spouses have an agreement to the contrary or unless the
debtor spouse can establish some benefit to the community from
the use of its funds.
1. Departure from Benefit Test' 3 4
In one area present case law does deny reimbursement for pay131. The writer is unaware of a single case granting reimbursement with interest. It appears that the no-interest rule was borrowed from early Texas and Louisiana cases. But in those states income from a spouse's separate property during
marriage was then community owned; thus the community often benefited directly by keeping a spouse's separate estate in financial good health by the payment of some separate debts. It is suggested that the no-interest rule is a trade-off
for the special community benefit of ownership of rents and profits of the separate
estate in Texas and Louisiana. Reppy, Community and Separate Interests in Pensions and Social Security Benefits After Marriage of Brown and ERISA, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 417, 466-67 &n.178 (1978). Thus, the reason for the no-interest precedent in the civil law jurisdiction does not obtain in California, where the rents
and profits from separate property are also separate. CAT. Crv. CODE §§ 5107-5108
(West Supp. 1980). For a useful survey of reimbursement cases in all community
property jurisdictions, see Bartke, Yours, Mine and Ours-SeparateTitle and Community Funds,44 WASH. L REV. 379 (1969). See also Comment, The Husband'sUse
of Community Funds to Improve His Separate Property, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 844

(1962).
132. CAL. Crv. CODE § 5125(e) (West Supp. 1980). One can imagine, however,
situations in which the community did receive some benefit from the payment of
the separate debt to serve as a return to it in lieu of interest. The payment may
have prevented judicial sale of separate property of the debtor spouse regularly
used by the family (such as a pleasure boat, vacation cabin, etc.). Or the payment
may have been necessary to restore the debtor spouse's general credit in the community necessary for him or her to generate community gains (as well as to carry
on separate property projects).
133. If the payor spouse had no intent to defeat the rights of the other spouse,
simple interest should be calculated. If bad faith were found, a basis for ordering
compound interest would be present.
134. CAL. CIV. CODE §4800(b)(4) (West Supp. 1980), applicable at divorce,
provides: "Educational loans shall be assigned to the spouse receiving the
education in the absence of extraordinary circumstances ....

."

Note that this

does not direct the characterization of the loan debt, merely the assignment.
Education enables a person to earn either separate or community profits or both.
Unless some injury or the like has rendered the educated spouse unable to work,
it becomes a known fact that much of the earnings traceable to the education will
be separate. Thus a portion of the overall cost of the education is appropriately
classified as a separate debt (California does apportion a debt as part separate,
part community. See Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal.
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ing a "separate" debt with community funds. Following Weinberg
36
v. Weinberg,135 the recent decision of In re Marriage of Smaltz
classified alimony obligations owed by H to his first wife and paid
during marriage to his second wife as community debts! Although H used community funds to make the payments, reimbursement was denied at dissolution of the second marriage. The
benefit test was not used. Rather, the debt was found community
because the existence of community funds during the second

marriage (i.e., ability of H to pay) prevented H from having his

alimony obligation reduced.137 The court in Smaltz also stressed
that H acted in good faith, since he had no separate funds with
which to pay the alimony.
Under the appropriate community-or-separate benefit test
used to determine reimbursement rights good faith is irrelevant.
If W is to be an equal owner along with H of the community
under a scheme of equal management, her ownership rights are

lost if H's use of community funds for his separate purposes does
not convert W's community interest from a share of specific assets into a reimbursement claim. The approach to reimbursement
taken in Weinberg and Smaltz is illogical 38 and fails to protect
Rptr. 13 (1967)). Most likely all of the community benefit from the education can
be attributed to tuition already paid; hence all of the remaining loan debt at
divorce is likely to be characterized as separate and would be assigned to the
educated spouse without need of § 4800(b) (4).
At the death of the noneducated spouse, the unpaid loan debt should be
characterized as separate for the same reason. However, at the death of the
educated spouse, if the loan was acquired during marriage and the education was
not used to generate separate gains (as by investing separate property), the
obligation will have to be characterized as community.
135. 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
136. 82 Cal. App. 3d 568, 147 CaL Rptr. 154 (1978).
137. In Weinberg, unlike Smaltz, H had both community property of the second
marriage and separate property to use to pay alimony and child support and the
debts were apportioned as part separate and part community based on the
amount of each estate on hand when the payments were made.
138. Suppose before marriage H maliciously battered P while trying to remove
P from H's separate property. After marriage H earns great wealth. In P's tort
suit where punitive damages are sought, undoubtedly the jury will be advised as
to the amount of community wealth in deciding the appropriate measure of punitive damages. And under CAI. CIV. CODE § 5122(b) (West Supp. 1980) the community property can be reached to pay such damages once H's separate estate is
exhausted. Under the Weinberg-Smaltz approach to debt classification, at dissolution the obligation to pay punitive damages would be at least partly a community
debt (entirely so if at the time the damages were assessed H no longer had any
separate property) because the amount of damages depended on the amount of
community property.
Or consider a case where H before marriage settles a tort suit by agreeing to pay

each spouse's community interest. Legislative correction is in order.
2. Uncertainty at Death Dissolution
While divorce courts are clearly required to classify outstanding
debts as community or separate in dividing the community property, the statutes are unclear as to whether the same approach is
to be taken by a probate court with respect to outstanding debts
when death dissolves the community. California Probate Code
section 980(e) says that if the parties before a probate court (e.g.,
surviving spouse and decedent's personal representative) cannot
agree on how outstanding debts should be paid:
each debt shall be apportioned to all of the property of the spouses liable
for the debt, as determined by the laws of this state, in the proportion determined by the value of the property less any liens and encumbrances at
the date of death,
and the responsibility to pay the debt shall be allocated
139
accordingly.

Since community property is liable to creditors of H to pay most
of his separate debts, literally applied section 980(e) turns what
would be a separate debt at divorce into a partly community debt
at dissolution by death. For example, suppose H before marriage
defaulted on a contract with P and P obtained a judgment for
$100,000. H then marries and earns considerable community property. The marriage is dissolved when there is on hand $300,000 of
H's separate property and $300,000 community property (all H's
earnings). If dissolution is by divorce, the court will order H to
pay the debt and disregard it, as a separate debt, in dividing the
$300,000 of community funds. If dissolution is by the death of W
with a will naming her child as universal legatee, section 980(e)
appears to order reduction of the community estate (half of which
is subject to W's testamentary power) by $50,000, taken to pay P
even though the obligation to P was H's separate debt.140 Possibly the injustice can be avoided by allowing W's estate a creditor's claim against H for $50,000 after P has been paid, perhaps in
a collateral proceeding. But a strong argument can be made that
the legislature would not have wanted such circular proceedings
and would have provided for payment of separate debts at death
with separate funds if that was considered appropriate.
his victim five percent of all of H's future earnings so long as they both shall live.
Under Weinberg-Smaltz the obligation after H's marriage would be a community
debtl
139. CAL. PROB. CODE § 980(e) (West Supp. 1980).
140. If H's death had dissolved the community with a will leaving all to his
mother, § 980(e) would apparently reduce by $25,000 the half of the community
property owned by W. See CAr. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956).
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San Francisco attorney Max Gutierrez,1 41 has proposed a reasonable interpretation of section 980(e) to avoid the injustices
caused by literal interpretation. He contends the words "as determined by the laws of this state" makes reference to the case-law
doctrine that, ultimately, a spouse's separate estate should be responsible for his separate debts as well as to such statutory provisions as California Civil Code section 5116,142 allowing a separate
creditor, of H to levy on community property.1 4 3 Literally, however, the phrase "as determined by the laws of this state" refers
to property that is liable on a debt and not to the reimbursement
process. Thus, amendment of section 980(e) is urgently needed to
make clear that the apportionment called for is to be used only
when an outstanding debt cannot be classified as community, separate, or a specific mixture of both as determined under the benefit test.
D. Exceptions to the ManagerialSystem in California
1.

Tort Obligations

California Civil Code section 5122(b)144 imports from Arizona
the concept of "community" and "separate" torts not for the purpose of determining liability vel non but priority of liability.
Since all of the property subject to a spouse's management is ultimately liable to his or her tort victim, section 5122(b) is a refinement of rather than an exception to the managerial system of
determining liability of marital property.
The statutory test for characterizing torts is whether the injury
was inflicted while the obligor spouse was performing an activity
for the benefit of the community. If so, community property is
primarily liable, the tortfeasor's separate estate secondarily liable.
If the benefit test is not satisfied, the tortfeasor's separate estate
is primarily liable. After exhausting such separate property that
is nonexempt, the judgment creditor can reach community assets.
Undoubtedly the seizure of them gives the non-tortfeasor spouse
a right of reimbursement on behalf of the community at dissolution by death or divorce,14 5 although section 5122 says nothing
141. Supra note 126.
142. CAT_ Crv. CODE § 5116 (West Supp. 1980).
143. Gutierrez, supra note 126, at 12-13 passim.
144. CAL.CIrv. CODE § 5122(b) (West Supp. 1980).

145. There is no reported case of the community obtaining reimbursement from
the other spouse's separate estate prior to dissolution. The "black letter" law has

about that.
Any revision of the California statutes concerning debt collection should clarify an uncertainty created by section 5122 with respect to the procedures to follow in implementing it. Should a
court rendering a tort judgment classify the tort as separate or
community if asked to do so by a spouse, or is the classification to
be done in ancillary enforcement proceedings? If it is to be done
in the tort victim's suit, the spouse of the tortfeasor, one of the
parties protected by section 5122(b), 146 must be given the right to
intervene.147
always been that dissolution is the proper time of reimbursement. See generally
Provost v. Provost, 102 Cal. App. 775, 283 P. 842, 844 (1929). Prior to 1975 and the
adoption of equal management it made little difference when the reimbursement
occurred. If H's community earnings had been used to pay a separate tort obligation of H's and H later inherited great wealth, immediate restitution to the community would not have benefited W, for she would not have had any management
power over the newly constituted community assets. That is not true now. When
a separate tort creditor abiding by § 5122 has exhausted the tortfeasor's separate
property and then has seized some community property and the tortfeasor subsequently inherits separate wealth, an immediate reimbursement of the community
would be most beneficial to the spouse of the tortfeasor and her creditors. The
courts should realize that the older cases delaying reimbursement until dissolution of marriage are not compatible with the present equal management system in
effect in California since 1975. In particular, creditors of the spouse having the
right to claim reimbursement ought not to have to wait until dissolution to reach
the inchoate community property. Under pre-1975 law it was fairly clear in California that the creditors in such a situation could not benefit from the existing reimbursement claim. See Peck v. Brummagim, 31 Cal. 440 (1866). Even before equal
management, creditors in Washington were treated more favorably in such a case.
See Conley v. Moe, 7 Wash. 2d 355, 110 P.2d 172 (1941). It is not clear in Conley
whether the creditor, permitted to levy on the community-owned reimbursement
claim, would be allowed to assert it immediately and reduce it to cash by bringing
the cause of action against the separate estate or whether the creditor would have
to wait until dissolution to bring the cause of action he had garnished.
The proposed community property act for Wisconsin, supra note 104, creates a
cause of action for immediate reimbursement to the nondebtor's separate estate of
half the community property seized in satisfaction of a separate debt (proposed
§ 766.75). This sum would come from remaining community property, which will
be called marital partnership property in Wisconsin.
146. Protection afforded the non-tortfeasor spouse (the present preservation of
community property subject to equal management by the non-tortfeasor spouse
under CAL. CIy. CODE §§ 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1980)) is obviously preferable in
the eyes of that spouse (and particularly his or her creditors) to the loss of such
property (while tortfeasor's separate assets remain) and its replacement with a
community reimbursement claim not assertable until dissolution.
147. The tortfeasor himself is a protected party when the tort can be labeled
community, for § 122 enables the tortfeasor to shield his separate property if sufficient community property exists to pay the tort judgment creditor. Note that
tortfeasor, having committed a community tort, however, will not always be able to
engage in self help in this situation. The community assets may be in a bank account in W's name so that H cannot withdraw the funds to pay his tort victim. See
CAL. FuN. CODE § 851 (West Supp. 1980) and discussion in notes 183-87 and accom-

panying text infra. If W is not going to cooperate in enabling H to protect his separate property, as he is entitled to under CAL. CIV. CODE § 5122(b) (2) (West Supp.
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If the tort litigation does not result in classification of the debt
as separate or community, there must be an opportunity to obtain
such a classification in separate proceedings. A new statute is
needed authorizing the debtor or his spouse to seek an order directing the creditor to levy on properties of the spouses in an order to be determined. Both spouses and the creditor are
obviously necessary parties to such a proceeding and must be
given notice. The hearing preceding such an order would necessarily be an occasion for characterizing assets as separate or community as well as classifying the debt. The statute should provide
for charging the costs of the proceeding to the tortfeasor or conceivably to the tortfeasor's spouse if he or she initiates the proceeding.
A creditor needs statutory assurance that his levy of execution
will not be upset under section 5122 after it has been accomplished. Therefore, the statutory scheme should invite the creditor to give notice to the spouse of the tortfeasor (the tortfeasor
himself as a party to the tort suit is well aware that a levy of execution is imminent) that he or she has so many days to file with
the creditor a list of properties claimed to be primarily and secondarily liable under section 5122. The tortfeasor spouse should be
entitled to a court hearing in order to controvert the accuracy of
the priority list submitted by the non-tortfeasor spouse. If no action is taken by the notified spouse, a levy of execution conducted
after the specified period of time should be immune from an attack based on section 5122. Until a statutory procedure is enacted
the spouse seeking to invoke section 5122 apparently must utilize
whatever equitable procedures are generally appropriate to retain
a levy of execution. The author is unaware of any existing basis
for shifting the costs of such proceeding to the tortfeasor when it
is initiated by his spouse.
Any legislative attention to section 5122 should consider the following additional problems. First, the statute should authorize
characterization of a tort debt as part community and part separate in specific fractions.1 48 Apparently any community benefit
1980), H has to arrange for the tort victim to obtain a judgment, and then H must
take appropriate steps to assure that W's bank account is levied on.
148. See the example in W. REPPY, supra note 2, at 218, where the victim was
walking by a structure when a wall collapsed on him. The structure was owned
partially by H's separate estate and partially by the community. As § 5122 is now

written a literal interpretation could lead to the conclusion that any community

now makes the complete tort obligation community. Second, the
statute now applies only when the tort involves "death or injury
to person or property." Was this language intentionally chosen to
be narrower than all tort liability, and if so what torts are excluded? For example, is invasion of privacy an injury to the person? 149 Third, should a provision be added to allow one spouse to
enjoin the other from paying the tort debt with funds that are secondarily liable under section 5122? This problem is likely to arise
when the spouses are living separate and apart and jockeying for
property advantages. Suppose X has a personal injury judgment
against H. If it is classifiable as separate, H would like to use
community funds under his management to voluntarily pay off
the creditor.15 0 If the debt were community and W had access to
a joint bank account that included a large amount of H's separate
property, W might want to exercise her power to withdraw funds
from this account to pay X.
2.

Obligations Not in Tort

One prong of the basic premise of the managerial system of
debt liability, that property of the community is liable for the contracts of either spouse made after marriage, is codified in California Civil Code section 5116.151 The other prong, that a person's
separate property is liable for all of his or her obligations, is codified in section 5121.152 Section 51.16 was enacted as part of the
1975 equal management reform package. A preamble to one of
the four acts that constitute the reform states in pertinent part:
"The Legislature finds and declares that... the liability of community property for the debts of the spouses has been coextensive with the right to manage, and control community property
and should remain so .... "153 This is a statement of the manabenefit from the activity causing the tort (here maintenance of the building) renders the entire debt community. The case law relating to reimbursement at divorce arising from payment of community or separate debts with funds of a
different classification recognizes partition of the debt into its community and separate components. Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr.
13 (1967). But see note 138 infra criticizing the court for the approach it took in
making such a partition.
149. The present statutory language is useful in making clear that it is the fact
of injury caused to person or property that triggers § 5122. If the injured victim
waived the tort to sue in assumpsit (implied agreement to repair or pay restitution, for example), the courts will hold § 5122 implicated despite the fact that technically the action was ex contractu rather than ex delicto.
150. This would eliminate, during the period of living separate and apart, property in which H had an interest but which was liable to W's ordinary creditors
(i.e., not "necessaries" creditors).
151. CAL. Crv. CO E § 5116 (West Supp. 1980).
152. CAIL Crv. CoDE § 5121 (West Supp. 1980).
153. 1974 Cal. Stats. ch. 1206, § 1, at 2609. As observed in Comment, The Implica-
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gerial system theory. The reform legislation, however, left the
rule in some areas clouded, since it continued from prior law or
created several specific exceptions to the managerial system approach.
a. The "Necessaries"Doctrine
Under the "necessaries" doctrine the separate property of one
spouse may be liable for obligations incurred by the other and
probably even for contracts and quasi-contracts to which neither
spouse is a party. The doctrine is based on three statutes, all of
which were redrafted in 1973-74 as part of the equal management
reform legislation to be gender neutral. (Previously the statutes
imposed heavier burdens on H's separate property than on W's.)
Civil Code section 5121 provides:
The separate property of a spouse is liable for the debts of the spouse contracted before or after the marriage of the spouse but is not liable for the
debts of the other spouse contracted after marriage; provided, that the
separate property of the spouse is liable for the payment of debts contracted by either spouse for the necessaries of life pursuant to section
5132.154

Section 5132 reads as follows: "A spouse must support the other
spouse while they are living together out of the separate property
of the spouse when there is no community property or quasi-community property ....
1 55 The third relevant statute cuts back on
the necessaries doctrine with Civil Code section 5131, providing:
"A spouse is not liable for the support of the other spouse when
the other spouse is living separate from the spouse by agreement
tions of the New Community Property Laws for Creditors'Remedies and Bankruptcy, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1610, 1629 (1975), the context of this declaration was the
creation of a legislative history that would bolster the case for constitutionality of
retroactive application of the rights of W's creditors to reach community property
formerly managed solely by H and H's creditors to reach community property formerly managed solely by W. The desired holding was forthcoming in Roberston v.
Willis, 77 Cal. App. 3d 358, 143 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1978).
154. CAT. Civ. CODE § 5121 (West Supp. 1980).
155. Id. § 5132. The statute refers to CAI. Cirv. CODE § 4803- (West Supp. 1980)
for the definition of quasi-community property. In brief, that is property acquired
during marriage by a spouse while domiciled in another state which would have
been community on the facts had the spouse been domiciled in California. The
legislators probably had in mind domicile in a non-community property state, but
§ 4803 is more broadly drafted. It classifies as quasi-community property H's earnings while the couple were domiciled in Nevada, Idaho, Arizona, etc., before moving to California. It is suggested that § 4800 be amended so that its wording does
not make such out-of-state community property quasi-community for "pecking order liability" under § 5132.

unless such support is stipulated in the agreement." 5
(1)

6

Problems Defining a "Necessary of Life"

There are several cases defining "necessaries of life." As expected, they would include food, shelter, and medical care. 5 7 But
some rather surprising debts have been granted "necessaries"
status to make liable property not subject to the management of
the debtor spouse. In Wisnom v. McCarthy,158 W, who apparently
was in good health, hired a maid to do housework. The spouses
were living apart but not by agreement so that the predecessor of
section 5131 was not applicable. Because of the "economic and
social position" of the spouses, a maid for W was held to be a
"necessary of life," and H was held personally liable for the
maid's salary. The Wisnom court seems to have tortured the
necessaries doctrine out of sympathy for the maid, because when
the case arose community property was not liable for W's nonnecessaries contract. The decision reeks of an elitism that seems
inappropriate under contemporary attitudes about wealth and the
role of women. In such a situation today W should budget support funds she receives before 4ivorce under Civil Code section
4357159 to pay for the maid, and by no logic should H's separate
property be liable.
What is reasonably debatable is whether the wealth of the
spouses should ever affect the characterization of a debt as a
"necessaries" obligation. For example, hospital care is obviously
a "necessary" if a spouse is seriously ill. If a private room is contracted for though, should the added expense above that required
for the typical hospital room fall under the "necessaries" doctrine? It would be unfortunate to answer this question based on
the economic let alone social standing of the family. The fact that
the patient had always had the most expensive health care in the
past should not convert an extravagance into a "necessary."
Given cases like Wisnom, however, it is probably necessary to
156. Id. § 5131.
157. See, e.g., Davis v. Fyfe, 107 CaL App. 281, 290 P. 468 (1930); Evans v. Noonan, 20 Cal. App. 288, 128 P. 794 (1912); Smith v. Bentson, 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
789, 15 P.2d 910 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1952). Washington has held that defense
counsel for a spouse accused of crime is a "necessary" so that if the accused's
spouse has separate wealth, the defendant is not a pauper entitled to the services
of the public defender. State v. Clark, 88 Wash. 2d 533, 563 P.2d 1253 (1977). Such a
conclusion is logical but will lead to such bizarre results as requiring W to use her
separate inheritance from Mother to pay for H's defense against criminal charges
that he murdered Mother.
158. 48 Cal. App. 697, 192 P. 337 (1920).
159. CAL CIV. CODE § 4357 (West Supp. 1980).
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amend sections 5121 or 5132 to prevent the courts from using a
sliding scale based on wealth to determine what is a "necessary."
An ambiguity exists whether the necessaries doctrine applies to
debts -contracted by third persons or to contract obligations to
which neither spouse is a party. In CreditBureau of San Diego v.
Johnson,160 an accident rendered H unconscious and H's family
physician hired a specialist surgeon to operate on H. The court
said W would be liable.161 The applicable statutes then contained
wording similar to that found in section 5121, making that statute
applicable to "debts contracted by either spouse," and section
5132, imposing an obligation of "support" not limited to contracts
entered into by a spouse. Johnson apparently did not see the
problem-that the contract was made by the family physician, not
be either of the spouses. Or else it was clear to the court that
notwithstanding section 5121, the support statute, section 5132,
made W liable to the surgeon.
Before the 1975 reform legislation the statute directed at ifability of H's separate property avoided the problem, as the language
did not require a spouse to be party to the contract. 162 Thus, in St.
Vincent's Institutionfor Insane v. Davis,163 the creditor found the
insane W wandering around and took care of her without even
knowing .of H's existence. The court had no difficulty holding H
liable under the "necessaries" statute applicable then to husbands. Probably the courts would reach the same result today,
holding that section 5132 is the pertinent statute, and it does not
require that the obligations have been entered into by W (who
was insane in Davis and simply could not have made a contract).
However, to avoid uncertainty an amendment to section 5121 is
160. 61 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 834, 142 P.2d 963 (1943).
161. At that time under former CAL. CIrv. CODE § 171 (current version at CAL.

Cirv.

CODE

§ 5121 (West Supp. 1980)) most of W's separate property was exempt

from "necessaries" liability. Property that was separately hers because of gift
from H was liable, and if the couple had transmuted community property to joint

tenancy or any other form of separate property, W's separate interest was liable.
162. Former California Civil Code § 174, enacted in 1872, provided: "If the hus-

band neglect to make adequate provision for the support of his wife, except in
cases mentioned in 5131, any other person may in good faith, supply her with arti-

cles necessary for her support, and recover the reasonable value thereof from the
husband." CAL. CIV. CODE § 174 (current version at CAL. CIv. CODE § 5130 (West
Supp. 1980)). It certainly was sound of the 1973-74 legislature to drop the language

that limited the credit vendor to a quantum valebant suit and did not allow a suit
to recover the actual contract for the stipulated price.
163. 129 Cal. 20, 61 P. 477 (1900).

advisable. It should impose liability on a spouse's separate property for "necessaries" obligations whether or not contracted by
the other spouse.
(2)

Problems Arising From Reference to QuasiCommunity Property

Redrafting of section 5132 is urgently needed. It makes no
sense as written. The problem arises from the reference to quasicommunity property. This concept usually has legal significance
only at dissolution of marriage by death' 64 or divorce,165 although
the homestead law and gift tax law do recognize the concept dur66
ing the marriage.1
Suppose W buys necessaries on credit and does not pay. Her
creditor obtains judgment. In seeking to collect on it he learns all
the community property of the spouses is exempt under Civil
Code sections 690.1 et seq. and other applicable exemption statutes. W has no separate property. Assuming for the present, that
the judgment runs against H as well as W, can a creditor levy on
H's separate property? Section 5121 incorporates the limitations
in the necessaries doctrine found in section 5132, which applied
literally finds no support duty attaching to H's separate property
because community property does exist. That cannot be what the
legislature intended. The word "nonexempt" should be implied to
164. At which time CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 201.5-.8 give the surviving spouse an interest in the quasi-community property closely analogous to a community property half ownership. The Probate Code sections do not use the term quasicommunity property, but the definition of property covered by the sections is very
similar to the definition of-quasi-community property in the divorce context. See
CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.5(a) (West Supp. 1980). The difference is that at divorce,
but not death, the doctrine includes out-of-state realty. When the title holder dies,
it seems clear the Probate Code sections envision any court determining the rights
of the survivor to use situs law rather than California law. The quasi-community
property doctrine has no application when the marriage is dissolved by death of
the spouse not holding "title" to the property. Paley v. Bank of America, 159 Cal.
App. 2d 500, 324 P.2d 35 (1958). However, CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.5(b) (West Supp.
1980) seems literally to confer a testamentary power of appointment over half the
quasi-community property on the nonacquiring spouse who predeceases the titleholding spouse where there has been a change in form of the asset (e.g., a sale
and reinvestment of proceeds) after its initial acquisition in another domicile. A
technical amendment to conform subsection (b) to the language of subsection (a)
so that it covers only acquisitions originally made by the decedent spouse and not
the survivor spouse is in order.
165. In which case CAr. CiV. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1980) calls for dividing
the quasi-community property in the same manner as community property.
166. See CAL. REv. & TAx CODE §§ 15301, 15304 (West Supp. 1980). See also id.
§ 15303.5, allowing a tax-free transmutation from quasi-community to community
property. Respecting quasi-community property and homesteads, see Comment,
Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws: The Constitutionality of the "QuasiCommunity Property"Legislation, 54 C~Ax. L. REv. 252, 269-72 (1966).
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modify the term "community property" in section 5132. An
amendment to the section clarifying this ambiguity is in order.
Suppose the necessaries creditor's judgment is for $1,000 and
the nonexempt community property totals $500. There is some
community property on hand that is liable. Does section 5132
mean the separate property cannot be reached at all and the
necessaries creditor obtains only $500? Of course the legislature
did not intend such a result, and section 5132 must be construed
to authorize the creditor himself to exhaust the community property by levy of execution so that H's separate property is then liable.
A similar construction is compelled if the debt is $1,000 and
there is on hand $500 of quasi-community property owned by W
plus non-quasi community separate property of H. The creditor
can by initial levy exhaust the quasi-community property of W's
so that the conditions of section 5132 making H's separate property liable for necessaries are met.
Suppose, however, the $500 of quasi-community property is
owned by H, not W. By what authority may creditor levy on anything now? The quasi-community property is H's separate property, which, clearly, is liable under section 5121, but section 5132
qualifies section 5121 and limits its scope. Taking the statutes literally, apparently the creditor cannot reach any of the property
owned by H.167

Obviously that was not what the legislature intended. Section
5132 must have been intended to be a pecking-order statute. The
necessaries creditor can be required by the spouses to levy in the
following order: community property; and when it is exhausted,
quasi-community property; and when it is exhausted, separate
property of the nondebtor spouse. What is completely unclear is
where the separate property of the debtor spouse fits into the
pecking order? Suppose debtor W is separately wealthy but there
is no community property and none of W's separate property is
quasi-community. H has some quasi-community property. Can
W compel creditor to levy on H's quasi-community property?
Probably she can. Can H compel creditor to levy on W's ordinary
separate property because she is the debtor spouse? Probably
167. That is, read literally, § 5132 never imposes liability on nondebtor H's
quasi-community property and shields his "regular" separate property from liabil-

ity to the necessaries creditor so long as that quasi-community property exists.

not. Likewise, suppose both H and W have separate property that
is not quasi-community. Can nondebtor H compel the creditor to
levy on W's separate property? Apparently not.168
The logic that leads to section 5132's placing quasi-community
property on the pecking order before ordinary separate property
calls for revision of the statute to place the debtor spouse's separate property ahead of the nondebtor spouse's separate property
if the pecking order approach is to be retained. Apparently the
quasi-community property is to be reached by creditors before
the nondebtor spouse's regular separate property in order to preserve for him, the nondebtor, what will be 100% his (or his estate's) at dissolution by death or divorce. Where the necessaries
debt was incurred to benefit the debtor spouse herself (rather
than, for example, consisting of clothes bought on credit for the
couple's children) the case for protecting the nondebtor's
spouse's regular separate property at the expense of the debtor
spouse's separate property is arguably just as strong as the case
of protecting quasi-community property.
Rather than revising the current pecking order to make it even
more complex, the legislature ought simply to repeal section 5132
and remove reference to it in section 5121.169
(3)

Problems Concerning Rights of Reimbursement

If a "necessaries" creditor elects to levy on W's property or on
H's, can the spouse who ends up paying for the necessaries get
reimbursement as to a half share of the amount paid when the
marriage is later dissolved by divorce or death? Some language in
the case of See v. See,170 implies a fiat rule that any time separate
property of a spouse is used to pay for necessaries there can be
no reimbursement unless such reimbursement is based on an
agreement between the spouses. But See is readily distinguishable from similar situations arising today. See arose before equal
management under circumstances where all the community property of the couple was managed solely by H. The court was in a
position to declare that it was H's fault that the community property was exhausted when H used separate funds to pay for family
168. Cf. Estate of Weringer, 100 Cal. 345, 34 P. 825 (1893), where the issue was
whether W's estate, which may have included separate property, or H should pay

medical bills for care rendered to the dying W. Citing the necessaries statute, for-

mer CA. CIV. CODE § 174 (current version at CAL CiV. CODE § 5130 (West Supp.
1980)), the court apparently holds H responsible.
169. Elsewhere it has been recommended that § 5121 be reworded to extend the
necessaries doctrine to debts not contracted by either H or W. See text following
note 163 supra.
170. 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966).
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expenses.171
Under equal management it may be the "fault" of the spouse

not owning separate property that there was no community property on hand when the necessaries creditor had to be paid, allowing the seizure of the other spouse's separate property. The
nondebtor spouse may have foolishly invested the community
property or exhausted it on an extravagant spending spree. It

certainly is not the fault of the separate property owner in such a
case that no community property was on hand.
The See rule is also undesirable because a well-advised spouse
in most instances can readily avoid it. If he can get an unsecured
loan with the lender relying primarily on expected future community earnings for repayment,17 2 these loan proceeds can be used
rather than separate funds to pay the necessaries creditor. If subsequently acquired community funds are used to repay the

lender, See could not have any application. Even if separate
funds were used to repay the loan it is not clear whether the loan

itself would be treated as a family expense under See.
If, to avoid See, H as the owner of separate property borrowed
community funds from a bank to pay a necessaries creditor, the
community would have to repay with interest. Can H also avoid
See by the device of writing out a memo to the effect that his separate estate was making a loan (interest free) to the community?173 Why shouldn't the community get the benefit of such an
171. The court held H could not use "total recapitulation" accounting to classify
assets on hand as his separate estate--a process which lias a built-in reimbursement of separate funds used to pay community debts, including necessaries-because H there had commingled separate and community property and "fail[edl to
keep adequate records." Id. 'at 784, 415 P.2d at 780, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 892. But if the
commingling and absence of records occurred "through no fault of the husband"
he could employ total recapitulation accounting. Id. See Beam v. Bank of
America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971). Reimbursement would
be improper, according to See, because "the husband has both management and
control of the community property... [and] his use of separate property to maintain a standard of living that cannot be maintained with community resources
alone" offered no equitable basis for a reimbursement claim. 64 Cal. 2d 778, 785,
415 P.2d 776, 781, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888, 893 (1966).
172. There is a presumption that money borrowed during marriage is community; to overcome it the proof must show that the lender relied for repayment primarily on the separate property of a spouse. Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 259
P.2d 656 (1953); Ford v. Ford, 276 Cal. App. 2d 9, 80 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1969). As yet
there is no authority for apportioning the loan proceeds into part separate and
part community when the lender relied on both estates in mating the loan.
173. Cf.Newland v. Newland, 529 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (writ dismissed) (H's after-the-fact testimony that a transfer of funds from a community to

interest-free loan? But if See can so readily be avoided by H
scribbling out a memorandum of "loan" when he pays the necessaries creditor, the no-reimbursement rule is simply a snare for
the separate property owner lacking sharp legal advice.
See has been cited by the California Supreme Court in a case
dealing with post-1975 law as if its no-reimbursement rule were
still in effect,174 although apparently the full range of anti-See arguments have not been presented to the court. If See was correct
when decided, it was only because the case law as well as the
statutes were at that time conferring special benefits on wives to
indirectly compensate them for the more extensive management
powers over community property given husbands simply because
of their sex. For example, at the time of See, H had an unqualified duty to support W with his separate property but her separate property was liable for his support only if he was unable to
75
work because of "inflrnity."1
See should be legislatively abrogated or judicially overruled. If
it is to be retained at all, the See rule of no-reimbursement should
be made inapplicable to situations where, when community property is exhausted, both H and W own separate wealth. See
should also be inapplicable where, at the time a necessaries creditor must be paid, one spouse has separate property and the other
spouse none, but the latter, prior to dissolution of the marriage,
inherits or otherwise obtains separate wealth. If one of them pays
a necessaries creditor voluntarily or if the creditor levies only on
the property of one of them, it seems shocking, since the spouses'
support obligations are equal now under sections 5121 and 5132,
not to allow a reimbursement at dissolution that will result in the
spouses' separate estates sharing the task of supporting the family.176 Alternatively, a new statutory scheme could authorize one
separate account was actually a loan allowed H to avoid a rule of Texas law somewhat analogous to See).
174. In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 CaL 3d 76, 592 P.2d 1165, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413

(1979), holding H could not obtain reimbursement for necessaries paid for with his
post-separation earnings that were separate property of H's under the living-apart
doctrine, CAI. Civ. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1980). But Epstein was not a case
where W herself had separate wealth. The See rule was also reiterated in the unfortunate Lucas decision. See discussion of Lucas pp. 812-13 supra.
175. Compare former CAL. CMv. CODE § 174 (current version at CAr. CIV. CODE
§ 5130 (West Supp. 1980)) (H's separate property liable) with former § 176 (current version at CA. CIV. CODE § 5132 (West Supp. 1980)) (W's separate property
liable only upon H's "infirmity").
176. The new reimbursement rule could require W's separate estate to pay to
H's half of the net amount of family expenses paid for with his separate property
in excess of that paid for by W's separate property. Or pro-ration could be based
on the relative amounts of separate property each owned when the debt was paid.
That is, if H used $1,000 of his separate funds to pay a necessaries creditor when
there was no community property and he had $20,000 separate property and W
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spouse to direct the levying creditor to seize equal amounts of the
separate property of both H and W.
In sum, extensive revision of Civil Code sections 5121 and 5132
is needed to correct problems concerning rights of reimbursement. All reference to quasi-community property should be eliminated. Moreover, if the legislation abrogates See, distinguishing
between quasi-community and ordinary separate property in the
pecking-order statute (section 5132) will be unnecessary because
the separate estate will be reimbursed at dissolution.
(4) Need to Clarify Procedures
Sections 5121 and 5132 should be replaced by a statute that defines necessaries creditor so as to eliminate distinctions based on
wealth and social status. The statute should empower a necessaries creditor to levy execution on all marital property: community, H's separate property, and W's separate property, without
distinction. If the pecking order approach must be retained, the
statute should provide a procedure whereby a spouse can invoke
a priority-of-liability provision, directing the creditor to community property not managed by that spouse or to community property which that spouse cannot unilaterally convey to the creditor.
Where it is necessary to resort to separate property to pay the
necessaries creditor, the statute should authorize reimbursement
to the separate estate that paid the obligation, at least if the other
spouse has or later obtains separate property. The statute should
specifically state that if neither spouse invokes the priority-of-liability provisions, the creditor's levy cannot later be set aside even
if the creditor seizes separate property when nonexempt community funds were on hand.
The legislature should consider whether to continue in effect
the rule that the necessaries creditor cannot reach the separate
had $60,000, H's claim for reimbursement is for $750, since W should pay for 75% of

the obligation.
Reimbursement approached in either such manner should be granted even if
there was community property on hand at the time H paid the debt. Particularly,
this should be so if the community property was not liquid. It would be absurd to
require H to sell the family community-owned car, for example, in order to avoid
an anti-reimbursement rule that would apply if he used his separate cash then on
hand to pay the necessaries creditor. Reimbursement should be denied only if the
evidence shows that the spouse using separate funds for family expenses intended to waive the right to have the other spouse ultimately share a fair portion
of the family support burden.

property of a spouse who was not made a party to the action and
did not become a judgment debtor.177 This rule developed at a
time when the spouses practically lived separate in property.
There was no shared management. Under contemporary equal
management, if W is defendant she represents H in the litigation
so as to bind his half interest in the community property. Should
his separate estate be treated differently? Yes, if the spouses are
then living separate and apart, particularly if there is no community property (or very little of it) compared to the amount of the
nondebtor spouse's non-quasi-community separate estate. In
such a situation the debtor spouse would have little incentive to
defend the suit. In other situations, however, a needless multiplicity of actions results. The plaintiff who sues only the debtor
spouse may be surprised that nonexempt community funds on
hand are insufficient to pay off the judgment. Now, since plaintiff
did not add the spouse as a defendant, he has to burden the
78
courts with another suit if legally possible.1
(5)

Problems Arising when Spouses Are Separated

Section 5131,179 creates an exception to the necessaries doctrine
when the spouses are living apart by agreement. It should be repealed or redrafted. It should make no difference, when the issue
is the liability of one spouse's separate property for necessaries
supplied the other spouse while they are separated, whether the
separation was amicable (by agreement) or violent (no agreement). Indeed, the statute could penalize a spouse, who after the
separation, becomes destitute because of his or her reasonable attitude at the time of the separation.
It was recently suggested that the "agreement" referred to in
section 5131 is a formal, written contract governing the rights of
the parties while living apart.180 Such a limited scope for the statute would make it more acceptable, but still the question arises
177. See, e.g., Evans v. Noonan, 20 CaL App. 288, 128 P. 794 (1912); Credit Bu2d Supp. 834, 142 P.2d 963 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1952). To obtain judgment against the nondebtor spouse, the necessaries creditor need not prove that that defendant actually has any separate property. Credit Bureau of Santa Monica Bay Dist. v. Terranova, 15 Cal. App. 3d 854, 93

reau of San Diego v. Johnson, 61 Cal. App.

Cal. Rptr. 538 (1971).

178. Certainly a good argument can be made that there is no separate ca ise of
action against the debtor spouse and that the right to obtain a judgment rgainst
the latter has been rherged into the judgment against the former.
179. It provides: "A spouse is not liable for the support of the other spouse
when the other spouse is living separate from the spouse by agreement unless
such support is stipulated in the agreement." CA1. Crv. CODE § 5131 (West Supp.
1980).
180. In re Marriage of Epstein, 83 Cal. App. 3d 55, 147 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1978), vacated, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 592 P.2d 1165, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1979).
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why, if the formal agreement is silent about support obligations,
the law should assume that each spouse is waiving the right to
support. 181 When ambiguity arises, it would seem logical to construe the contract in favor of a continuing obligation of spousal
support. This is particularly so when the contrary approach compelled by section 5131 could force an indigent married person to
rely on welfare payments despite having a wealthy spouse.
In any event, there is authority contrary to the limited construction proposed for section 5131.182 Therefore at least some legislative consideration of the statute is imperative. The writer
recommends outright repeal; the support obligation should continue until it is specifically waived by agreement.
b. One-spouse Community Bank Accounts
California Financial Code section 851 provides:
A bank account by or in the name of a married person shall be held for
the exclusive right and benefit of the person, shall be free from the control
or lien of any other person except a creditor, and shall be paid to the person or to the order of the person, and payment so made is a valid and sufficient release and discharge to the bank for the deposit or any part
thereof.1 8 3

Where one spouse has deposited community funds in an account
in the name of that spouse alone, this statute creates an exception to equal management of the community by both spouses.184
However, the statute says, "a creditor" can levy execution on the
funds in the account. Does this mean just a creditor of the depositor? Section 851 was amended to sex neutral form in one of the
181. In an antenuptial agreement the support obligation cannot be waived as a

matter bf California's strong public policy. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Higgason, 10
Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973). The same rule would apply to a
contract made between the spouses after marriage but before a rupture of their
marriage relation.
182. Estate of Bose, 158 Cal. 428, 111 P. 258 (1910) (W left H without any discussion of property rights yet what is now § 5131 held to be applicable because, apparently, of an implied agreement to live apart).
183. CAL. FiN. CODE § 851 (West Supp. 1980). CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 7601, 11200
(West Supp. 1980) make similar provisions for savings and loan accounts and certificates in the name of one spouse.
184. CAI. Crv. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1980). The exception for bank accounts
seems reasonably necessary to avoid utter chaos for bankers. When W seeks to
withdraw money deposited by H, the bank cannot know if it is separate property
of H or perhaps community money of his § 5125(d) business. CAI. CIV. CODE
§ 5125(d) (West Supp. 1980); see text accompanying notes 188-97 infra. The bank
really cannot even be sure that the woman is the depositor's wife. It must be able
to rely on the contract of deposit and signature card in determining whether or not
to approve a withdrawal of funds.

four acts making up the 1975 reforms. It will be recalled, a preamble to a companion act declared an intent to have debt liability
follow management and control. 8 5 If this preamble is a gloss on
section 851, "a creditor" would refer only to a creditor of the
spouse having management power over the bank account.
I do not believe that was the legislative intent. The preamble
referred to stated a legislative policy intended to expand creditors' rights by giving retroactive effect to various new liability
rules; 186 there is no suggestion in the legislative history that the
preamble would be turned against the creditor. Thus, Financial
Code section 851 should be read in conjunction with Civil Code
section 5116187 making community property generally liable for
the contract debts of both spouses and Civil Code section 5122(b),
making community property liable for the torts of a spouse. Onespouse community bank accounts appear to be an instance where
a creditor can obtain by levy of execution property the debtor
spouse lacked power to voluntarily draw on to pay the obligation.
c.

One-spouse Community Business Assets

Civil Code section 5125(d) provides: "A spouse who is operating or managing a business or an interest in a business which is
community personal property has the sole management and control of the business or interest." 8 8 Once again the debt-liability
issue is whether this is to be construed in conjunction with the
statement of policy adopting the managerial system of creditors'
rights or California Civil Code sections 5116 and 5122(b) declaring
community property liable for the obligations of both spouses. If
W is the judgment debtor, can the creditor levy on community assets used in H's community business if W has never participated
in its management? 8 9 Resolving this question is much more difficult than resolving the related problem involving Financial Code
section 851, for section 5125(d) is obviously intended to give protection to the business-operating spouse, while the Financial
Code provision is intended to protect only the bank. If the man185. See text accompanying note 153 supra.
186. See note 153 supra; Reppy, Retroactivity of the 1975 California Community
Property Reforms, 48 S. CA L.I REV. 977, 1007-25 (1975).

187. See text at note 151 supra.
188. CAr. CIV. CODE § 5125(d) (West Supp. 1980).

189. Just what H might do to permit W to be viewed as participating in the op-

eration or management of the business is wholly unsettled and raises issues that
will be faced if community assets in a § 5125(d) business are not to be treated as

an exception to the managerial system of debt liability. I would assume that if W
even works as a clerk in a community-owned store where H is the nominal boss,

W will be viewed as sharing in the "operation" of the business so that the problem
does not arise. What if she just keeps the books?
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ager spouse is H, allowing W to deplete the community assets of
his business by going into debt and having judgments taken
against her followed by levy of execution on the community assets in H's business will very clearly cause substantial interference for H.
While no reported cases deal with the problem, the commentators have stated widely varying views. One commentator assumes the principles of the managerial system of debt liability
stated in the preamble apply so that none of the community assets in a section 5125(d) business operated by one spouse can be
reached by ordinary creditors (i.e., not necessaries creditors) of
the other spouse. 90 Another author apparently agrees that principles of the managerial system at least presumptively render
community assets in a section 5125(d) business not liable for the
debts of the non-manager spouse.191 However, it seems he would
permit such a creditor to reach those assets if the debtor spouse
192
would otherwise be insolvent.
Still another commentator, Professor Alan Pedlar in a student
comment, opined that the spouse operating the section 5125(d)
business can compel the creditors of the other spouse to first exhaust other property that is liable on the debt (i.e., the debtor's
separate property and community property that is neither exempt
nor nonliable) before attempting to reach the assets of the business.1 93 According to Professor Pedlar, if the creditor was still un190. Bruch, The Legal Import of Informal Marital Separations: A Survey of
Californiaand a Call for Change, 65 CALuF. L. REV. 1015, 1053 n.136 (1977). Prof.

Bruch cites me as sharing her view, but I do not. I believe § 5116 applies to the
community assets in a § 5125(d) business.
Agreeing with Prof. Bruch is Note, Dissolution of MarriageAfter the Discharge
in Bankruptcy: The Not So Fresh Start Doctrine, 10 PAc. L.. 861, 864 n.27 (1979).
191. H. VERALL, CA.IFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY 401 (3d ed. 1977).
192. [C]ommunity property can be removed from common control by investment in a business managed and controlled by one spouse. That removal from control of one of the spouses can be justified but if the effect is
to deprive the creditors of that spouse of assets available to satisfy their
claims, equitably and perhaps constitutionally, justification becomes diffi-

cult. In the past creditors have been allowed to trace community assets
from their debtor to the spouse of that debtor on dissolution of the marriage. It would seem that any transaction removing assets from availabil-

ity to creditors other than in return for fair value should permit similar
tracing by creditors.
Id. at 401 (footnotes omitted).
193. Comment, The Implications of the New Community Property Laws for
Creditors' Remedies and Bankruptcy, 63 CALF. L. REV. 1610, 1630-31 (1975). The

writer is Professor Alan Pedlar in his law student days.

paid he could not simply levy execution on the community assets
in the section 5125(d) business but would have to bring a special
creditor's bill in equity against the manager spouse. The judge
would determine how much community equity the manager
spouse needed to keep his business alive and would declare this
not liable.94 The judge would then make a charging order in the
amount of the additional community interest in the business
(that is, the value of the remaining equity not declared exempt)
which would be an equitable lien on the community profits of the
section 5125 (d) business. Apparently, too, Professor Pedlar would
allow creditors of the manager spouse whose claims relate to the
business to intervene and establish a priority in reaching the
community interest in the section 5125(d) business.195
Professor Pedlar's theory might reasonably be adopted in a legislative revision of the statutes relating to management power and
debt liability. But there is simply no legislative history at all to
support his idea that present section 5125(d) envisions treating
the one-spouse community business rather like a partnership
when it comes to creditors' rights. I have made what I hope is a
thorough review of the legislative history 96 and conclude that the
legislature just did not think about the creditors' rights problem.
The present law, therefore, is what the statutes say on their face,
and section 5116 says the community property is liable without
qualification for the contract debts of both spouses. Section 5122
makes the community property liable for the tort obligations of
both spouses. If W is the debtor and H the manager spouse, H
simply has no basis for objection if W's judgment creditor sends
the sheriff on a writ of execution to collect nonexempt equipment,
stock in trade, cash, etc., that happens to be an integral part of the
community business. 97 The remedy for H is to borrow some
money and pay off the creditor. Or he can incorporate the business. Then W's creditors would be able to reach corporate stock
rather than specific assets.
The legislature should provide a method short of incorporating
the business whereby the manager spouse could obtain the kind
of protection advocated in Professor Pedlar's comment. The statute could provide for recordation of an election by the manager
spouse to have a one-spouse community unincorporated business
treated as entity for creditors' rights purposes. The creditor of the
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 1633 n.125.
Id. at 1632.
See Reppy, supra note 186, at 990-1044.
It is assumed the business is neither incorporated nor an asset of a com-

mercial partnership.
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nonmanager spouse would acquire a share of the business rather
than breaking up the operation by a seizure of specific assets.
d. PrenuptialContractDebts
California Civil Code section 5120 provides: "Neither the separate property of a spouse nor the earnings of the spouse after
marriage is liable for the debts of the other spouse contracted
before the marriage."198 Of course, unless the nondebtor's community earnings have been placed in his or her own bank account
or are tied up in a business the debtor is free to use such funds to
pay a prenuptial creditor.
There is uncertainty as to how readily the nonliability benefit
can be lost. There is no case law under section 5120 interpreting
this question. However, an analysis of cases decided under former California Civil Code section 168199 is useful. The cases decided under section 168, which made W's earnings not liable for
H's debts, seem inconsistent. In one, a tractor had been
purchased partly with a known amount of W's community earnings and partly with other community funds. It was held W by
authorizing such an investment had "waived" the protection of
section 168 so that H's creditor could seize the entire tractor. 00
This would suggest that any change in form of the earnings
removes them from the protection of section 5120. The decision
also seems to bar any type of "uncommingling" where nonliable
earnings have been combined with separate property, as in a
bank account, or with other community property that is liable.
Other cases under former section 168 suggested W would successfully assert nonliability by identifying the earnings through
tracing and uncommingling. 2 01 Since the legislature thought
there was good reason for providing for nonliability of certain
classes of earnings, these latter cases seem correct in not holding
the benefit to be lost when tracing was possible.
198.
199.
(West
200.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120 (West Supp. 1980).
CAL. Crv. CODE § 168 (West 1954) (became § 5117 in 1970, repealed in 1974
Supp. 1980)).
Pfunder v. Goodwin, 83 Cal. App. 551, 257 P. 119 (1927). See also Street v.

Bertolone, 193 Cal. 751, 226 P. 913 (1924) (earning spouse is obliged to keep earn-

ings "separate and distinct" from property that is liable to the creditors).
201. Tedder v. Johnson, 105 Cal. App. 2d 734, 234 P.2d 149 (1951); Truelsen v.
Nelson, 42 Cal. App. 2d 750, 109 P.2d 996 (1941). Both cases state that the question
is whether the commingling of the earnings caused them to "lose their identity as

separate property."

The uncommingling problems raised by section 5120 are somewhat different from the usual case of uncommingling separate
from community property.2 02 Under section 5120 the problem
arises when one type of community property, earnings of the
nondebtor spouse, are mixed with other types of community
property. In this situation the presumption or inference that separate funds are withdrawn to pay separate debts and community
to pay family or community debts,203 cannot be employed to determine whether the earnings are still in or have been withdrawn
from a commingled bank account. About the only presumption
that could apply is that each withdrawal consists of a pro-rata
amount of the earnings and of other community property in the
2 04
account.
Probably the courts will reach these sensible conclusions without amendment to section 5120. However, if the legislature is going to rewrite the statutes applicable to debt collection from
married persons, section 5120 should either be repealed 2Os or a
clause added that the nonliability benefit is available so long as
the spouse can trace the earnings through changes of form and
any commingling back to the source in earnings. The amendment
should also make clear whether the legislature intends the nonliability benefit to attach to rents and profits of the earnings, as
when the spouse places them in a savings account and collects interest.
202. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79

(1975).
203. See Hicks v. Hicks, 211 Cal. App. 2d 144, 27 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1962); White v.

White, 26 Cal. App. 2d 524, 79 P.2d 759 (1938).
204. Where the issue was separate or community characterization of withdrawals for investment, such a pro-rata approach to uncommingling was used in one
case arising under Texas law. Duncan v. United States, 247 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1957).
But cf. rejection of this approach in an analogous circumstance in Estate of Adams, 132 Cal. App. 2d 190, 282 P.2d 190 (1955). See also Falk v. Falk, 48 Cal. App. 2d
762, 120 P.2d 714 (1941).
205. Apparently the reason for nonliability is to encourage marriage and eliminate one of the benefits of "living in sin." Absent § 5120, marriage would increase
the amount of property one party's creditors could reach by allowing access not
just to his or her own earnings but to those of the partner as well. However, under
current law the parties could achieve the same effect on creditors by an antenuptial contract to live separate in property after marriage. See text accompanying
notes 314-20 infra. One wonders why the legislature decided to encourage only
persons who had "contracted" a debt to marry. It would seem impossible to construe § 5120 as applicable to pre-marriage tort obligations, for example. If § 5120 is
not repealed, similar treatment of similar problems calls for expanding its coverage to all types of pre-marriage creditors.

[VOL. 18: 143, 1981]

Debt Collection
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

e. PrenuptialDebts Neither "Contracted"forNor
Having Caused "Injury or Damage"
Some commentators believe there remains after the 1975 reform
of th4 community property statutes a judge-made exception to
the managerial system of debt liability whereby one spouse's separate property is liable for certain types of prenuptial obligations
of the other spouse. 206 The theory is that there is still life in the
extraordinary decision of Johnson v. Taylor.20 7 Applying the English common law of coverture, Johnson held that when H married
W, her debts208 became his under the "one flesh" fiction English
law applied to marriage. 209
With respect to all tort liability, Johnson is abrogated by Civil
Code section 5122(a), providing: "A married person is not liable
for any injury or damage caused by the other spouse except in
cases where he would be liable therefore if the marriage did not
exist."210 In addition the only sensible construction of Seqtion
5120, dealing with debts "contracted" by H or W before the marriage, is that it lays out the only exception from the managerial
system of liability that will be applicable to such debts.211 The exception provided by section 5120 is that the nondebtor's community earnings are not liable for debtor's premartial contractual
obligations even though the earnings are subject to the debtor's
equal management. This construction would not permit a judicially created further exception whereby the separate property of
206. See Comment, The Implicationsof the New Community Property Lawsfor
Creditors' Remedies and Bankruptcy, 63 CALw. L REV. 1610, 1622-24 (especially
n.81 at 1622) (1975); H. VERAL , supra note 191, at 399.
207. 120 Cal. App. Supp. 771, 4 P.2d 999 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1931).
208. H. VErnaL, supra note 191, at 399, says the effect of the 1975 statutory reform eliminating gender discrimination from almost all aspects of California marital property law is to provide that "a married woman can be subjected to a similar
judgment [i.e., as H suffered in JohnsonI for the premarital debts of her husband."
He says § 5120 so provides. Nothing about it supports the assertion.
209. Because California became a community property jurisdiction in 1927, see
text accompanying notes 15, 38 supra, the Johnson court's reliance on the English
common law of marital property is plainly erroneous unless the record indicated
that only pre-1927 property was at issue. (Cases applying English common law to
pre-1927 California marital property include Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308
(1860); and Medical Finance Ass'n v. Allum, 22 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 747, 66 P.2d 761
(App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1937) (dictum).) However, nothing in the Johnson opinion
suggests that was the case. Apparently the court simply forgot that the 1927 enact-

ment switched California to a civilian system of marital property.
210. CAi. Civ. CODE § 5122(a) (West Supp. 1980).
211. Section 5120 is quoted in full in text preceding note 198 supra.

the nondebtor spouse would be liable.212
Prenuptial obligations not in tort and not contracted for, such
as statutory penalties, criminal fines, are unprovided for by specific statute. However, the preamble to the 1975 reform declaring
that liability generally follows management and control 213 is applicable and would not authorize imposing liability on the
nondebtor spouse's separate property. As to all prenuptial obligations, Johnson was erroneous when decided214 and should not be
the basis of any exception to the managerial system of debt liability.
f. Nonliability of Separate Property Where Community
Security Is Given
A little-known and unique statute, Civil Code section 5123(b)

provides:
The separate property of a spouse is not liable for any debt or obligation
secured by a mortgage, deed of trust, or other hypothecation of the community property which is executed on or after January 1, 1975, unless the
to the liability of the separate propspouse expressly assents in writing
2 15
erty for the debt or obligation.

This is a strange form of anti-deficiency judgment protection. If

the community security is insufficient, unlimited amounts of community property half owned by the debtor spouse and half by the
other spouse may be seized, but the debtor spouse's own separate

property is not liable.
The reason for the statute, originally giving protection only to
W, seems fairly evident. In 1917, legislation was enacted requir2 6
ing W's joinder when H sought to mortgage community realty. 1
It must have become commonplace when W attended the closing
212. It would seem to be a good idea for the legislature to avoid this construction problem by specifically providing that the nondebtor spouse's separate property is not liable.
With respect to community property not subject to the debtor spouse's control
(either under the financial code provisions concerning one-spouse bank accounts
or CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125(d) (West Supp. 1980) creating one-spouse community
businesses) the implication of § 5116 is that the common law theory of Johnson
should not be used to impose liability for prenuptial contract debts. This is a possible implication of § 5116's declaration that community property is liable for "contracts of either spouse which are made after marriage."
213. See text accompanying note 153 supra.
214. See note 209 supra.
215. CAL. Crv. CODE § 5123(b) (West Supp. 1980). With respect to pre-1975 instruments, only W's separate property is not liable, CAL Cirv. CODE § 5123(a)
(West Supp. 1980), although arguably the discrimination is unconstitutional because of sex discrimination. See Arp v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 935,
563 P.2d 849, 138 CaL Rptr. 293 (1977) (anti-male rule held invalid) with the "cure"
being to strike the language of § 5123(a), restricting it to post-1974 instruments.
216. 1917 Cal. Stats. ch. 583 § 2, at 829 (as amended, CAL CiV. CODE § 5127 (West
Supp. 1980)).
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of a credit transaction to pass her the promissory note itself to
sign as well as the mortgage or deed of trust. That signature
made W a co-debtor, and of course her separate property became
liable,
Why the legislature in 1973-74 extended the benefits of the protective statute to H rather than repealing section 5123 is unclear.
The statute is a snare that will trap unsuspecting creditors who
believe that taking security can only increase the rights the creditor obtains. The statute requires adding "boiler plate" waivers of
section 5123 to secured credit transactions. It should be repealed.2 17
217. See Carroll v. Puritan Leasing Co., 77 Cal. App. 3d 481, 143 Cal. Rptr. 772
(1978) (Kaus, J., concurring), suggesting that § 5123 was not intended to apply
when W signed a separate promissory note rather than a combination mortgage
and note. If the statute can be so construed, its repeal is not significant. I think it
incapable of Justice Kaus' interpretation, however.
Another reason for repeal of both § 5123 and § 5120's nonliability provisions is
suggested by Comment, The Implications of the New Community Property'Laws
for Creditors'Remedies and Bankruptcy, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1610 (1975), and Pedlar,
Community Property and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of1978, 11 ST. MARY'S L.
349 (1979). The reason suggested is that these nonliability provisions will be disregarded by federal bankruptcy courts. In the common situation where a debtor
spouse owns no separate property, § 5120 is of no significance to a creditor (who
doesn't care whose community earnings he is seizing) unless the nonliability provision excludes him from collecting on the debt. Similarly, § 5123 is primarily important where the creditor with community security cannot collect fully on the
obligation because the obligor's separate property is not liable. If the unpaid creditor forces the debtor spouse into bankruptcy, the nonliability may well be removed by force of federal bankruptcy law superceding state law regarding
liability. The new bankruptcy act permits the bankrupt to select either state law
or federal law exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1979). Because §§ 5120 and 5123 render
nonliable classes of property of unlimited value, it could very well be that the federal courts will hold that they are not "exemptions."
Under the old bankruptcy act, the Arizona rule making community property
nonliable for separate debts was respected in federal bankruptcy courts even
without statutory authorization to do so. Comment, supra, at 1657. See also In re
Wallace, 22 F.2d 171 (E.D. Wash. 1927); Moore, The Community Property System
and the Economic Reconstruction of the Family Unit Insolvency and Bankruptcy,
11 WASH. L. REV. 61 (1936). Prof. Pedlar's comment finds legislative history to the
effect that the new bankruptcy act was to be enforced according to its literal terms
making all nonexempt community property the "estate" which all classes of creditors can reach, see 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2) (1979), notwithstanding the contrary law
of Washington and Arizona where a debt was separate. Comment, supra, at 1660
n.282 (citing REPORT OF THE COmssSION ON THE BANxRR'rcy LAws OF THE UNITED
STATES, HIR Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I at 196-97 (1973).
The fate of the Arizona nonliability rule under the new act has yet to appear in a
reported decision. Logically, whatever happens to that rule should apply to the
nonliability provisions of §§ 5120 and 5123 of the California Civil Code, which are
really no more state "exemptions" than the Arizona rule. If bankruptcy courts are
going to disregard these nonliability provisions of California law, they will have an

g.

Child Support Obligations

Present California law is chaotic when it comes to child-support
obligations. Statutes are seemingly inconsistent, but it appears
that exceptions to the managerial system of liability do exist. A
large exception is carved out by Civil Code section 199, which provides: "The obligation of a father and mother to support their natural child[218 ... shall extend only to, and may be satisfied only
from the total earnings, or the assets acquired therefrom, and separate property of each if there has been a [judicial] dissolution of
their marriage .... -"219
However, Civil Code section 5127.6220 creates an apparent exception to the immunity of some classes of community property
extended by section 199. Section 5127.6 provides that "the community interest" of a parent in the earnings of his or her spouse
"shall be considered unconditionally available" for the support of
"any child who resides with the child's natural or adoptive parent
'22 1
who is married to such spouse.
effect only where they do not create an insolvency vis-A-vis the debtor spouse and
a particular creditor against whom the nonliability provision is asserted. Such a
limited scope for the statutes is probably not intended by the legislature, and repeal would be preferable.
218. Section 199 of California Civil Code was ruled unconstitutional in 59 op.
Cal. Att'y Gen. 15 (1976) because of discrimination in favor of bastards and against
legitimate children. The attorney general construed "natural" to mean legitimate.
This meant that a bastard could reach all his father's wife's earnings under CAL.
CIV. CODE § 5116 (West Supp. 1980) while a legitimate child could reach none. Because of the use of the word "natural" in § 5127.6, see note 221 and accompanying
text infra, it appears that the legislature intends the word to mean a child related
by blood rather than adopted. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.6 (West Supp. 1980). Under
this approach, § 199 is unconstitutional for discriminating in favor of adopted children and against children born to the parents. The former can reach all of the
earnings of their father's wife for support, while similarly situated nonadopted
children can reach none. The "cure" seems to be to remove the special-benefit for
adopted children by applying § 199 to them too. Legislation amending § 199 to
make it apply to adopted as well as "natural" children is in order. Moreover, since
natural normally means bastard when applied to a child, BLAcK's LAw DIcTiONARY
303 (4th ed. 1951), the connective legislation should substitute the term-blood-related for natural in both § 199 and § 5127.5 if it wishes to draw such lines.
Section 199 does not apply when the first marriage of a parent is dissolved by
death and the parent then remarries. Suppose father H is the survivor and the
children are placed in the custody of their maternal grandparents. To the extent
that § 199 controls liability, the earnings of W-2 are liable (because the statute
makes no exception to the basic rule that what H manages, his creditors can
reach) but they would not be if W-1 were alive. Whether such discrimination in
favor of children who have only one parent living denies equal protection is unclear.
219. CAL. CIV. CODE § 199 (West Supp. 1980). The italicized words were added
by the 1979 amendment. 1979 Cal. Stats. ch. 1030, § 1, at 2.
220. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.6 (West Supp. 1980).
221. Here the word "natural" obviously means related by blood. Section 5127.6
goes on to state that the amount available is to be reduced by the amount of "any
existing previously ordered child support obligations of such spouse." One com-
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Certainly a question exists whether the language "is considered
unconditionally available" means that it really is available to the
children. If so, then section 199 does not fully apply 222 where the
children are living with one parent and a spouse of that parent
who is not the children's parent. Rather, such children can reach
the parent's half interest in the nonparent spouse's earnings.
Thus, a partition of the community of the kind the supreme court
says cannot happen 223 will happen. Presumably the remaining
half interest becomes the separate property of the wageearner
spouse. 22 4 Whether a change of form in the money earned, as by
investment in securities, changes the nonparent's earnings into
some other form of community property protected by section 199
has yet to be considered in any reported case or by any com22 5
mentor.
Where the children are not living with the parent owing child
support and the wife is the obligor parent an exception to section
199 arises under Civil Code section 5127.5.226 Section 5127.5 extends liability of the community for the wife's child support bementator believes that 5127.6 was designed solely to establish a childs eligibility
for welfare. See C. BRUCH, MANAGEMENT POWERS AND DUTIEs UNDER CALIFORNIA'S
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAWS 47 (California Law Revision Commission Doc. No. 80-

90, 1980).
222. But note that § 199 still shields not only the non-parent spouse's half interest in his or her earnings but all community property that is not the "earnings" of
either H or W, such as community property acquired by gift or transmutation
from separate property, gambling winnings, lost objects found by H or W during
marriage, etc.
223. Britton v. Hammell, 4 Cal. 2d 690, 692, 52 P.2d 221, 222 (1935). But see
Mitchell v. American Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 220, 167 Cal. Rptr. 760
(1980), holding that an attempt by one spouse alone to encumber community realty results in an effective partition by encumbering the half interest of that
spouse. The opinion has dictum that one spouse can convey his half interest in
community realty to a third party. This hideous decision denies the protection for
the non-joining spouse that CAi. CIV.

CODE

§ 5127 (West Supp. 1980) intended by

its joinder requirement: keep community realty intact unless both spouses decide
to alienate it. Immediate and retroactive legislative abrogation of Mitchell is imperative.
224. Compare how New Mexico apparently handles such a partition of the community by a creditor at text accompanying note 120 supra.
225. Compare the split of authority arising under former Civil Code § 164 (current version at CAr. CIv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1980)) that immunized W's
earnings from H's debts, discussed in text accompanying notes 200-01 supra.
226. CAL. CiV. CODE § 5127.5 (West Supp. 1980). In re Marriage of Brown, 99
Cal. App. 3d 702, 160 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1979), holds that the children of W can sue her
for support either under § 199 or § 5127.5. Since the latter makes more property
liable, the choice will invariably be § 5127.5, unless the plaintiffs fear stirring up
problems of gender discrimination not considered in Broum.

yond her own earnings as follows: 'The wife's interest in the
community property, including the earnings of her husband, is li-

able for the support of her children to whom the duty of support
is owed .... "'227
Section 5127.5 was enacted in 1971 when H's earnings were subject only to his management and would not have been liable at all
for any obligations of W except for "necessaries." Since the subsequently enacted section 199 was inconsistent with it, section

5127.5 seemed to have been impliedly repealed by the 1975 reform
legislation. 228 However, legislation in 1979 referred to section
5127.5 as if still in effect, 229 and it is therefore not surprising that
2 30
at least one appellate court agreed that it was.

The statute, by calling for a partition of the community, thus
reduces the extent of the exception to the managerial system of

liability created by section 199 for child support cases. However,
section 5127.5 as written is surely unconstitutional for a discrimi-

nation against women that cannot be rationalized. 23 1 The likely
cure is to apply it to the support obligation of male parents as
well as female parents.
E. Debt Liability When Spouses Live Separate and Apart
The rules of law concerning liability for debt do not change
when the spouses begin living separate and apart, but the practical differences are extensive. California Civil Code section 5118
makes the "earnings and accumulations" 2 32 of both H and W after
such a separation 233 the acquiring spouse's separate property. It
227. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.5 (West Supp. 1980). The section goes on to exempt
W's half interest in the first $300 per month earned by H and her interest in community earnings H uses to pay his own child support obligations.
228. See Bonanno, The Constitution and "Liberated" Community Property in
California-Some ConstitutionalIssues and Problems Under the Newly Enacted
Dymally Bill, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 97, 106 (1974).
229. Section 5127.6, quoted in part in text preceding note 221, supra, begins as
follows: "Notwithstanding Section 5127.5, the community property interest ...
[etc.]."
230. In re Marriage of Brown, 99 Cal. App. 3d 702, 160 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1979).
231. See C. BRUCH, supra note 221, at 46 n.90. The male parent's half interest in
his wife's wages are immunized by § 199 to his benefit, so he can bequeath this
half interest at his death, will be awarded it at divorce, and can manage it prior to
dissolution.
232. CAL. CrV. CODS § 5118 (West Supp. 1980). Support H pays to W while they
are separated has been held an "accumulation" of hers which becomes her separate property under § 5118. In re Marriage of Wall, 29 Cal. App. 3d 76, 105 Cal. Rptr.
201 (1972). Probably all gains accruing after the separation will be separate property on one theory or another except rents and profits from pre-separation community property. See In re Marriage of Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 119 Cil. Rptr.
590 (1975).
233. As to what kind of living arrangement triggers § 5118 to make subsequent
earnings separate, see Loring v. Stuart, 79 Cal. 200, 21 P. 651 (1889); In re Marriage
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is thus not liable for the other spouse's debts.234
Second, H and W probably each take with them or keep certain

community assets existing at the time of separation and purchase
with community cash then on hand new assets necessary when
one household splits into two. A judgment creditor of H is perfectly free to levy execution on the nonexempt community assets
located at W's household, for under no theory of marshaling of assets 235 is such community property any less liable on the
preseparation community debt than community assets in H's
apartment. 23 6 If debtor H is uncooperative and is concealing asof Baragry, 73 Cal. App. 3d 444, 140 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1977); Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal.
App. 3d 209, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976); Makeig v. United Security Bank & Trust Co.,
112 Cal. App. 138, 196 P. 673 (1931), and the excellent analysis in Bruch, The Legal
Import of Informal Marital Separations: A Survey of CaliforniaLaw and a Call
for Change, 65 CALiF. L REV. 1015 (1977). See also Comment, Living Separate and
Apart Under Section 5118 of the Family Law Act-Effects and Implications of the
Baragry Decision, 6 W. ST. L REV. 183, 193 (1979).
234. If the spouses were living apart not by agreement, the separate property
would be liable for "necessaries" acquired by the other spouse. See text accompanying notes 156, 179-82 supra.
235. Comment, The Implications of the New Community Property Laws for
Creditors'Remediesand Bankruptcy, 63 CALIF. L REV. 1610, 1642-48 (1975), asserts
that CAL. CIrV. CODE § 3433 (West 1970) (a general provision authorizing an order
marshaling assets, that is, establishing a priority of liability) empowers one
spouse to compel a separate creditor of the other spouse to first exhaust the
debtor's separate property before levying on community property. The argument
is sensible, but there is no case authority for it when the spouses are married at
the time of levy of execution. (For the law after divorce, see note 254 infra.)
Under the commentator's theory, relief could be obtained with respect to most
debts incurred by the other spouse after separation. Under the benefit test, they
will usually be separate debts, incurred to maintain the new separate household
or to generate earnings under CAL. Crv. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1980). (But a
post-separation community debt is certainly possible-e.g., a purchase on credit of
supplies used to repair and maintain a community-owned rental unit which, despite the separation, will continue to produce community rents and profits.) The
nondebtor spouse could compel the creditor to first exhaust the separate property
of the debtor (and post-separation earnings will likely be on hand). However,
once that is done it seems impossible to distinguish, in the marshaling process, between community assets in the possession of the debtor spouse and community
assets in possession of the nondebtor spouse who seeks marshaling.
236. It may well be that H and W's dividing possession of various community
assets at the time of their separation involved an express transmutation between
them that the assets would from then on be the separate property of the spouse in
possession. Or an implied transmutation might be found. The extent to which W,
in the hypothetical in text, could defeat H's creditor by proving such a transmutation is discussed in text accompanying notes 304-09 infra.
Even if a transmutation of ownership cannot be established, the separation may
be the occasion for a management agreement whereby H gives up all control over
community assets to be possessed by W and she gives up control over all such assets to be possessed by H. Under the managerial system of debt liability, W could

sets, the well-advised creditor will not bother with supplemental
proceedings but simply send the sheriff to W's house to collect
237
nonexempt community assets.
Third, separated spouses who obtain legal advice save the postseparation earnings that are separate property under section 5118
and consume community funds on hand. This is done because
the community funds can be seized by the other spouse's general
creditors, while only that spouse's necessaries creditors can reach
the postseparation earnings (and only on a showing that the separation was not by agreement). Additionally, the community propdivorce while separate
erty will be divided at a subsequent
property is retained by the owner.2 38
With respect to the separated spouse's own community debts,
use of separate funds to make payment risks a finding later of gift
that might bar reimbursement. 23 9 If the debts are separate, as
most postseparation obligations will be, the voluntary use of community funds to pay them while conserving separate property will
not technically provide much of a benefit to the spouse, since the
other spouse will have a right of reimbursement. 240 From a practical standpoint, however, the spending spouse and his attorney
could reasonably conclude it was beneficial to have nondivisible
separate property on hand at divorce, with the burden on the
other spouse to prove a debt paid was a separate debt in order to
241
obtain reimbursement.
If one of the spouses is in a position to obtain support payments
from the other, Civil Code section 4805 is some help in preventing
invoke this agreement as a basis for deflecting H's creditors from community
property now managed solely by her. The effect of § 5116 in such a case is unsettled. In any event, such a management contract could no more defeat H's creditors than could a transmutation of ownership interests.
237. The very difficult problem of how many exemptions exist in this situation
is an issue happily beyond the scope of this article.
238. Compare CAL. CrV. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1980) with Robinson v.
Robinson, 65 Cal. App. 2d 118, 150 P.2d 7 (1944).
239. Cf. Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853, 614 P.2d 285 (1980).
The no-reimbursement rule has been relaxed for a separated spouse to one extent:
if earnings that are separate under § 5118 after separation are used to pay a community debt existing before separation that is not for necessaries (i.e., not covered
by the spouse's duty to use separate funds to support the other spouse and their
children), such use of separate funds is not a gift and the right to reimbursement
may be later asserted. In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 592 P.2d 1105, 154
Cal. Rptr. 413 (1979); In re Marriage of Smith, 79 Cal. App. 3d 725, 145 Cal. Rr .r. 205
(1978).
240. See, e.g., Somps v. Somps, 250 Cal. App. 2d 328, 58 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1967); In
re Marriage of Walter, 57 Cal. App. 3d 802, 129 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1976).
241. There is also the point that interest has never been granted in a reimbursement situation. See note 131 supra. Using community funds to pay the postseparation separate debt allows the debtor spouse to keep separate funds in an
interest-paying account or otherwise use them to generate separate income.
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the payor spouse from draining off the community property. 242 If
suit for divorce or legal separation is commenced, 243 the court
may order support or alimony payments to be made. Section 4805
provides that the order shall require the payor spouse to first
draw on postseparation earnings which would have been community property had there been no separation; only when such separate earnings are exhausted shall the payor resort to community
funds to pay support. Section 4805 also assures the payor the
right, however, to exhaust community and quasi-community property before resorting to ordinary separate property.
Revision of section 4805 in 1974244 to require separate earnings
to be used before community property in paying spousal support
during separation 245 reflects concern that the debt-payment process where spouses are living apart can cause harm to one or both
spouses. Additional statutory protection seems advisable. A statute specifically allowing the nondebtor spouse to require the
other spouse's separate creditors to first exhaust separate property of the debtor spouse would resolve any doubts as to whether

the general marshaling statute, section

3433,246

applies in such a

case. Additionally, a statute should provide that where during or
after separation the spouses made a voluntary division of physical
possession of the community property (even if they did not intend to transmute the property to separate property), the
nondebtor spouse can compel community or separate creditors of
the other spouse to first exhaust community property in the possession of the debtor before levying on property possessed by the
247
spouse seeking this type of marshaling.
242.
243.
244.
245.

CAT. CIV. CODE § 4805 (West Supp. 1980).
See CAL. Crv. CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1980).
See 1974 Cal. Stats. ch. 1329, § 1, at 2885.
Section 4805 states that its order-of-payment provisions apply to "any de-

cree, judgment or order of support" rendered under the family law act. This would
include a decree of ordering post-divorce alimony. However, § 4805 cannot be construed to allow the alimony obligor to pay with community property not divided
by the divorce court and now tenancy in common property. See, e.g., Gorman v.
Gorman, 90 Cal. App. 3d 454, 153 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1979). Use of such funds to pay the

support obligation would require turning over $2 for every $1 owed.
246. CAT_ Crv. CODE § 3433 (West 1970).
247. The procedure should authorize the creditor to object on the ground that
forcing him to locate community assets of the debtor spouse would cause him to
incur costs that he might not be able to recover. The nondebtor spouse should be

cautious in invoking the proposed remedy. For example, suppose the debtor is W;
she now possesses such assets that no support order will be issued against H. If
her creditor takes the community property in her possession, her financial status

F. Liability on PredivorceDebts Where Levy Occurs After
Dissolution
In making an equal division of the community property, the divorce court must identify all unpaid outstanding or contingent
debts, value them, and order one of the spouses to pay each debt
or a specified part thereof.248 But such an order is not binding on
a creditor of either spouse 249 unless the order was entered in a
proceeding in which the creditor was a party. Former community
assets awarded to the nondebtor spouse, say W, become her separate property after divorce. However, the assets remain liable to
H's creditors who at the time of divorce have a judgment against
hiM250 or creditors to whom H is in default and who obtain their
judgment after the divorce. 25 1 By the logic of these decisions the
former community property now owned solely by W would also
be liable, if the contract was entered into before the divorce although the breach occurred after the divorce, even though the divorce court ordered H to be responsible for the obligation. A
Washington case illustrates this.252 During marriage, in operating
a community motel business, H contracted to rent from plaintiff
television sets for the motel rooms. H and W were divorced, the
court awarding H the motel and W other community property. H
was ordered to be responsible for the debts of the motel business.
At the time the community was dissolved the motel owed some
$500 in television set rentals; thereafter further defaults on rental
occurred. The court held the rental contract not severable into
subrental periods, and thus in its entirety it was an obligation
made by H during marriage. W was an appropriate defendant in
plaintiff's suit for breach of contract, since property she owned
was liable for the breach.
In all cases where W pays any part of a debt assigned to H by
the divorce court, she will have a cause of action against him for
reimbursement of the amount paid, hopefully with interest from
(together with the other criteria considered under CAr. Cry. CODE § 4801 (West
Supp. 1980)) will entitle her to a support order, which H must pay out of separate
earnings, H might possibly be better off and probably could not be hurt by just
paying W's creditor with community property in his possession.
248. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Chala, 92 Cal. App. 3d 996, 155 Cal. Rptr. 605
(1979). See also Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 592 P.2d 1165, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413
(1979); Wilson v. Wilson, 33 Cal. 2d 107, 199 P.2d 671 (1948); In re Marriage of Eastis, 46 Cal. App. 3d 459, 120 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1975).
249. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Mantz, 4 Cal. 2d 322, 49 P.2d 279
(1935).
250. Vest v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 2d 91, 294 P.2d 988 (1956).
251. Bank of America Nat'l Trust &Sav. Ass'n v. Mantz, 4 Cal. 2d 322, 49 P.2d 279
(1935).
252. Baflin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 893, 425 P.2d
623 (1967).
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the date of her payment. Additionally, the law should imply a
right on her part to reimbursement of all litigation expenses, including attorney's fees. Additionally, when the creditor institutes
action after H and W have been divorced, there is authority that a
court of equity will order marshaling of assets by an order compelling the creditor to first exhaust the assets now owned by the
253
debtor spouse.
May the creditor levy against former community property now
owned by W after divorce when the judgment runs only against
H? In other words, is W a necessary party if post-divorce execution is to be levied against her property? Clearly she is not a necessary party if the judgment is obtained before divorce. 25 4 Under
current California law it would seem not to matter that the suit
was filed against H and the judgment obtained while he and W
were living separate and apart, since the equal management statute does not cut off the power of each spouse acting alone to bind
255
the community property when a separation occurs.
When the suit is commenced against H before a final divorce
decree and the creditor obtains his judgment on the debt after divorce, one California case indicates W is bound although she was
not made a party.256 This seems necessary as a practical matter.
If the creditor begins the suit while divorce is pending, equal
management is in effect. Also before a final divorce decree, even
if the spouses are separated, the creditor cannot be sure there
will ever be a divorce. W's lawyer in the divorce suit should be
able to find out about the litigation and bring it to the attention of
the divorce court. Probably, a separated W can intervene in the
suit against H as a party defendant to protect her interests.27 So
253. Mayberry v. Whittier, 144 Cal. 322, 78 P. 16 (1904) (dictum).
254. See Mayberry v. Whittier, 144 Cal. 322, 78 P. 16 (1904) (dictum); Vest v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 2d 91, 294 P.2d 988 (1956).
255. CAL CIV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1980). The obvious need for legislative
attention to this problem is discussed in Bruch, The Legal Import of Informal Marital Separations: A Survey of CaliforniaLaw and a Callfor Change, 65 CALF. L.
REV. 1015 (1977). See also Cross, Equalityfor Spouses in Washington Community
Property Law-1972 Statutory Changes, 48 WASH. L. REV. 527, 543-45 (1973).
256. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Mantz, 4 Cal. 2d 322,49 P.2d 279
(1935) (assuming, which is not clear from the facts, that the final divorce decree
was obtained after the interlocutory decree period without substantial delay). The

problem of whether W was bound by the judgment against H as a privy of his was
not discussed.
257. The fact of separation distinguishes the situation where one spouse becomes a party during marriage and cohabitation in litigation affecting the community. I have elsewhere taken the view as to this situation that the spouse first

long as H is the statutory co-manager of the community property
when suit is filed, it would not deny due process to place on W
the status of H's privy in order to make the judgment binding on
her interest in the community property awarded to her at a subsequent divorce.
Where the creditor begins the suit after divorce, the state of
Washington requires that W be made a party if former community property now owned by her is to be bound.2 58 Due process
would seem to require as much, since the co-manager relationship on which privity could be based if the suit began before divorce is absent. California courts can be expected to follow the
Washington precedent without a statute,259 yet legislative codification is desirable because there are difficult related problems
that need legislative solution. First, may W assert counterclaims
and set-off available to H? Surely she should be able to do so, but
some procedure must be fashioned to assure that the judgment of
the court on such defensive claims is binding on H so that the
creditor will not have to relitigate them with H. The statute then
should provide that W may assert defensively all claims H could,
including those claims not related to the community. However, to
260
do so W must make H a party.
The second question is whether the creditor has any prejudgment remedy such as attachment to prevent W from consuming
the only property she possesses that is liable on the debt, former
community property. It would seem that so long as W receives
consideration for her expenditures such as food, medical care,
rental housing, etc., the creditor has no legitimate basis for commaking an appearance as a party "seizes control" of the community interest in the
suit, disabling the other spouse from filing documents, dismissing counsel, etc.
See Reppy, supra note 101, at 1021.
258. Northern Commercial Co. v. E.J. Hermann Co., Inc., 22 Wash. App. 963, 593
P.2d 1332 (1979). Cf.Credit Bureau of Santa Monica Bay Dist., Inc. v. Terranova,
15 Cal. App. 3d 854, 93 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1971) (W's necessaries creditor must make H
a party to be able to reach H's separate property).
259. If W has moved out of state, the transaction entered into by H will have
sufficient connections to California (at least if H and W were domiciled in California when H entered into it) that long-arm jurisdiction can constitutionally be had
over W. The community, of which W was a member, will almost certainly have
sufficiently availed itself of the benefits of California law so that either community
partner can be subjected to service of process out of state or by publication. As to
the present due process standard for long-arm service, see Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
for long-arm jurisdiction in all situations where the state and federal constitutions
permit its exercise. CAL. CrV. PRo. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
260. For the reasons stated in the preceding footnote, W ought to be able to get
long-arm jurisdiction over H with respect to the issues she seeks to raise because
of the likely close connection between H and the debt that has brought W into
court. The Californini divorce decree ordering H to pay that debt should itself be
ample basis for such long-arm jurisdiction.
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plaint. Anytime the law makes certain classes of property liable
to a creditor and other classes not liable or exempt, the debtor is
invited to consume the former and preserve the latter. That W
will do all she possibly can to consume the former community

property prior to rendition of judgment against her is something
the creditor is well aware of prior to bringing suit.
Finally, what form should the creditor's judgment against H
and W (or just W) take? Should it determine what assets are former community property? Should it be an unlimited judgment
against W with the issue of what property is liable postponed to
the execution stage of proceedings? Analogous cases indicate

that the creditor need not identify at the trial any property W possesses that is liable on H's debt.26 1 If W permits an unlimited
judgment to be entered against her, she may waive the nonliability status attached to her property that is not former community

property.262 Since there is no authority directly on point, legislation resolving all such uncertainties would be useful.
G. Debt Liability and Property of UnmarriedPersons Living
Together as if Married
1.

Voidable Marriages

A marriage declared voidable by California Civil Code sections

4401 and 4425,263 is treated as a marriage for all purposes under
the law until a party with standing to attack it obtains a judgment

2 65
of nullity,264 California's cumbersome new term for annulment.

261. Credit Bureau of Santa Monica Bay Dist., Inc. v. Terranova, 15 Cal. App. 3d
854, 93 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1971).
262. See Carroll v. Puritan Leasing Co., 77 Cal. App. 3d 481, 143 Cal. Rptr. 772
(1978), holding nonliability of separate property under CAT. CIrv. CODE § 5123 is
waived if not raised at trial and recited in the judgment. Carroll is distinguishable
in that it involved a wife who was a primary debtor, not just the owner of property
that is liable. The distinction may not be significant, however, because the requirement that the judgment list the nature of property that is not liable may be
for the benefit of the sheriff levying execution subsequently. A smooth execution
procedure is needed whether or not the spouse sued is primarily liable or derivatively liable as the owner of property that is liable.
263. Section 4401 (as well as section 4425(b)) make a bigamous marriage voidable and not void if the former spouse was missing for five years before the second
"marriage" and reputed to be or believed to be dead. Section 4425 makes marriages voidable where consent of a "spouse" is tainted by minority, insanity, or
fraud or when one spouse has proved to be permanently impotent. CAT. Crv.
CODE §§ 4401, 4425(b) (West 1970).
264. Estate of Gregorson, 160 Cal. 21, 116 P. 60 (1911), indicating standing is conferred on the aggrieved "spouse" and such persons as conservators who protect

The annulment then retroactively wipes out the community. 266 If
a spouse establishes putative status by showing a good faith belief in the validity of the marriage, 267 acquisitions which were
community property are called quasi-marital property in the annulment proceedings. 268 If neither spouse establishes putative
status, the rules applicable to "Marvin" relationships 269 apply.
No case has decided whether a preannulment creditor of one of
his or her interests but not on strangers to the marriage. Certainly a creditor will
not have such standing. (Seldom would a creditor benefit from such an attack, but
he could if he had contractually agreed to look only to separate property of a
spouse to obtain repayment of a loan, for example. Voiding the marriage would
make at least half of the debtor "spouse's" earning debtor's separate property, and
perhaps all of it.)
265. See CAL CIV. CODE §§ 4450, 4451 (West 1970).
266. Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 P. 441 (1911) (declaring property that had
been community no longer was and that community property rules regarding division on dissolution would "apply by analogy" in favor of a putative spouse); In re
Marriage of Trantafello, 94 Cal. App. 3d 533, 156 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1979). See generally
Comment, The Void and Voidable Marriage:A Study in JudicialMethod, 7 STAN.
L. REV. 529 (1955), observing the retroactive invalidation of all effects of the voidable marriage is the "black letter rule" but that many exceptions are recognized
(citing, e.g., People v. Godines, 17 Cal.App. 2d 721, 62 P.2d 787 (1936) (annulment
does not eliminate claim of marital privilege for pre-annulment communications)).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4429 (West 1970) states: "The effect of a judgment of nullity is to
restore the parties to the status of unmarried persons." This certainly does not
mandate retroactive change in the community status of acquisitions prior to the
annulment.
267. It is unsettled whether, if one of the "spouses" was in good faith but the
other knew of the defect preventing a valid marriage, the latter can take a quasimarital half share in the acquisitions of the good faith "spouse" that were community property before annulment. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 75, 134
Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), notes and specifically refrains from deciding the issue while
overruling on other grounds In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 862 (1973), which had declared the nonputative "spouse" could benefit from
the quasi-marital property doctrine.
Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CALIF. L, REV. 937,
947-52 (1977). The authors think Cary was wrong and that only a putative spouse
has standing to invoke § 4452. Under Cary it would be impossible for one party to
the union to be a putative spouse but the other not, yet § 4452 directs the court to
"declare such party or parties to have the status of putative spouse" (emphasis
added).
Apparently the very instant one of the "spouses" learns of the invalid marriage
he or she loses putative spouse status. Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d
708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948). Suppose Pam "married" Ed in good faith, but he knew that
he had never been divorced to dissolve a prior marriage. The couple had several
children. Years later Ed confessed the bigamy and agreed to get a divorce quickly
from his first wife. Pam chose to stay with Ed and forgive him, especially because
of the children. The Lazzarevich rule means that Pam has no community or
quasi-marital interest in any of Ed's earnings accruing after his confession. The
rule apparently reflects what I consider a totally unrealistic notion of morality.
The rule is preposterous and should be legislatively abrogated. Section 4452
should be amended to provide that putative status once attaching continues until
annulment or death of a party, at least absent unusual facts making this inequitable. See Jackson v. Swift & Co., 151 So. 816 (La. App. 1934).
268. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1980).
269. See note 7 supra and text accompanying notes 283-92 infra.
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the "spouses" to a voidable marriage can be adversely affected by
an annulment's retroactively eliminating the community. For ex-

ample, Joe and Sue marry, he having obtained her consent by
fraud. Joe incurs large debts. Sue frugally saves her earnings
and successfully invests them. Sue learns of the fraud and sues
for annulment, with a judgment rendered shortly before Joe's
creditors levy execution based on judgments they obtain against
him. If the marriage had been valid we know the dissolution judg-

ment would not bar creditors from levying on Sue's earnings
awarded her at divorce. But what happens when Joe and Sue's
marriage has been declared void and annulment decreed? If the
effect is retroactive as to creditors, all of Sue's earnings are not
liable on the ground they were retroactively converted to her sep27
arate property. 0
It seems possible that if Joe's creditor could establish that Sue
and Joe had held themselves out as married and the creditor relied on that in entering into his transaction with Joe, some sort of

estoppel might arise to prevent Sue from denying the community
status of her preannulment earnings. 2 71 However, it is unlikely a

creditor could prove that he knew Sue was holding herself out as
married or, if he could prove that, establish the further element of
estoppel that he dealt with Joe in reliance on his being married to
2 72

Sue.

Interestingly, however, the cases involving estoppel and the effect of annulment on third parties have not required evidence of
270. Joe's necessaries creditors could not reach Sue's separate property if full
retroactive effect were given to the annulment decree, because Sue would never
have had a duty to support the man she was never married to. It is conceivable
that, notwithstanding the fraud that tainted the marriage, an implied Marvin-style
sharing contract could be found between Joe and Sue. If that agreement made her
earnings co-owned by Joe, his creditors could perhaps reach a half interest after
the annulment. See text accompanying notes 271-75 infra.
271. There certainly would be no problem raising an estoppel if Sue were the
spouse who knew of the defect of the marriage. On the hypothetical facts, however, if Joe defrauded Sue and she had no reason to know that when she held herself out as his wife, she has no knowledge of the true facts superior to that of the
creditor, and one of the usual elements of estoppel in pais is absent. Mott v.
Nardo, 73 Cal. App. 2d 159, 166 P.2d 37 (1946) (no estoppel where knowledge of
facts by parties is "equal").
272. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 623 (West 1966). Comment, The Void and Voidable
Marriage: A Study in JudicialMethod, 7 STAN. L REV. 529 (1955), opines that the
relation back of the fiction of annulment law should not be used to the harm of
third parties who relied on the existence of the marriage and that the "reasonable
expectation of creditors" should be given weight.

any reliance by the third party. In one,2 73 a woman's status as

trust beneficiary would terminate on her marriage. She "married"
but then obtained an annulment. The court held her estopped to
deny the marriage, conceding the alternate trust beneficiaries had
not taken any action in reliance on the apparent marriage but
holding this was irrelevant. A statute provides that "[a] judgment
of nullity is conclusive only as to the parties to the proceeding
and those claiming under them."274 In enacting this, it is doubtful
that the legislature had in mind the rights of creditors of the parties to an annulment. However, the statute is susceptible of the
interpretation that creditors can avoid the retroactive effect of annulment without proving the elements of estoppel in pais such as
2 75
reliance, unequal knowledge of actual facts, etc.

Since the law is so uncertain in this area, a specific statute is
advisable. The statute should provide that annulment of a void
marriage shall not bar creditors from asserting the former community property status of assets now owned by the "husband" or
"wife".
2. Void Marriages
Incestuous and most bigamous marriages are declared void ab
initio by statute.27 6 If both parties know of the defect, the union
will be treated as a "Marvin" arrangement. 277 If both parties believed in good faith that the union was valid, at annulment their
earnings will be quasi-marital property and distributed like community property at divorce. 2 78 The case law is also quite clear
that prior to annulment the earnings of the parties that would be
273. Stoner v. Nethercutt, 8 Cal. App. 3d 667, 87 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1970). Cf. Watson v. Watson, 39 Cal. 2d 305, 246 P.2d 19 (1952); Estate of Lemont, 7 Cal. App. 3d
437, 86 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1970).
274. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4451 (West 1970).
275. See note 272 supra.
276. CAL.CW. CODE §§ 4400, 4401 (West 1970).
277. See text accompanying notes 284-92 infra.
278. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1980). See note 267 supra, observing

the uncertainty as to whether both "spouses" obtain the benefits of the quasi-marital property doctrine when only one was in good faith. Obviously this uncertainty
should be legislatively resolved. Legislation specifically extending the quasi-mari-

tal property doctrine to dissolution of the union by death is also needed. At present, the courts must apply the doctrine by analogy on the basis of equities when
dissolution is by death. Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779
(1974). See also Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948) (decided
before the quasi-marital property statute was enacted). The quasi-community
property system is made applicable at death (although that term is not used),
CAL. PaOB. CODE §§ 201.5-201.8 (West Supp. 1980), as well as at divorce, CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 4803, 4800(a) (West Supp. 1980). Similar symmetry seems desirable for
the quasi-marital property doctrine.
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279
community in a valid marriage are not community property.
One decision implies that the "spouses" prior to annulment own
such property as tenants in common. 280 Under basic principles of
debt liability the creditor of each could seize only a half interest.
There is no authority whether a necessaries creditor of one
"spouse" to a void marriage can reach separate property of the
other spouse when the creditor cannot raise an estoppel in
pais.281

However, most cases dividing earnings at annulment of the void
marriage speak of doing equity. These cases necessarily deny

any ownership interst in the "spouse" of the party making the acquisition. 282 On this theory, the creditors of the acquiring
"spouse" could seize all of his earnings but none of the other
"spouse's" earnings.
For creditors' rights purposes a void marriage should be treated
as valid. The voidness of the marriage should be a problem between the spouses, not something reducing the rights of third'parties. For debt liability purposes, at least, the creditor should be
able to treat the earnings of each party as community property.
Since the courts are unwilling to take this step, 283 it is up to the
279. See, e.g., Goff v. Goff, 52 Cal. App. 2d 23, 125 P.2d 848 (1942). It matters not
that both may have believed in good faith that their marriage was valid.
280. Sousa v. Freitas, 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 89 Cal Rptr. 485 (1970). Earnings
from a business in which both parties to the marriage worked might also be held
as business partnership property.
281. In the context of married couples, the necessaries doctrine seems to rest
on the obligation of support. See CAL. CIrv. CODE § 5121 (West Supp. 1980) (referring to CAT_ CrV. CODE § 5132 (West Supp. 1980)). See also CAL CIV. CODE § 5131
(West Supp. 1980). A statute authorizes a good faith putative spouse to a void or
voidable marriage to obtain alimony pendente lite. CAL CIrv. CODE § 4455 (West
Supp. 1980). Thus, at least where the necessaries debtor is such a putative spouse,
it would appear that the basis for permitting the creditor to reach the separate
property of the debtor's "spouse" exists. I recommend legislation imposing the
duty of mutual support on parties who have gone through a marriage ceremony
(whether the marriage was void or voidable). The statute should make clear that
creditors can invoke it.
282. See, e.g., Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal 335, 191 P. 533 (1920); Estate of
Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974). A curious statute, CAL Cirv.
PROC. CODE § 872.210(b) (West 1980), provides that no action to partition quasimarital property can be brought. This does not necessarily mean, however, that
the nonacquiring spouse has a property interest before annulment in what CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1980) calls quasi-marital property. If the parties to
the invalid marriage (each being a putative spouse) combined their earnings to
buy land, it would be quasi-marital, and partition before annulment would be
available absent the bar of § 872.210.
283. Under Spanish civil law, on which the post-1927 California system is based,

legislature to make such a reform.
3.

"Marvin" Relationships

Persons who live together as if they were married but who have
never attempted to marry, or have gone through a ceremony both
knew was invalid, are said to be involved in a meretricious relationship.284 This term suggested a sort of lawless union, but now
that the much discussed case of Marvin v. Marvin285 gives considerable legal protection to parties based on the implications of that
relationship, some new term seems needed. This article will refer
to these relationships as Marvin relationships or arrangements
and the parties thereto M (for male) and F for (female).
The Marvin decision approved enforcement at the termination
of a living-together arrangement of an expressed or implied contract to share earnings so long as the contract was not for prostitution. Disapproving a contrary court of appeal case, 28 6 Marvin

also held that provisions of the Family Law Act, such as Civil
Code sections 5105 and 5110,287 did not apply to such a relationship to make the earnings of M or F community property by force
of statute. Marvin is silent on how, prior to a judgment enforcing
the express or implied contract, the earnings and other onerous
acquisitions of M and F are owned. Under the contract theory of
Marvin, this could depend on the intent of the parties.
Suppose the agreement was that M and F would co-own the onerous acquisitions of each as tenants in common. Once that form
of ownership was achieved, the creditor of each could seize a half
interest in each asset but could not reach the half interest of the
nonobligor cohabitant. The problem is whether the law would
give effect to a contract that sought to have tenancy in common
status arise ipso facto as money was earned or property was
otherwise onerously acquired without the acquiring spouse makthere is infact a community of property when both spouses are in good faith. See
LA. CrV. CODE ANN.arts. 117, 118 (West 1952). The many cases stating that there
can be no community of property without a valid marriage reject the civil law.
This has forced California courts to turn to equitable principles and analogies to
achieve the just results that are straightforward under the civil law doctrine. Occasionally the California courts have refused to fashion a device to give a good
faith spouse the benefit of the civil law rule. Thus, a putative spouse was denied
the status of heir of her "husband" in Estate of Levie, 50 Cal. App. 3d 572, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 445 (1975), an outrageously bad decision especially in its misunderstanding
of the policy behind CAL CIV. CODE § 4104 (West 1970) to validate rather than invalidate marriages. Enactment in California of LA. Cirv. CODE ANN.arts. 117-18
(West 1952) is long overdue.
284. W. REPPY &W. DE FuNiAx, supra note 2, at 66.
285. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815 (1976).
286. In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
287. CAL. Cir. CODE §§ 5105, 5110 (West Supp. 1980).
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ing any assignment or delivery. If some act of assignment or delivery were required to create the cotenancy and if the acquiring
cohabitant had not carried out such act with respect to acquisitions on hand when the other party's creditor levied execution,
the creditor would have to assert the right to garnish the debtor's
contractual claim (to sue for damages or specific enforcement).
There is no authority whether a Marvin-based contract claim can
be garnished or creates third party beneficiary rights.288

The problem of the need for delivery or assignment to carry out
the promise of coownership also arises if the express agreement
between M and F is that their onerous acquisitions will be community property. Such an agreement raises additional problems.

Since there is no marriage, the assets cannot be owned as true
community property. The contract should be construed as making applicable to the M-F relationship as much of the community
property law as can lawfully apply. That should include the rules
of Civil Code sections 5116 and 5122 that the earnings, and other
onerous acquisitions, of M are liable for the contract and tort
debts of F incurred during the relationship. 289 A contract specifically declaring such liability would surely be construed as creating third party beneficiary rights in F's creditors. 290
288. There is no reported case yet of a creditor claiming as third party beneficiary under a Marvin contract. In Planck v. Hartung, 98 Cal. App. 3d 838, 159

Cal.

Rptr. 673 (1979), M, while using F's barbecue apparatus, negligently caused a fire
destroying plaintiff's property. Plaintiff apparently sought an unlimited judgment
in tort against F on the theory that barbecuing the meal was a joint venture. The
court affirmed a judgment dismissing the claim against F. That was erroneous.
Plaintiff should have been allowed to prove a Marvin-style contract adopting by
analogy the principles of community property and sue on it as a third party beneficiary. Applying CAi. CIV. CODE § 5122(b) (West Supp. 1980) by analogy, M committed a community tort and F's earnings during the relationship are primarily
liable. If the parties were married, it is true, F would not be a necessary defendant, but that type of analogy to community property law was not the reason for
dismissal. Given the uncertainty of remedy against a Marvin relationship cohabitant under facts like Planck v. Hartung, obviously F had to be made a party defendant if plaintiff was to reach F's earnings. The court said: "If Hartung [M] and
McDavid [F] had been married, there would have been no liability on the part of
McDavid (see Civ. Code, § 5122, subd. (a).)" 98 Cal. App. 3d at 842, 159 Cal. Rptr. at
675. The court's failure then to deal with the implications of subdivision (b) is surprising.
289. CA_.. Crv. CODE §§ 5116, 5122 (West Supp. 1980).
290. The argument against the creditors would be as follows: sections 5116 and
5122 make only co-owned earnings liable to the creditors of both H and W. The
earnings of M, a Marvin relationship cohabitant, are separate property and not coowned until he carries out his promise to share by making a delivery to F or executing documents of assignment.

Of course, few parties to a Marvin relationship will have made
a formal, written contract. Even where such a contract exists, it
may be vague on the issue being considered, such as, "We agree
to share everything fifty-fifty." Probably most often any contract
found under the Marvin doctrine will be implied rather than expressed. In such circumstances the law has to fill in the gaps for
the parties. The possibilities are: (1) incorporation of as much of
the community property rules as the law allows, including the
promise to subject one's earnings to liability for debts of the other
party incurred during the relationship; (2) ownership of earnings
as tenants in common; (3) ownership by the acquiring party alone
subject to a contractual duty to share fifty-fifty such acquisitions
when the relationship ends by death or splitting up.
In a case where the creditor is lead to believe that M and F are
married and acts in reliance thereon, both parties should be estopped to deny that their agreement is alternative number (1).
The analogy to community property that alternative (1) provides
probably allows the creditor to reach all the earnings of both
spouses in most instances. Even when the creditor cannot raise a
technical estoppel, public policy ought to place the burden of
proof on the cohabiters to establish that their Marvin contract
was not of the type most favorable to third parties. Legislation
codifying such a rule is recommended.
The legislature should also consider the wisdom of a statute imposing obligations of mutual support on parties to a Marvin relationship so that if the contract between the parties were clearly
not type No. (1) a supplier of necessaries to one of them could
still reach the separate property of the other.291 It may be argued
that the recommended package of legislation almost approaches
recognition of a common law marriage. 292 But fairness to credit
vendors would be served by such a step. After the Marvin decision has given legitimacy, and so many of the benefits of community of property, to the relationship the supplier of medical care,
food, rent, etc., on credit should not be denied the benefits of the
291. Compare Gerlach v. Terry, 75 Cal. 290, 17 P. 208 (1888). Apparently M and
F were living in a meretricious relationship. M employed a physician to care for
F. The court held her separate property not liable on M's contract with the physician.
292. There is one important area, however, where community-style obligations
built upon a Marvin contract foundation will be treated very differently from the
effect given to a true community of property following a marriage: federal taxation. When the community arises out of a contract and not as a matter of law at
the time of marriage, the Internal Revenue Service treats the resulting co-equal
ownership as arising from an assignment of income. Commissioner v. Harmon, 323
U.S. 44 (1944). There appears to be no consideration in money or money's worth
for the assignment, see 26 U.S.C. § 2511 (1979), so the gift tax implications are staggering.
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necessaries doctrine applicable to married persons when it turns
out the debtor is actually living "in sin."
IV.

INTERACTION BETWEEN CREDITORS' RIGHTS LAW AND
TRANSMUTATION PRINCIPLES

The basic rule is that a third party entering into a transaction
with H or W wherein the spouse may become an obligor takes his
debtor as he finds him. To state the obvious, if third-party T contracts with H at a time H has already been divorced from W,
when T later obtains judgment against H for breach T cannot possibly have any claim on W's earnings accrued at any time, except
insofar as H had a cause of action against W that T might garnish.
T also could not reach any property H had given to W at any time
unless the conveyance was made with actual intent to defeat H's
creditors. 293
Where the method of conveyance under attack by a subsequent
creditor is a husband-wife transmutation, two major problem areas arise: (1) the timing of the conveyance and what is necessary
to make it effective; and, (2) the proof and formalities necessary
to establish the conveyance, in particular whether the spouses
can assert against third parties the right to make oral transmutations of realty and whether third parties can impeach the
spouses' written records to increase their creditors' rights. Somewhat different problems arise from agreements merely shifting
management and not ownership.
A.

Transmutationsand the Problem of Delivery
1. Gifts and Sales
As has already been noted,294 gift transmutations between H

293. CAI. Crv. CODE § 3439.07 (West 1970) (corresponds to UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES ACT § 7, 9B UN FORM LAWs ANNOTATED at 138 (West 1966)).
This was also the rule at common law. See, e.g., Kane v. Desmond, 63 Cal. 464
(1883) (H made bona fide gift of piano to W and then went into debt); Horn v. Volcano Water Co., 13 Cal. 62 (1859) (completed gift binding on subsequent creditors
unless intended to defeat creditors); North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Ingalls,
109 Cal. App. 147, 292 P. 678 (1930) (H solvent when bona fide gift to W made via
creation of life insurance benefits). If the intent is to defeat creditors existing only
at the time of the gift, subsequent creditors may nevertheless invoke such intent
to have the conveyance set aside. Sasaki v. Kai, 56 Cal. App. 2d 406, 133 P.2d 18
(1942). See also Severence v. Knight-Counihan Co., 29 Cal. 2d 561, 177 P.2d 4

(1947).
294. See text accompanying notes 21-53 supra. Even when the donor and donee

and W can be made informally; no documents of assignment are
necessary and no delivery of tangible items is required for the gift
to be valid between the spouses. However, a number of informal
transmutations changing ownership which were seemingly valid
between the spouses have been held not to bind creditors because of Civil Code section 3440, providing in pertinent part:
Every transfer of personal property... made by a person having at the
time the possession or control of the property, and not accompanied by an
immediate delivery followed by an actual and continued change of possession of the things transferred, is conclusively presumed fraudulent and
void as against the transferor's creditors while he remains in possession
295

The statute has been applied unflinchingly in the context of marital property transfers where a formal delivery and change of possession could have been expected only for the sake of legal ritual.
In Murphy v. Mulgrew, 2 96 W purchased 297 some horses from H
pursuant to a bill of sale signed by him. The animals remained in
a barn on the homestead occupied by H and W, and H continued
in his capacity as manager of the homestead to use the horses.
Notwithstanding the formalities of the bill of sale, H's creditors
were allowed to seize the horses under section 3440.298 Similar
are unmarried, if they live together the law loosens up the delivery requirementat least to bind the parties to the alleged gift. Where the new owner wishes to
keep the gift in the same location occupied by both parties, no symbolic movement of the tangible property off the premises and back on again is required. See
Robinson v. Hoalton, 213 Cal. 370, 2 P.2d 344 (1931) (father-to-son gift of livestock
on farm where both lived); Estate of Raphael, 115 Cal. App. 2d 525, 252 P.2d 979
(1953) (mother-to-son gift of furniture in house they both lived in); Graham v.
Griffin, 66 Cal. App. 2d 116, 123, 151 P.2d 879, 882 (1944) (father-to-daughter gift of
cow on ranch where both lived).
295. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440 (West 1970). The statute lists several exceptions-such as transfers of choses in action, cargoes at sea, and wines in wineries. The
transferee can also bind creditors by recordation of the transfer in certain instances. It has been noted that the exceptions relate to "transactions of limited
importance to the domestic setting." C. BRUCa, supra note 221, at 67 n.137. Section 3440 is not part of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act. It evolved from
an 1830 New York law that exempted good faith transactions. S. RiESENFELD,
CREDITORS' REMEDIES Aim DEBTORS' PROTECTION 405-06 (3d ed. 1979). It was first
enacted in California as part of the 1872 Field Code.
296. 102 Cal. 547, 36 P. 857 (1894).
297. Section 3440 applies to transfers for full consideration as well as to gifts.
298. An earlier and apparently contrary decision, Morgan v. Ball, 81 Cal. 93, 22
P. 331 (1889), held that W did take possession of a horse and buggy she acquired
from H even though H continued to use it much as before the transfer. See also
Kane v. Desmond, 63 Cal. 464 (1883) (H "delivered" piano to W-how he could do
so without keeping possession himself not explained). Morgan has been limited
to its fact situation in which the horse and buggy "seem[ed] to have been publicly
known and recognized as hers by all who used it." 81 Cal. at 97, 22 P.2d at 332. In
O'Kane v. Whelan, 124 Cal. 200, 56 P. 880 (1899) (H gives W horse and wagon by
written assignment), there was no such public knowledge, but W had recorded an
inventory listing the assets as her separate property. Such constructive public
knowledge did not prevent H's creditors from seizing the horse and wagon pursuant to § 3440.
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cases involve a purchase by one spouse from the other, by way of
formal bill of sale, of commercial equipment not moved from a
business where both H and W worked 2 99 and an automobile
housed after the transfer in a garage at their home owned by the
purchaser-spouse who permitted the vendor-spouse to use the vehicle. 3 00
2. Transmutations Neither Gifts Nor Sales
Whether a transmutation that does not change the quantum of
ownership of the spouses but merely the nature of ownership and
management powers is a section 3440 "transfer" has yet to be decided. A community-to-joint tenancy transmutation is of this
type. 01 In Allen v. Meyer, 30 2 a business consisting of community
personal property was formally transmuted by a property settlement contract executed by H and W into tenancy in common.
There was no delivery, and H by agreement with W continued to
manage the business as before. A bankruptcy referee held this
was a section 3440 transfer void as to H's creditors. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on an agency theory.3 03
The referee was wrong to apply section 3440 to a transmutation
that involves no change in the quantum of ownership. It is absurd to require delivery and change of possession when community property is converted into joint tenancy property, or vice
versa, because the right of coequal possession by H and W has
not changed. Merely management rights and succession rights
have changed. If such a transmutation harms creditors-and
clearly it can-it should be attacked for actual or constructive
fraud, not on technicalities respecting delivery. Under this approach, post-transmutation creditors will seldom be able to object
299. Ross v. Thomas, 24 Cal. App. 734, 142 P. 102 (1914). See also Pfunder v.
Goodwin, 83 Cal. App. 551, 257 P. 119 (1927) (gift transmutation of tractor from

community to W's separate property by writing tractor remained at residence of
H and W, and H continued to use it).
300. Blaney v. Cline, 53 Cal. App. 686, 200 P. 751 (1921).
301. So is the converse joint-tenancy-to-community, but it will always benefit
creditors unless the community property falls under some special exception to
CAL. Cry. CODE §§ 5116, 5122 (West Supp. 1980) (e.g., if the assets become community property in a single spouse business and CAT. Civ. CODE § 5125(d) (West
Supp. 1980) is construed as creating an exception to §§ 5116 and 5122).
302. 195 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1952).
303. Specifically that because W had appointed H to manage her tenancy in
common half of the business, he entered into business-related contracts as her
agent and bound her as principal.

to the transaction. However, if at the time of a community-tojoint-tenancy transmutation one of the spouses is heavily in debt,
on obligations not for "necessaries," and the other is not, the arrangement, which would, if effective, cut in half the amount of
property the creditors could reach smells of actual fraud. Section
7 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act (Uniform Act) pro30 4
vides a remedy for both existing and subsequent creditors.
Where there is no actual fraud, but the transmutation renders
the debtor-spouse insolvent, no remedy is provided by the Uniform Act 30 5 because of adequate consideration. 06 However, one
federal case construed California case law as giving relief to existing creditors. In Wikes v. Smith,30 7 H and W divided $2,000 of
community funds into portions of $1,000 for each spouse, and each
deposited his portion in a bank account in his name. Without specifically deciding whether this was a transmutation of community
funds into equal parts of separate property or an arrangement
shifting management power over community property, 308 the
court held there had been a "transfer" that H's creditors could attack. Any agreement between H and W to transmute to separate
property or otherwise defeat creditors "came too late to affect the
rights of creditors of Gerald [H], since all such creditors extended credit while the property retained its community status."309 Reliance was placed on cases holding that conversion by
court decree at divorce of community property into equal shares
304. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.07 (West 1970) provides: "Every conveyance made
and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors, is
fraudulent as to both present and future creditors."
305. CAL. Cirv. CoDE § 3439.04 (West 1970) is the statute dealing with constructive fraud based on transfers creating insolvency. It provides: "Every conveyance
made ... by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent
as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made...
without a fair consideration."
306. CAL. CEv. CODE § 3439.03 (West 1970) provides: "Fair consideration is given
for property . .. when in exchange for such property ... as a fair equivalent
therefor, and in good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied." Obviously, insofar as a community-to-joint tenancy transmutation is construed as debtor H conveying anything to W, she conveys to him in consideration
something of equal value.
307. 465 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1972).
308. Under Financial Code provisions similar to those now in effect, see text accompanying notes 183-87 supra, W's depositing $1,000 of her funds in the bark account gave her sole control. It was assumed by the Wikes court th z the
managerial system of liability meant that unless the transfer could be voided, H's
creditor could not reach community funds in W's bank account notwithstanding
that the Financial Code provisions gave the depositor spouse control free from interference by all persons "except creditors." As indicated above, see text accompanying note 186 supra, I believe this interpretation of the Financial Code
provision is erroneous.
309. 465 F.2d at 1146.
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of separate property does not bar a creditor seizing assets now
owned by the nondebtor spouse by tracing to former community
310
status.
Section 3440 should also be held inapplicable to transmutations
intended to act in futuro and which are not technically gifts because the object of the transmutation does not now exist. For example, an "agreement" by H that all of his future inheritances
would be community property or that all of W's future earnings
will be her separate property may involve in some sense "transfers" of personal property. However, the transferor is not in possession of the assets at issue at the time of the agreement, and if
this is considered the time of "transfer" then section 3440 does
not apply.31 1 If the transfer is viewed as delayed until the property subject to the transmutation agreement comes into existence, there may be a few cases where the transferor has a
possession of which to divest himself. That is unlikely in the case
of converting inheritances into community property or converting
one spouse's earnings into her own separate estate. However, an
unusual transmutation contract wherein H agreed his own earnings would be W's separate property might trigger section 3440
delivery problems. They are avoided if W's ownership is viewed
as relating back to the time of the original agreement so that no
property interest of H's, that he might "transfer", ever attached to
the earnings.
B.

Transmutationsand the Problem of Insolvency

Whether a transmutation can be avoided by creditors for constructive fraud under section 4 of the Uniform Act because it
causes insolvency 12 will often depend on when the transmutation
310. See text accompanying notes 248-62 supra.
311. See text at note 295 supra.
312. See note 305 supra. Insolvency is defined in CAT_ CiV. CODE § 3439.02

(West 1970). The transferor may be technically "in the black" after the transfer
but still is insolvent under the Uniform Act if unable to meet debts that are likely
to come due in the future, including contingent obligations. See Albertson v.
Raboff, 185 Cal. App. 2d 372, 8 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1960); Baker v. Geist, 457 Pa. 73, 321
A.2d 634 (1974) (applying identically-worded Pennsylvania version of Uniform
Act). See also pre-Act California law, accord Alpha Hardware & Supply Co. v.
Ruby Mines Co., 97 Cal. App. 508, 275 P. 984 (1929); Borgfelt v. Curry, 25 Cal. App.
624, 144 P. 976 (1914).
An interesting problem exists as to whether H's "necessaries" creditors should
be considered in assessing his insolvency if W has adequate separate property to
pay them in full. The way the statute is worded, apparently the amount of those

is considered to have occurred. As indicated above, there are several types of transmutation where the agreement between H and
W is made before the asset subject to it comes into existence.
1. Antenuptial Contracts
California Civil Code section 5134 provides that parties anticipating marriage may make "marriage settlements." 313 Section
5135 provides that insofar as such contracts have "granted or affected" real property, they must be recorded in the county where
such realty is located. 314 The implication of this is that with respect to assets other than real property, third parties are bound
even if the contract is not recorded.
The inclusion of these statutes at the end of title 8 of the Family
Law Act-which includes the sections defining community and
separate property and the liability of each to creditors-implies
that such a contract is a means for varying the statutory rules
that would otherwise attach to a marriage. A typical "marriage
settlement" is an agreement to live separate in property. By permitting such a contract, section 5134 creates a situation whereby a
community of property never exists between the spouses. Thus
when after marriage W labors at her job and is paid wages, they
are at all times hers. The alternative construction is that the community property statutes, such as section 5110,315 attach to W's
wages and then the antenuptial contract immediately converts
the coownership between H and W to the sole ownership of W.
The first interpretation is preferable. Under that interpretation, a
creditor of insolvent H unable to reach W's separate property
could not object to characterization of the earnings as W's separate property on grounds H was already or was thereby rendered
insolvent. Under the alternative view, there is a transfer at the
time W is paid which is constructively fraudulent under section 4
of the Uniform Act. 3 16
Suppose the antenuptial agreement provides that all H's future
inheritances will be community property rather than separate
obligations would be included. Certainly they ought to be to the extent such cred-

itors in fact seize community and H's separate property before all of H's "ordinary" creditors are paid. Why, however, should the law permit such "necessaries"
creditors to set aside a transfer made by H to a third party when W, who benefited
from the incurring of a family expense on credit, has separate funds that could be
reached?
313. CA. CMy. CODE § 5134 (West 1970).
314. Id. § 5135.
315. Id. § 5110 (West Supp. 1980).
316. Id. § 3439.04 (West 1970). Cf. Barnes v. Rosen, 359 So.2d 1133 (La. App.
1978) (effect on agreement to live separate in property on W's liability for child
support).
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property but does not contract for a general community. Since
the concept of H's separate property does exist in such marriage,
it is a bit easier to characterize the contract as operating at the
time of inheritance to make a transfer from H's separate estate to
community property.3' 7 Nevertheless, since the proper construction of the agreement to live separate in property is that California Civil Code section 5110 (creating a community) never applied
at all to the marriage, symmetry suggests viewing the communityinheritance clause as restraining from the outset of the operation
of Civil Code section 5108318 (which would have made H's inheritance his separate estate) so that it never applied to inheritances
(although it did apply to gifts and property owned by H before
marriage).319 Thus, under this interpretation the property would
never be separate with a transfer to community, but would be
community from the moment of the inheritance.
With respect to creditors existing at the time of making of the
antenuptial agreement, rather than at the time of an alleged subsequent "transfer", the agreement to live separate in property
should not be constructively fraudulent. The debtor spouse simply changes his status from single to married with the creditor
having the same rights as existed before the change of status. Of
course actual fraud might be proved to give the creditor relief
under section 7 of the Uniform Act.32o
2.

Postnuptial Transmutations

With respect to a postnuptial transmutation, in many instances
the analysis as to when-for purposes of determining if a transfer
was by an insolvent or rendered the transferor insolvent-the
transmutation is effective is the same as with an antenuptial
agreement. Thus, an agreement shortly after marriage by H that
future inheritances would be community property should be
317. This would seldom hurt creditors, but it is possible that H in order to assure that funds he borrowed would be his separate property (see note 172 supra),
persuaded a lender to agree to look to H's separate estate alone for repayment.
318. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5108 (West 1970).
319. Cf. Aufdemkamp v. Pierce, 4 Cal. App. 2d 276, 40 P.2d 599 (1935), where by

antenuptial contract H agreed to convert some of his separate property to W's separate property. He did so after the marriage. The court found "relation back" to
the extent that W's agreement to marry H was consideration for the transfer.
320. CAI- Cirv. CODE § 3439.07 (West 1970). If unmarried H had somehow obtained a loan from a creditor who agreed to look solely to his separate property in
the event of H's marriage, the agreement to make his future inheritances community seems patently fraudulent under § 7 of the Uniform Act.

viewed as expanding the scope of the community applicable to
the marriage at the time H makes his declaration just as an antenuptial declaration would take effect at marriage. A postnuptial
agreement by H and W that both would thereafter live separate
in property should be viewed as eliminating the community from
their marriage at that moment. Accordingly, when one of the
spouses later is paid earnings during marriage, they are his or her
separate property ab initio; community status does not attach to
the earnings, to be eo instante converted into separate property
by a transfer, possibly fraudulent, from the nonearning spouse of
his or her community half interest.
3. Tax Cases as Precedent
Before nationwide income splitting for federal income tax purposes was authorized in 1948, several decisions tested whether
splitting could be obtained by a transmutation or whether the
right to split was lost. The outcome depended on whether an interspousal agreement affecting future acquisitions was immediately executed or whether a transfer occurred later each time an
affected asset was acquired. The results seem inconsistent, unless an approach generally favorable to the tax collector is a
thread of consistency.
Where the transmutation sought to divide ownership of future
acquisitions, it was treated as executory so that a transfer occurred each time affected property was obtained. Thus, in Lucas
v. Earl,321 Californians H and W made a pre-1927 agreement that

their future onerous acquisitions would be co-owned in joint tenancy rather than so-called community property, which pre-1927
meant they were the acquiring spouse's separate property. According to the United States Supreme Court, when H subsequently had earnings, California law of so-called community
property first attached to the earnings to make them H's alone so
that he became liable for the full income tax. Then the transmutation agreement operated on the earnings, converting them into
joint tenancy property by way of assignment from H to W of a
half interest.322 Commissioner v. Harmon,323 involved Oklahoma
321. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
322. The Lucas court did not discuss the disturbing gift tax implications. As to
them, see Rev. Rul. 77-359, 1977-2 C.B. 24. The spouses--they were from Washington, although that makes no difference to the applicability of the ruling in other
states-contracted that all future inheritances and gifts received by either would
be community property. The Internal Revenue Service said there would be a taxable gift (as to half the value) each time H or W received a gift or inheritance, and
it could be reduced for gift tax liability purposes only to the extent the other
spouse also received an inheritance or gift during the same calendar quarter.
Thus, if H inherited $1 million in December 1980 and W inherited $1 million in Jan-
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spouses at a time that state had a statutory community of prop-

erty regime that was optional; spouses who did not affirmatively
elect to come under the regime lived separate in property.324 The
election of H and W to live in a community of property was
treated like the agreement in Lucas v. Earl causing an assignment of income every time one of the spouses received a pay
check.
On the other hand, where the agreement was to live separate in

property rather than under California's post-1927 community of
property regime, at least for income tax purposes, the agreement
is viewed as fully executed when made. Under two Ninth Circuit
decisions, earnings are viewed as separate property from the moment of acquisition, and no assignment of a half interest by the
non-earning spouse is hypothesized.3X 5 Clearly, these holdings
cannot be squared with the tax treatment of agreements to make
community that which would otherwise be separate.
The Ninth Circuit approach is far more logical than Lucas and
Harmon and avoids a host of problems in giving effect to the intention of the spouses. For example, if the logic of Lucas and
Harmon is applied, California spouses would dare not separate
amicably with any semblance of an "agreement" to live apart.
The courts could construe any such agreement as the spouse's
opting to make Civil Code section 5118326 applicable. If H earned
uary 1981, their transmutation agreement has the disastrous effect of creating
transfers subject to gift taxes totalling $1 million, although there is no change in

the quantum of ownership of property between them (everything is still 50-50). It
seems the clearest malpractice for counsel to recommend such an agreement for
spouses who both expect to inherit substantial sums.
323. 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
324. A somewhat similar state of the law obtains today in many civil law jurisdictions. In Quebec, the legal regime is a form of deferred community (separate
until dissolution) unless the spouses by agreement elect the community of movables and gains or a regime of separation of property. QuE. Crv. CODE arts. 1266 et
seq. (legal regime); 1270 et seq. (community of movables and gains); 1436 et seq.
(separation of property) (Y. Renaud & J. Baudoin eds. 1974). In France, the
spouses have a choice of six statutorily-defined conventional regimes ranging from
separation of property to a universal community, the legal regime being a deferred
community. C. Crv. arts. 1400-91 (legal regime); 1498 et seq. (details of six other
regimes) (Dalloz 1977-78).
325. See, e.g., Sparkman v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1940); Helvering
v. Hickman, 70 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1934). Both cases upheld the non-earning
spouse's claim of no income tax liability. However, because of progressive tax
rates, the overall effect is beneficial to the IR.S. where the spouses cannot agree
on the filing of a joint return.
326. CAL CIrV. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1980).

$40,000 while separated from W, Harmon would treat W as assigning half of it to him under their agreement to live separate
and apart; she would have to report $20,000 of this income on her
separate return. One can imagine California lawyers instructing
spouses on how to effectuate a violent separation that could not
be construed by the I.R.S. and federal courts as involving any
agreement. 327
C. Formalitiesof Transfer and the Effect on Creditorsand Other
Third Parties
The rules permitting spouses to transmute real property without a signed writing and to effectuate transmutations without either consideration or delivery could reasonably have been
confined to disputes between the spouses themselves, not affecting third parties. The same is true of the doctrine dispensing with
the Parol Evidence Rule in husband-wife disputes and permitting
community ownership to be established where a deed recites a
joint tenancy. However, the law has developed to the contrary.
Perhaps it is not surprising that a creditor of H or W should be
able to prove the "true" state of property ownership and not be
defeated by the spouse's invoking formalities of transfer that do
not apply to transactions between them. But to permit the
spouses to impeach through transmutation theory unambiguous
record "title" in order to defeat creditors' claims can be viewed as
abuse of the doctrine of "easy transmutation."
1. Creditors Using the Doctrine Against the Spouses
One of the earliest cases inviting creditors to impeach formal
"record" title was Hurlburtv. Jones.328 The wife had filed and recorded a formal declaration making her a sole trader and her income from her trade her separate property. 329 A creditor of H
sought to reach earnings of this business on the theory they were
really community property. The court said such creditor would
prevail if the evidence showed W only nominally engaged in the
business, "it being understood between them [H and W] that all
327. For tax purposes the ideal form of separation would be found in Patillo v.
Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976) (putative wife ordered from
family home at gunpoint). If the parting is extremely amicable, it may not qualify
as a § 5118 separation at all (and income will still be community) according to the
analysis of In re Marriage of Baragry, 73 Cal. App. 3d 444, 140 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1977),
discussedin Comment, Living Separateand Apart Under Section 5118 of the Family Law Act-Effects and Implications of the Baragry Decision, 6 W. ST. U.L. REV.
183, 193 (1979).
328. 25 Cal. 225 (1864).
329. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra and 377-83 infra.
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profits should belong to him as between them ....

"330

3

More recently, in Hansford v. Lassar, 31 H's creditor sought to
levy on the entire interest of the spouses in land which had been
conveyed to them by deed reciting a joint tenancy. Creditor contended that the property was really community and that all rather
than just debtor H's half would be liable. Creditor prevailed by
establishing that the spouses did not know the difference between

community property and joint tenancy and thus could not have
transmuted from community to joint tenancy the funds used to
buy the land. Similarly, in Hulse v. Lawson,332 H's creditor impeached a joint tenancy deed by showing community funds were
used for the purchase and there had been no actual agreement to
transmute. In Tinsley v. Bauer, 3 3 W had established a joint tenancy bank account, but her creditor was able to reach all of the
funds in it rather than just her half by tracing deposits to W's
community earnings and showing there had been no transmutation.
2. Spouses Using the Doctrine Against Creditors
The tables were turned against the creditor in Oak Knoll Broad330. 25 Cal. at 228 (dictum). By "belong[ing] to him" the court means the income would be pre-1927 "community" property.
See also Gray v. Perlis, 76 Cal. App. 511, 245 P. 218 (1926). The wife had been
adjudged a sole trader in 1916. Husband's trustee in bankruptcy sought to reach
the assets of her business on the ground that the sole-tradership was a sham. It
was held this raised an issue of fact for the trial court (which ruled against the
trustee).
331. 53 Cal. App. 3d 364, 125 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1975). A similar ploy by the creditor
was permitted in In re Rauer's Collection Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 248, 196 P.2d 803
(1948), but the court concluded the spouses did intend a joint tenancy. See also
Springer v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 782 (CCH 1977). The spouses executed a formal marriage contract providing that a particular business and the profits therefrom would be W's separate property. The LR.S. successfully asserted that H was
taxable on half the profits of the business not on an assignment of income theory
but on the theory that "treatment" by H and W of the business as a community
business had superceded the written contract.
332. 212 Cal. 614, 299 P. 525 (1931). Accord, Schoenfeld v. Norberg, 11 Cal. App.
3d 755, 90 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1970).
333. 125 Cal. App. 2d 724, 271 P.2d 116 (1954). See also Lovetro v. Steers, 234 Cal.
App. 2d 461, 44 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1965). The spouses owned a promissory note which
on its face stated the form of ownership to be joint tenancy. The husband released
the promisor. That release affected the entire debt if the note were actually community property but could not bind W's half interest if it were owned in joint tenancy. The promisor was permitted to impeach the "title" by showing that the
spouses never agreed to transmute the community assets given in exchange for
the note to joint tenancy property.

casting Corp. v. Hudgings.3 3 4 W's creditor levied on a joint tenancy bank account, seeking to seize W's half interest. H resisted
the levy on the theory the funds in the account were actually
community property, his earnings at that time not liable for W's
ordinary debts, those debts not for "necessaries". The spouses
testified they didn't know what joint tenancy was, and so the
holding was no transmutation had occurred and creditor's levy
caught nothing.
H's creditors were also defeated in Spear v. Farwell,33 5 when
they levied on a bank account nominally held in joint tenancy in
order to reach H's half interest. Intervening, W testified funds in
the account were her separate property and that, although she deliberately chose the joint tenancy designation for the account, all
she intended was that H would get the money at her death. The
court found a mistake of law and further found that H's creditor
in extending credit had not relied on H's owning a half interest in
the account. Creditor's judgment lien did not reach any of the
funds because
[tlhe interest which the lien of judgment affects is the actual interest
which the debtor has in the property, and a court of equity will always
permit the real owner to show that the apparent ownership of another is
exor was not real; and when the judgment debtor has no other interest
336
cept the naked legal title, the lien of judgment does not attach.

In two other cases, title was in H's name, but when his creditor
sought to levy on it, W successfully objected that she had sup33
plied separate property consideration and had not made a gift. 7
334. 275 Cal. App. 2d 563, 80 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
335. 5 Cal. App. 2d 111, 42 P.2d 391 (1935).
336. Id. at 114.
337. Murphy v. Clayton, 113 Cal. 153, 45 P. 267 (1896); Owings v. Laugharn, 53
Cal. App. 2d 789, 128 P.2d 114 (1942). In both cases the finding of no transmutation
was bolstered by the English common law doctrine of purchase money resulting
trust.
Section 853 of the California Civil Code recites a general presumption of resulting trust where the title in a deed of realty is not the same source as the funds
paid in consideration. CAL Crv. CODE § 853 (West 1954). However, the statute has
been construed in a discriminatory manner applicable where W was the party directing title be placed in H's name (see, e.g., Socol v. King, 36 Cal. 2d 342, 223 P.2d
627 (1950); Shaw v. Bernal, 163 Cal. 262, 124 P. 1012 (1912); McKinnon v. McKinnon,
181 Cal. App. 2d 97, 5 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1960)) but inapplicable, with a presumption of
gift arising instead, where H had title put in W's name (see, e.g., Altramano v.
Swan, 20 Cal. 2d 622, 128 P.2d 353 (1942); Estate of Claussenius, 90 Cal. App. 2d 600,
216 P.2d 485 (1950)). So construed § 853 is clearly unconstitutional because of indefensible sex discrimination. See note 76 supra. The obvious "cure" is to apply it
according to its terms without creating an exception where H is the acting party.
Yet, the recent cases strongly indicate that the state supreme court will cure by
the other alternative: excepting from the statute all interspousal transactions and
presuming a gift in such cases. See In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d
285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980) (down payment on house paid by W with separate
funds; title taken in joint tenancy; gift presumed).
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In other cases where the spouses have sought to impeach record
title to defeat creditorsthe trier of fact has not been convinced, 338
but no such case had held that a creditor could rely on record title
or apparent ownership under the statutes defining community
39
and separate property.
A third party's reliance on apparent title was frustrated in
Diefendorff v. Hopkins.34 W was operating a boarding house but
was not a registered sole trader. From the profits of that operation W had purchased various furnishings. To raise money she
sought to sell the furnishings to the plaintiff, who would then
lease them to her. On advice of counsel, plaintiff requested that
the bill of sale for the furniture be signed by H and name him as
vendor, the proper form if the wife's business were community
property. Later, W's creditors seized the furniture, and plaintiffs
338. See Snell v. Telehala, 274 Cal. App. 2d 61, 78 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1969). Husband's creditor levied on property held in joint tenancy; the court considered a
"fabrication" W's testimony that in fact H had transmuted the community funds
used to buy the property to W's separate property and that the spouses intended
it to be her separate property. See also O'Callaghan v. People, 165 Cal. App. 2d
358, 332 P.2d 170 (1958) (W's attempt to defeat H's creditor by establishing property held in joint tenancy was her separate property); Tinsley v. Bauer, 125 Cal.
App. 2d 724, 271 P.2d 116 (1954) (H's attempt to defeat W's creditor by establishing
funds in joint tenancy bank account where his community earnings not then liable
to her creditors).
339. However, one decision indicates that the attack on title by the spouses to
defeat the creditor must be made at or prior to the time of levy. In Pepin v. Stricklin, 114 Cal. App. 32, 299 P. 557 (1931), H's creditor levied on H's half interest in
land held under a deed reciting joint tenancy. An execution sale was conducted
and the creditor purchased H's interest. W then asserted the land was her separate property because her separate funds had been used to buy the land and she
had not intended a transmutation by the use of a joint tenancy title. The court
held that by purchasing at the sale the creditor had become a bona fide purchaser
for value entitled to rely on the actual title (i.e., he had changed his position in
reliance on the title of record and W was estopped from asserting her separate
property claim).
The entering into a contract of purchase, even though no money has yet
changed hands, ought to be sufficient action in reliance on record title to protect a
third party. Thus, in Jeffers v. Martinez, 93 N.M. 508, 601 P.2d 1204 (Ct. App. 1979),
W had record "title" to realty with the date of the instrument showing she owned
it before marriage. By an unrecorded instrument she had transmuted the land to
community property. She alone contracted to sell the property, and then the
spouses tried to resist specific performance on the basis of New Mexico's
equivalent of CAL. CrV. CODE § 5127 (West Supp. 1980), which required H to join in
the contract of sale. The court held the spouses bound by the record title unless
W's vendees knew of the transmutation. The court did not indicate whether the
buyers actually knew that title was in W's name alone and relied thereon in entering into the contract.
340. 95 Cal. 343, 30 P. 542 (1892).

suit to establish his lessor's interest was unsuccessful. It was
held the business and hence the furniture were at the time of the
sale to plaintiff W's separate property because H had relinquished his community interest through a "course of conduct."
Thus the bill of sale should have been signed by W.
3. Alleviating the Problem by Recognizing Community
Property with Right of Survivorship
The foregoing survey of cases reveals that most of the cases
where transmutation principles have interacted with creditor
rights involve one or both spouses investing community wealth
under a document of title that recites a joint tenancy. This is particularly common in the case of purchase of a family residence.34 '
Apparently real estate brokers and financial institutions are recommending this form of title; at least on some basis one or both
of the spouses comes to believe there will be savings in money
and paperwork at dissolution of marriage by death where the decedent's half ownership passes to the other spouse by survivorship rather than will or intestate succession. 4 2
Confusion concerning the legal effect of deeds with joint tenancy recitals taken in such circumstances necessarily results because what the spouses actually want, a right of survivorship
affixed to community property, the California courts have said
they cannot have.34 3 At least they cannot do so merely by way of
a joint tenancy or right of survivorship recital in a deed of property purchased with community funds.3 44
341. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 616 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr.
853 (1980), and numerous cases there analyzed.
342. See Blankenship v. Blankenship, 212 Cal. App. 2d 736, 28 Cal. Rptr. 176

(1963); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 147 Cal. App. 2d 521, 305 P.2d 289 (1957); Griffith, Community Property in Joint Tenancy Form, 14 STAN. L. REV. 87, 87-91 (1961); Mills,
Community Joint Tenancy: A ParadoxicalProblem in Estate Administration, 49
CAL. ST. B.J. 38, 40 (1974) (eighty-five percent of deeds to married grantees recite
joint tenancy). See also Tenhet v. Boswell, 18 Cal. 3d 150, 158 n.5, 554 P.2d 330, 335
n.5, 133 Cal. Rptr. 10, 15 n.5 (1976) (joint tenancy form of deed remains very popular.
343. See, e.g., Siberell v. Sibereli, 214 Cal. 767, 773, 7 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1932), stating "[F~rom the very nature of the estate,. . . a community estate and a joint tenancy cannot exist at the same time in the same property." Tomaier v. Tomaier, 223
Cal. 2d 754, 757, 146 P.2d 905, 906-07 (1944); Watson v. Peyton, 10 Cal. 2d 156, 73 P.2d
906 (1937). Accord, Gloden v. Gloden, 240 Cal. App. 2d 465, 471, 49 Cal. Rptr. 659,
663 (1966); Walker v. Walker, 108 Cal. App. 2d 605, 239 P.2d 106 (1952).
344. No reported case has yet arisen where the spouses supported a joint tenancy deed with a contract providing that the property would indeed be joint tenancy property with right of survivorship but that the co-owners agreed to equal
management over the entire property and agreed that the creditors of each could
reach the entire property. Certainly such a contract would be enforceable (not
contrary to public policy) and also would likely be found to confer third party beneficiary rights on creditors. See Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1980), arising
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Legislation specifically authorizing the affixing of a right of survivorship to community ownership has been previously suggested.345 It remains a sound idea. It is senseless that the law
should defeat the intentions of the parties that are not against
public policy and can, in fact, be achieved by more complex legal
devices-than the parties have yet used.3 46
What is needed is not just legislation permitting a right of survivorship attached to community property but also setting forth
rules of construction of deeds and other instruments that would
eliminate much of the presently generated litigation over what
was intended by the instrument referring either to joint tenancy
or to a right of survivorship. Without such qualification, the proposed statute would simply multiply the amount of such litigation
by creating a new question: whether the recital evidences intent
for a true joint tenancy or a commtmity of property with survivorship.
Real estate brokers and lending institutions can be expected to
continue to encourage use of joint tenancy form deeds by spouses
who have no intent to transmute community property to true
joint tenancy, but rather are looking for some savings in
paperwork and possibly in money through a right of survivorship.
Therefore, the proposed statute should create a presumption that
a recital of joint tenancy in any form,34 7 in a deed or other instrument conveying property purchased in whole or in part with community funds, does not transmute the property into joint tenancy
property but merely affixes to the community ownership a right of
survivorship.34 8 The recital should be ineffective unless the deed
under Maine's equitable distribution system (a form of deferred community). H
used separate funds to acquire property and had title placed in joint tenancy. At
divorce the property was treated as marital property (deferred community property), notwithstanding the survivorship feature H had created, and thus was subject to equitable division.
Community ownership coupled with mutual wills executed pursuant to a written contract to will would not achieve what the parties desire, even if the contract
provided for unilateral withdrawal by either spouse (similar to the right of severance of a joint tenancy), because at least the informal probate adminstrative proceedings under the Community Property Set-Aside Law, enacted in 1974-75, would
be required. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 202 (West Supp. 1980).
345. See Mills, supra note 342; Griffith, supra note 342.
346. See note 344 supra.
347. E.g., "to H and W as joint tenants"; "to H and W as joint tenants with right
of survivorship"; "to H and W in joint tenancy"; "to H and W in joint tenancy with
right of survivorship."
348. The statute should make clear that this form of ownership can be obtained

is executed (or ratified in writing) by the spouse who at his or her
death will have lost testamentary power because of the instrument. 349 A requirement that the recital is ineffective unless both
grantee spouses execute the deed or other writing adopting the
deed would be a reasonable alternative.
The statute should also provide that where community funds
are used to purchase property, a true joint tenancy (arising by
way of transmutation from community to separate property) will
be formed only if the instrument negates community ownership,35 0 and if it (or some other writing adopting or ratifying it) is
executed by both spouses. 351 Where the language of the instrument, executed or ratified in writing by the necessary spouse(s),
is unambiguous--i.e., there is either a mere survivorship or joint
tenancy recital or there is a joint tenancy recital coupled with a
negation of community ownership-it should be conclusive not
only in favor of third parties, 352 but between the spouses themselves.3 5 3 No subsequent oral transmutation should be recognized either to defeat creditors who assert the community status
by any language showing such an intention, such as: "to H and W as community
property with right of survivorship."
349. Since the purpose of the requirement is to prevent fraudulent claims and
reduce litigation, execution of any writing adopting the joint tenancy recital
should suffice.
350. E.g., "to H and W as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as
community property."
351. Since the transmutation to joint tenancy has immediate effects of cutting
management and control in half rather than merely the postponed effect of a testamentary substitute when one community owner dies, both spouses are at once affected by the instrument and proof is needed that both have agreed to it.
352. See Griffith, supra note 342, at 106.
Concededly the proposed statute gives creditors more protection in the marital
property transmutation context than they have against other types of claims resting in parol under which the debtor's record title is impeached. There is considerable authority that a third party can successfully resist levy of execution on
property held in the debtor's name by proof (not in writing) establishing a constructive or resulting trust. See V. A. ScoTr, TRusTs § 462.5 (3d ed. 1967) (constructive trust); 90 CJ.S. Tnwts, § 185 (1955) (constructive and resulting trusts);
McGee v. Allen, 7 Cal. 2d 468, 60 P.2d 1026 (1936); Murphy v. Clayton, 113 Cal. 153,
45 P. 267 (1896); Breeze v. Brooks, 97 Cal. 72, 31 P. 742 (1892) (debtor's brother
defeats levy under theory of purchase-money resulting trust); Richion v. Mahoney,
62 Cal. App. 3d 604, 133 CaL Rptr. 262 (1976); Wheeler v. Trefftzs, 228 Cal. App. 2d
271, 39 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1964); Bank of Cottonwood v. Henriques, 91 Cal. App. 88, 266
P. 836 (1928).
Husband-wife transmutation cases can be distinguished from constructive and
resulting trusts arising outside the context of the marriage relation. There would
seem clearly to be less opportunity for and likelihood of a fraud on creditors when
the third party who claims an equitable title is not married to the debtor. The
third party may well be adverse to the debtor spouse. In any event, it will be an
unusual case where the debtor spouse will continue the same degree of use and
enjoyment of the preserved asset when the successful claimant is a third party as
he does when the claimant is his spouse.
353. See Mills, supra note 342, at 89.
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of the property or a surviving spouse asserting a right of survivorship. Where the instrument negates community ownership, a
creditor should not be permitted to prove either a subsequent
oral transmutation to community property status or that in signing the instrument the spouses really did not intend the transmutation stated on its face.
Finally, the statute should be drafted so that a contemporaneous understanding between the spouses existing at the time title
is taken with a joint tenancy recital that some other form of ownership is intended is unenforceable as against third parties and
preferably between the spouses themselves. That is, California's
new "soft" version of the Parol Evidence Rule should not apply to
instruments of title governed by the new statute.35 4 The statute
should also address the issue of how a severance destroying the
right of survivorship can be achieved. Analogous legislation in
Washington 3 55 and apparently Idaho356 aimed at avoidance of pro354. This California invention permits extrinsic evidence to be received even
where no ambiguity appears on the face of the instrument if it is urged such evidence will establish an ambiguity. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas
Drayage & Rigging Co., Inc., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968). Cf.
Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 17 Cal. 3d 500, 551 P.2d 1213, 131 Cal. Rptr.
381 (1976) (California Supreme Court concedes it has "modified" the common law
parol evidence rule by case law). The case law has yet to resolve whether a court
is to hold that an ambiguity is created by extrinsic evidence which reveals simply
that the parties to the agreement had an understanding contrary to the normal
meaning of the language of the instrument.
The proposed statute should be drafted so that the written agreements made
pursuant to it are not subject to CA.. CirV. CODE § 1698 (West Supp. 1980). Section
1698 authorizes an oral modification of a written contract if the modification is "executed." As noted herein, California courts are quick to find execution of transmutation agreements, usually requiring nothing other than the recitation of a change
of status of property. See text accompanying notes 21-60 supra. One question still
unsettled is whether § 1698 applies to a contract that includes a clause expressly
stating that all modifications and rescissions must be in writing. Hopefully, it is
not against public policy for parties to waive § 1698's authority to modify contracts
orally. The type of clause proposed would increase certainty in commercial dealings. The argument could be made, however, that the clause requiring a written
modification could itself be eliminated by an "executed" oral agreement to eliminate it. If this modification were "executed," substantive provisions of the agreement could then be modified orally.
355. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.120 (1979). See Cross, The Community Property
Law in Washington, 49 WASH. I REv. 729, 798-802 (1974). The agreement is held to
be automatically "executed" (so that title passes) when one spouse dies. In re
Wittman's Estate, 58 Wash. 2d 841, 365 P.2d 17 (1961). In practice record title is
achieved by filing of the agreement and affidavits (that establish payment of death
taxes, etc.). See Brachtenbach, Community Property Agreements-Many Questions, Few Answers, 37 WAsH. L REV. 469, 478 (1962).
356. See Comment, A First Look at the Community Property Agreement in

bate administration provide for a "community property agreement" with right of survivorship that can be defeated only if the
357
two spouses mutually rescind or modify the agreement.
Apparently, however, the type of survivorship arrangement that
Californians want-or at least the type they are used to-is the
survivorship that can be eliminated by the unilateral act of either
co-owner. Where a true joint tenancy exists, and one of the coowners desires a severance, converting the joint tenancy into tenancy in common, California no longer requires use of a strawman
conveyance. 358 A deed whereby one joint tenant purports to convey an interest to himself causes a severance if that is the intent.359 The statute allowing community property with right of
survivorship should permit any written instrument to terminate
the survivorship but should call for notification of the spouse of
the party terminating the survivorship so that the spouse is aware
of the occasion for providing for succession of his interest by will.
Where the spouses are separated, the only notice that may be
possible could be constructive notice via recordation of the termination instrument.
Income Tax Complications
It is unclear whether the Internal Revenue Service will treat a
community property with right of survivorship as community
property when one spouse dies survived by the other in order to
give the survivor's half interest a stepped-up basis.360 The survivor's interest in the case of a true joint tenancy retains its old basis.361 It is likewise unclear whether the property would be
Idaho, 12 IDAHO L. REv. 41 (1975), opining that IDAHO CODE § 15-6-201 (1979), part
of the Idaho Uniform Probate Code, now authorizes such probate-avoidance agreements. There being no Idaho case law dealing with the device, the commentator
surmises that the considerable Washington case law will be applied.
357. On the present uncertainty in Washington as to whether an unwritten rescission is effective, see In re Wittman's Estate, 58 Wash. 2d 841, 365 P.2d 17 (1961),
and Cross, supra note 355, at 800. The better rule, to avoid litigation and fraud,
would require a written rescission.
358. Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal. App. 3d 524, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1980).
359. Id.
360. See LR.C. § 1014(b) (6). This staute accords the survivor's half interest in
community property the same basis as attaches to the decedent's half interest
(date of death or alternative valuation date fair market value). In inflationary
times this usually means a step "up" for the survivor, but a step "down" is of
course possible.
361. Compare Bordenave v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (attempt to impeach joint tenancy recital in deed for § 1014(b) (6) purposes failed-no
stepped up basis) with United States v. Pierotti, 154 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1946) (even
though surviving wife had treated property held under deed with joint tenancy recital as joint tenancy property to avoid probate she successfully established there
had been no community to joint tenancy transmutation in order to benefit from
the stepped up basis).
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considered joint tenancy property for estate tax purposes under
section 2040 of the Internal Revenue Code. This is of little practical import, however, because the presumption under that section
that the decedent was the owner for estate tax purposes of all of
the property passing to the survivor can probably be overcome by
proof of the community nature of the property before the right of
survivorship was attached.S62

In discussing whether a new form of marital property proposed
for Wisconsin will qualify as community property to get the benefit of stepped-up basis under section 1014(b)(6) of the Internal
Revenue Code, Professor Irish states that it is "legislatively man-

dated joint ownership of marital property" that qualifies it as
community under the Internal Revenue Code.363 However, he
also adds that in the income tax cases arising before nationwide
income-splitting of married persons "an important factor" in determining a wife's half ownership of her husband's earnings, labeled by the jurisdiction as community property, "Was the wife's
testamentary power over one half of the community property."3 6 4

In these early cases, testamentary power was especially significant as a test of her community ownership because she at that
time lacked management power. Since the legislation herein proposed, authorizing attachment of a survivorship feature to California community property, would not alter equal management
principles during the marriage, the early cases would be readily
362. I.R.C. § 2040. Somewhat surprisingly there is apparently no authority indicating whether § 2040 applies to unusual forms of survivorship, such as the joint
life estate with contingent remainder in fee in the survivor. According to the test
formulated by one expert, the section would apply to this form of a survivorship as
well as to community property with a survivorship feature. Maxfield, Some Reflections on the Gift and Estate Taxation of Jointly Held Property, 34 TAx LAw. 47, 4849 (1980), states the test to be whether the surviving co-owner "automatically succeeds" to the deceased co-owner's interest in the property. Compare the situation
of a tenancy in common coupled with the co-owner's having made an enforceable
contract to leave by will all of his or her interest to the survivor. Here succession
is not "automatic." The will must be probated or, if it has not been executed, specific enforcement of the contract must be obtained.
363. Irish, A Common Law State Considers a Shift to Community Property, 5
COMMuNrrY PROP. J. 227, 230 (1978).
364. Id. at 230 n.23 (citing Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1930)). The issue
in such cases was whether the wife had an ownership interest or a mere expectancy. See United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926). That will not be the issue
when the courts must decide whether community 15roperty with right of survivorship is community property or joint tenancy property for purposes of a stepped up
basis. Either characterization would concede a half ownership interest in the surviving spouse.

distinguishable. Moreover, the proposed legislation would leave
each spouse with testamentary power over a half interest in the
property. It is true, the exercise of that power would require both
the making of a severance or otherwise destroying the right of
survivorship plus the making of a will, but testamentary power
would exist.
That is not the case in Washington and Idaho. In those states,
under the community property agreement made by the spouses,
title automatically passes to the surviving spouse. The spouses
have lost the right to unilaterally exercise testamentary power,
since joint action is needed to rescind the survivorship contract.
Surprisingly, apparently only one of several law journal articles
about the community property agreement has considered its effect on the operation of section 1014(b) (6) of the Internal Revenue Code. The commentator, a former Internal Revenue Service
attorney, assumes that Washington community property subject
to a survivorship agreement is still community property for pur365
poses of the stepped-up basis.

Obviously, until there is a definitive ruling on the matter by federal courts or the Internal Revenue Service, counsel should warn
married clients who consider using the statutory scheme for a
community with right of survivorship that there is substantial risk
the property will not be treated as community for stepped-up basis purposes.
4. A Statute of Frauds for Other Transmutations in Order
to Protect Creditors
The policies in favor of a statute barring the spouses from impeaching an unambiguous tenancy deed in order to defeat creditors indicate the need for additional reform covering other types
of transmutations other than those involving joint tenancy. As
has been shown,3 66 creditors have been encountering a ploy
whereby the nondebtor spouse claims that property, either presumptively community or the separate property of the debtor
spouse, is actually the nondebtor spouse's separate property. The
legislature should enact a statute whereby neither spouse, as
against creditors, may impeach any recital in the instrument if
two conditions are met. Impeachment should be prohibited
where the recital in the instrument: 1) supports the charact-riza365. Randall, Community Property Agreemen Joint Tenancies, and Taxes, 10
L. REV. 109, 115-16 (1974). Cf. Griffith, supra note 342, at 98 (it is sufficient that the California statute authorizing the affixing of a survivorship to community property declare that for tax purposes the property is community).
366. See text accompanying notes 334-39 supra.
GONZAGA
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tion asserted by the creditor; and, 2) is inconsistent with the characterization asserted in opposition to the creditor. The statute
should apply at least where the instrument is executed by the
spouse seeking to impeach title.
For example, if the named transferee on the instrument were H
and the date of the instrument of title pre-marriage, these recitals
would support the contention of H's creditor that the property
was H's separate property and would be inconsistent with W's
claim the asset was her separate property by way of subsequent
transmutation. 367 On the other hand, if the date on the instrument naming H as transferee were during marriage, the asset
would be presumptively community. Of course, H could have
purchased the asset with his separate funds and, if W were the
debtor spouse, H would necessarily be able to prove that fact
since it is not inconsistent with the recital in the instrument. If
however, the instrument recited community ownership and H executed the document, the proposed statute would not permit him
to impeach the recital on either the theory that H used separate
funds to make the purchase or the theory that there had been a
post-acquisition unwritten transmutation. 368 If there was a written transmutation agreement executed before the debtor spouse
incurred his obligation, the opportunity for perpetrating fraud on
the creditor is greatly reduced. The written transmutation should
be provable to defeat the creditor's claim, except where the instrument reciting community property was recorded and the subsequent transmutation agreement was not and, in addition, the
creditor was actually aware of the recorded instrument and relied
on it.
The appropriate rule where the nondebtor spouse seeks to impeach a written recital of title in an instrument he has not executed is debatable. Obviously, he must be able to do so if he can
prove he never consented to the recital in the instrument and
such recital is inconsistent with the actual legal classification of
the property at the time the instrument became effective. Where
the instrument at issue has not been executed by the spouse ob367. I do not suggest that the spouse could not prove the date to be inaccurate
or the document a fraud-merely that a subsequent nonwritten transmutation
could not be the basis for the contention.
368. In addition, impeachment should not be permitted under California's
"modified" parol evidence rule or under a purchase money resulting trust theory.
See notes 337 & 354 supra.

jecting to its terms, a third party such as a creditor cannot reason-

ably rely on the recital as being accurate. Accordingly, the statute
under discussion should permit a nonsignatory spouse to impeach the title unless the third party establishes that the spouse
was responsible for the recital appearing in the instrument or
knowingly consented to it.
5.

The Sole Trader Act as Precedent

A statutory scheme enabling third parties engaging in commercial dealings with a married person to rely on documents of record to determine whether the marriage is affected by some
arrangement departing from the ordinary rules as to power to
manage and obligate property would not be wholly new to California. The "Sole Trader Act" of 1852369 the state's first provision for
management by a wife of her own business and business income,
was greatly concerned with providing public notice to third parties who might deal with such a wife or her husband that the ordinary rules of marital property applied (which at that time
classified W's business income as community but gave exclusive
management of it to H) unless sole trader status was established

by a recorded document.
Prior to 1852, legislation had boxed in married women so that
they could not effectively operate a business unless their husbands were present to ratify all transactions. The husband, of
369. 1852 Cal. Stats. ch. 42, at 101. This was one of a series of early statutes by
the state legislature that set about to make California in effect an English common
law marital property jurisdiction, even though the California constitutional convention had, after spirited debate, adopted the civil law's community property system. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. XI, § 14 (defining W's separate property and
directing legislature to pass laws concerning W's rights in "property... held in
common with her husband"); J. BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTON IN SEPTEMBER
AND OCTOBER 1849 at 257-69 (making very clear that the quoted language intended
to retain Mexican marital property law). The legislature's efforts were supported
by some supreme court decisions based on a similar 'reformed" common law approach.
The movement by the legislature and courts in the 19th century to undercut
community property principles and establish a limited 'reformed" style common
law system is well detailed in Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in California'sCommunity Property System; 1849-1975, 24 U.C.L.A. L REV. 1,
8-24 (1976), and briefly reviewed in W. REPPY, supra note 2, at 1-2, 13-17 (1980).
An expert on common law jurisdictions' reform has described California's sole
trader legislation of 1852 as a form of Married Woman's Property Rights Act (i.e.,
an English common law type of reform). Younger, Community Property, Women
and the Law School Curriculum, 48 N.Y.U. L REv. 211, 223 (1973). The approach
seems obviously to have been borrowed from American common law states. Cf.,
e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 41 (Purdon 1965) (a sole trader statute for the wives of
"absent mariners" dating from 1718); Adams v. Knowlton, 22 Cal. 283 (1863) (briefs
of counsel cite as precedent under the California sole trader act cases from Pennsylvania arising under a statute of 1855 much like California's).
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course, had management and control3 70 of what was called community property3 71 including W's earnings.3 72 An 1850 statute had

even given the husband management and control also over W's

separate property!3 7 3 Thus, under the basic managerial system of

creditor's rights, there was no property W could voluntarily utilize

to pay her debts.3 74 She was thus incapable of entering into an
3 76
enforceable contract.
To remedy these absurdities and to give at least married women engaged in business some relief from the oppressive property system fashioned by the early California legislation, the Sole
Trader Act was passed. The Act applied to a married woman who
was in "business' or was a "trader,"3 76 and after amendment to be
370. This was consistent with the civil law of Spain and Mexico. W. DE FUNIAK
& M. VAUGHN, supra note 9, at § 113.
371. Shortly after the Sole Trader Act became effective, it became settled law
that what was called "community property" was not owned in common. Contrary
to Spanish-Mexican law, the state supreme court held that H was the sole owner
and W had merely the expectancy of an heir of H. See, e.g., Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 311 (1860). This development is analyzed in Prager, supra note 16,
at 34-36, and Reppy, supra note 17, at 1055-59 (1975).
372. See Washburn v. Washburn, 9 Cal. 475 (1858). See also Street v. Bertolone,
193 Cal. 751, 754, 226 P. 913, 914 (1924); Martin v. Southern Pac. Co., 130 Cal. 285, 286,
62 P. 515, 515 (1900); Mosesian v. Parker, 44 Cal. App. 2d 544, 112 P.2d 705 (1941).
373. 1849-50 Cal. Stats. ch. 103, § 6, at 254. The husband could not alienate or encumber the wife's property, however, without her consent. The constitutionality of
the statute under the constitutional provision assuring W of ownership of her separate property was never tested in a reported decision. The statute is discussed in
Prager, supra note 16, at 25-27.
374. Applying the English common law, it was held that her pre-marriage contract debts became H's debts when the marriage united them into "one flesh." H
could use property he managed to pay them and, it followed, W's pre-marriage
creditor could seize all such property (which included H's pure separate property
as well as that called "community.") See Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308 (1860)
(California law changed common law so as to exempt H's separate property).
375. Smith v. Greer, 31 Cal. 476 (1866); Maclay v. Love, 25 Cal. 367 (1864).
376. This rather clearly excluded women who were employees of someone else.
To use the act W had to be an independent businesswoman or the boss of the operation. In the 19th century, women in a wide variety of trades utilized the Act.
See Thomas v. Desmond, 63 Cal. 426 (1883) (rooming house); Hurlburt v. Jones, 25
Cal. 225 (1864) ("general ranching business"); Abrams v. Howard, 23 Cal. 388
(1863) ("buying and selling of goods, wares, and merchandise, etc."); Alverson v.
Jones, 10 Cal. 9 (1858) (W in "business of livery-stable keeping, and trading in horses"); Gray v. Perlis, 76 Cal. App. 511, 245 P. 221 (1926) (ladies' tailor shop). One
case, Guttman v. Scannell, 7 Cal. 455, 459 (1857), said the trade or business engaged in by W under the Act had to be "not unsuited to her sex" (although the
statutory language suggested no such a limitation), but indicated a haberdashery
business was not so unsuited.
No reported case concerns a married woman attempting to invoke the Act to
make her wages as a salaried worker her separate property. Undoubtedly it was

discussed below was on the books until repeal in 1980.377 In its initial form it entitled W to file a declaration that she was going to
engage in business as a sole trader. To be effective the declara-

tion had to be proper in form and recorded. 378 Once these formalities were achieved, subsequent income from the venture would

be W's separate property, rather than community, and subject to

her exclusive management. 379 Her creditors could then, of course,

reach it by involuntary process.
understood that the concept of trade or business under the Act was not broad
enough to include the job of serving as an employee of another person or entity.
Thus the Act was of benefit to only a small fraction of married women who earn
income by their labor.
377. CAI. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1811-21 (West 1972), repealed by 1980 Cal. Stats.
ch. 123, § 1.
The repealing act provides that the prior sole trader judgments shall "cease to
have any effect for any purpose" but that "[r]ights acquired prior to the effective
date of this act shall not be affected by the repeal. . ., but such rights shall be
recognized only to the extent they would have been recognized had the repeal not
been made." Id. § 2 (emphasis added). The peculiar nonretroactivity language
underscored was chosen because of the legislature's awareness that the Sole
Trader Act was probably unconstitutional because of discrimination against men
and discrimination against wage-earning wives who were denied the opportunity
to convert their incomes to separate property. The Sole Trader Act could be utilized only by independent entrepreneurs. See note 376 supra. In my view the discrimination against husbands has been unconstitutional since 1951, when wives
got management and control of their own earnings, applying the "middle tier" test
for denials of equal protection which the United States Supreme Court uses in
gender discrimination cases. E.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (alimony for
wives only at divorce held unconstitutional); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The California Supreme Court at one time employed a strict scrutiny test in gender discrimination cases arising under the state
constitution equivalent of the equal protection clause. Arp v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P.2d 849, 138 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1977); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v.
Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (applying what is now CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7). A majority of the court rather clearly abandoned this approach
in Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 601 P.2d 572, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340
(1979) (constitutional to prosecute only the male participant where youth under 18
is seduced in consensual sex notwithstanding immunity of woman), afd, - U.S.
- 101 S.Ct. 1200, 67 L.Ed.2d 437 (1981) (statutory rape law under which men alone
may be criminally liable held not violative of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection). The state supreme court's opinion permits such broad sex discrimination
under the state constitution that there must be doubt as to whether it would invalidate the Sole Trader Act for anti-husband bias. See Recommendation Relating to
Married Women as Sole Traders, 15 CAL. L. REVISION Comm'N REP. 21, 26 (1980)
(Sole Trader Act is "constitutionally suspect").
378. McKune v. McGarvey, 1 Labatt 205 (6th Dist. Ct. (Sacramento) 1857).
379. The 1852 Act also authorized investment of $5,000 of H's property (separate
or "community") in the business, and apparently such investment transmuted
such property to W's separate property. In any event, the Act was construed as
barring H's creditors from reaching such property placed in W's sole trader business unless, at the time of such transfer, H was or was thereby rendered insolvent. Guttman v. Scannell, 7 Cal. 455 (1857). The $5,000 limit on H's separate or
community capital that could be shielded under the Act was repealed by 1862 Cal.
Stats. ch. 121, § 4, at 109, but was restored at the level of $500 in 1872 by enactment
of the recently repealed provision. CAL Cirv. PRoc. CODE § 1814. (1872). See
Thomas v. Desmond, 63 Cal. 426 (1883).
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The great concern of the early cases under the Sole Trader Act

was that it might be used as a device to improperly shield property from a husband's creditors. Apparently out of sympathy for
such creditors, the Act was strictly construed so that minor mistakes or omissions in the wife's declaration papers precluded her
from having sole trader status. 380 To further strengthen the position of H's creditors under the Act, legislation in 1862 changed the
procedure by which W became a sole trader from one of mere registration and recordation to a judicial proceeding in which husband's creditors could become parties and oppose the wife's
request to obtain sole trader status.3 8 ' The 1852 and 1862 versions
of the Sole Trader Act provided for a special index at the office of
the county recorder to list married women who had become sole
traders. 382 Thus, third parties could quickly determine if the unu380. See, e.g., Adams v. Knowlton, 22 Cal. 283 (1863). W's declaration that she
would be a sole trader in operating a restaurant-hotel business neglected to include the statutory language that she would carry on the business "in her own
name"; she was denied the protection of the Act in a suit with H's creditors. Also
holding that in such litigation the burden of proof is on W to prove she properly
registered as a sole trader is Alverson v. Jones, 10 Cal. 9 (1858). Cf. Reading v.
Muller, 31 Cal. 104 (1866) (W's declaration was proper in form but H's creditor prevailed under best evidence rule when W produced merely a copy of the declaration).
That the purpose of such strict construction was to benefit H's creditors is clear
from the cases denying standing to the wife to rely on such defects in defending a
suit alleging W's breach of contract entered into in conducting the business.
Proter v. Gamba, 43 Cal. 105 (1872).
381. W filed a petition in the superior court of the county where she had resided six months. Former CAT. CiV. PRoc. CODE § 1811 (repealed 1980). Notice of
the petition was published. Former CAT. CrV. PROC. CODE § 1812 (repealed 1980).
W's petition had to state the 'Justification" for her application and aver that she
did not seek to defraud, delay, or hinder any creditor of H. Former CAL. Cirv.
PROC. CODE § 1813 (repealed 1980). These averments could be contested by H's
creditors, former CAL. Cirv. Pnoc. CODE § 1815 (repealed 1980), and "the issues of
fact joined, if any, must be tried as in other cases . . . 2' Former CAT. Crv. Pioc.
CODE § 1816 (repealed 1980). Sole trader status attached when judgment for W
was entered, but she had to have it recorded in every county where she did business as a sole trader, former CAI. Civ. Pioc. CODE § 1819 (repealed 1980), if the
judgment were to have effect beyond the county where judgment was rendered.
382. 1852 Cal. Stats. ch. 178, § 2, at 881-82; 1862 Cal. Stats. ch. 121, § 2, at 108. The
1872 revision simply provided that judgment should be "entered" declaring W a
sole trader. Apparently such judgments were not indexed separately from ordinary judgments (e.g., declaring a liability). Inquiry of the county recorders for
San Francisco, Santa Clara, and Los Angeles counties disclosed that special indices for sole trader judgments were not kept. Under that scheme locating a pertinent judgment would have been no easy matter for a person considering
extending credit to H.

sual characterization of W's earnings as separate property would
apply in a given marriage.
No case specifically addresses the question whether a married
woman eligible to become a sole trader could defeat her husband's creditors because of a private contract with H transmuting
her business earnings to separate property. However, the implication of the decisions in favor of H's creditors where W's attempt
to utilize the statutory scheme was abortive 383 is that such a contract, even though not a fraud on creditors because entered into
384
long before H went into debt, would not affect third parties.
Also, where W did mechanically follow all of the procedures of
the Act, but only nominally operated the business, at least one
case held that she should be denied the Act's protection (i.e., her
earnings would be community property reachable by H's creditors). The court found that W and H had agreed to use the sole
trader form "for the mere purpose of shielding their several and
joint earnings against existing and subsequent creditors of the
husband, it being understood between them that all profits would
belong to him as between them .. ."385
So long as the law refuses to raise an estoppel in this type of
situation-i.e., permits H, although not objecting to W's becoming
a sole trader of record, to impeach the official transmutation documentation on the basis of an "understanding" 38 -- this type of limitation on the effect of the recorded transmutation is necessary.
The statute proposed in this article requiring a writing, however,
would operate in a different manner. Both husband and wife
would have to sign the recorded transmutation agreement in order for it to be binding on creditors. This would preclude the situation possible under the Sole Trader Act whereby W set up
official documents converting her earnings to separate property
while H had a different understanding. There should be a system
383. See note 380 supra.
384. On the other hand, a transmutation of W's business to her separate property by private understanding with no attempt to follow the Sole Trader Act procedures would be binding between H and W at dissolution of their marriage, e.g., In
re Marriage of Ashodian, 96 Cal. App. 3d 43, 157 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1979) (involving
such a fact situation but not adverting to the Sole Trader Act), and undoubtedly
during the marriage as well.
385. Hurlburt v. Jones, 25 Cal. 225, 228 (1864).
386. There are several cases where the "understanding" of H and W prevailed
over written documentation of a transmutation. See In re Marriage of Ketscher, 79
Cal. App. 3d 527, 144 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1978) (ordered nonpublished) (declaration of
community status fied with U.S. Bureau of Reclamation). See also Springer v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C. Mem. 782 (CCH 1977) (formal antenuptial agreement to live
separate in property defeated by the joint conduct of a business resulting in profits being held community); Estate of Neilson, 57 Cal. 2d 733, 371 P.2d 745, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1962) (income tax return declaring property to be community).
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available where, if there is no outright fraud, duress, or incapacity, the formal agreement made by spouses is binding on them as
well as creditors and cannot be altered either by some implied
contract, via an "understanding" or "treatment,"38 7 or even by an
3 88
express oral agreement.
CONCLUSION

Considerable reform of California law respecting debt liability
of community and separate property of married persons is
needed. However, no change in underlying theory is warranted.
The managerial system historically used by California is preferable to Arizona's community versus separate debt system or New
Mexico's partitionable community approach.
387. I consider the Springer case an example of what the law should not tolerate. Springer v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. Men 782 (CCH 1977). H and W had a formal written antenuptial agreement to live separate in property. In addition H
deeded all interest in a particular business over to W. But H worked at the business as well as W, and the tax court held that the spouses' working together constituted "treatment" of the business as a community business. Thus, H was liable
for tax on half the gain.
Under the approach I advocate, a secret understanding between H and W that
the gains would be community despite the formal separation of property agreement could not be an instrument for fraud on anyone, creditor or IRS, because it
would even be unenforceable between the spouses.
388. See note 354 supra. Where an agreement between H and W either creates
separate property out of community or provides that certain assets are to remain
separate (e.g., despite any future alleged oral transmutations), the existing "inventory" statutes allow for recordation of the list of items agreed to be separate.
CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 5114-15 (West 1970).
It is unclear whether a spouse's separate interest held in co-tenancy with the
other spouse (either joint tenancy or tenancy in common) is to be listed in such
inventories. In any event, the recordation is of little help to assure the formal
agreement will not be subverted by claims of subsequent informal transmutations
because the inventory is only "prima facie evidence" of the separate character of
the assets listed. CAL CIV. CODE § 5115 (West 1970). In other words, that statute
just shifts from a pro-community to a pro-separate property presumption. Moreover, the inventory statutes are so inartfully drafted as to trap the spouses into a
form of recordation that may not even constitutionally shift the pro-community
presumption, in that the signature on the inventory is, by statute, to be that of the
separate property claimant. Obviously, the important signature to get is that of
the spouse who waives the pro-community presumption, namely the non-owner
spouse. Where only the spouse claiming ownership signs the inventory, there may
be no evidence to suggest it was the result of agreement rather than just some
self-serving recordation secretly filed by the named owner. The latter should have
no legal effect. Spouses utilizing the inventory procedure should both sign the recorded inventory. Meanwhile, the statutes should either be repealed in favor of
the broader type of recording provision recommended by this article or at least
amended so that the signature of the appropriate spouse is the one the statute requires on the inventory.

Legislation is needed to clarify the extent to which California
recognizes exceptions to the managerial system approach. For
example, doubts as to liability to H's creditors of community
funds in W's bank account or community assets in W's section
5125(d) business should be resolved in favor of liability. The
strange anti-deficiency judgment statute, section 5123, should be
repealed.
This writer recommends repeal of section 5120, which shields
the earnings of the non-debtor spouse from liability on the premarriage contract debts of the other spouse. But if this nonliability provision is to be retained, consideration should be given to
extending it to antenuptial tort obligations. Legislation should
clarify the extent to which the non-liable earnings can undergo
change in form and retain nonliability status, as well as whether
rents and profits from such earnings are likewise not liable.
Considerable revision of the law regarding liability to "necessaries" creditors is needed. Here is an area where simplification
seems in order. The "pecking order" approach of section 5132
should be abrogated. On the other hand, case law barriers to reimbursement (such as See v. See) when one separate estate has
paid an unfair amount of the basic family upkeep should be legislatively dismantled. Both H and W should bear equitably the ultimate burden of "family expenses." The "necessaries" doctrine
should also be expanded so that it applies to spouses living apart
"by agreement" unless that agreement waives support. This requires revision of section 5131.
Sections 199, 5127.5 and 5127.6 should be repealed. Ordinary
principles of the managerial system of debt liability should apply
to child support obligations. Reimbursement should be available
when the property interests of the nonparent spouse have been
used to pay such support (or alimony). This means legislative
overruling of Weinberg v. Weinberg.
With respect to separated spouses, additional remedy may be in
order to prevent one or both from applying community funds to
pay "separate" debts.
Where the spouses are divorced and one of them is sued by a
creditor seeking recovery of a debt assigned by the divorce court
to the other spouse, the law should clearly permit the defendant
ex-spouse to assert, to the extent possible, all the defenses and
offsets that the other party liable could assert. A reimbursement
action allowing recovery of both interest and attorney's fees
should be specifically authorized by legislation in favor of the exspouse forced to pay a debt assigned to his or her former mate.
With respect to void and voidable marriages, the civil law rule
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should be adopted by statute. Both a good faith spouse and his or
her creditors should be able to treat the marriage as valid. The
"necessaries" doctrine should also apply in such a case in favor of
those supplying necessities to the good faith spouse and children
of the "marriage."
The legislature should at least consider enacting some statutory
estoppel doctrine so that creditors of Marvinizers can obtain the
benefits the law gives to creditors of lawfully married persons.
Turning, finally, to transmutation, section 3440 must be redrafted so that where there is a written transmutation agreement
between H and W "delivery" is not necessary to make that agreement binding on creditors.
The incidence of transmutation can be greatly decreased by a
statute authorizing attachment of a right of survivorship to community ownership. Unambiguous written instruments executed
in accordance with the statute should not be impeachable on the
grounds of a different oral understanding. An even broader statute is desirable: Any unambiguous title or agreement should not
be subject to impeachment by the spouses seeking to defeat the
claims of creditors. Finally, the spouses themselves need some
device allowing them to make an unambiguous agreement concerning how their property is owned, an agreement they can rely
upon assured that the document cannot be invalidated by some
oral or even implied transmutation.

